- How to refrain from answering Kripke’s puzzle.Lewis Powell - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.details
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Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?Mark Balaguer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):53-78.details
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Three Problems for Richard’s Theory of Belief Ascription.Theodore Sider - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):487 - 513.details
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Fregean versus Kripkean Reference.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):21-44.details
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Specifying Desires.Delia Graff Fara - 2012 - Noûs 47 (2):250-272.details
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Meaning, Reference and Cognitive Significance.Kenneth A. Taylor - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):129-180.details
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The great beetle debate: A study in imagining with names.Stacie Friend - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):183-211.details
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Semantics, pragmatics, and the role of semantic content.Jeffrey C. King & Jason Stanley - 2004 - In Zoltan Gendler Szabo (ed.), Semantics Versus Pragmatics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 111--164.details
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Propositional attitude reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Singular propositions.Greg Fitch - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Platonism in metaphysics.Mark Balaguer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Language of thought hypothesis: State of the art.Murat Aydede - manuscriptdetails
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Propositional attitudes without propositions.Friederike Moltmann - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118.details
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So-labeled neo-fregeanism.Mark Crimmins - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):265 - 279.details
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Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt.Nathan Salmon - 1995 - Noûs 29 (1):1-20.details
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The price of innocent millianism.Stefano Predelli - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):335-356.details
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Forms and objects of thought.Michael W. Pelczar - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):97-122.details
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Why semantic innocence?Graham Oppy - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):445 – 454.details
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Clarification, ellipsis, and the nature of contextual updates in dialogue.Jonathan Ginzburg & Robin Cooper - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (3):297-365.details
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Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):93-118.details
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(1 other version)Fregean senses, modes of presentation, and concepts.Edward N. Zalta - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:335-359.details
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Are concepts mental representations or abstracta?John Sutton - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):89-108.details
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Singular thought and the cartesian theory of mind.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1996 - Noûs 30 (4):434-460.details
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Why be an anti-individualist?Laura Schroeter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.details
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A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports.Stephen Schiffer - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):361-368.details
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Do belief reports report beliefs?Kent Bach - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.details
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On the type/token relation of mental representations.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Facta Philosophica 2 (1):23-50.details
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Frege Cases and Rationalizing Explanations.Mahrad Almotahari & Aidan Gray - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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The transparency of mental vehicles.Michael Murez - 2023 - Noûs:1-28.details
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On Mates's puzzle.Andrés Soria-Ruiz - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):515-544.details
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Conciliatory strategies in philosophy.Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 17 (1):e12809.details
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A drawback for substitutional arguments.Justina Diaz-Legaspe & Sennet Adam - 2021 - Language Sciences 88 (November).details
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(1 other version)How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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Can Truth‐Conditional Theorists of Content Do Without ‘That’‐Clause Ascriptions?Lionel Shapiro - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (1):1-27.details
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(1 other version)How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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Quantification and Epistemic Modality.Dilip Ninan - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (4):433-485.details
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Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
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(1 other version)Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):261-285.details
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The Logic of Opacity.Andrew Bacon & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):81-114.details
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When you isn't you. The attraction of self-ascription in children’s interpretation of pronouns in reported speech.Franziska Köder & Maier Emar - forthcoming - Glossa.details
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What is Said, Linguistic Meaning, and Directly Referential Expressions.Isidora Stojanovic - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (4):373-397.details
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The Objects of Belief and Credence.David Braun - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):469-497.details
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Empty Singular Terms in the Mental-File Framework.François Recanati - 2014 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 162-185.details
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Belief Reports and the Property Theory of Content.Neil Feit - 2013 - In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications. pp. 105-31.details
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Are Concepts Mental Representations or Abstracta?Jonathan Sutton - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):89 - 108.details
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Profligate or abstemious Millianism.D. Sosa - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):51-56.details
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Why and How to Fill an Unfilled Proposition.Samuel C. Rickless - 2011 - Theoria 78 (1):6-25.details
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The Best of Intentions: Ignorance, Idiosyncrasy, and Belief Reporting.Jennifer Saul - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):29 - 47.details
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The One and Only Argument for Radical Millianism.Max Deutsch - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):427-445.details
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On Belief Content and That-Clauses.William W. Taschek - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (3):274-298.details
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