- Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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The Wrong Kind of Reasons.Nye Howard - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 340-354.details
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A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against.Andrew Reisner - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 95-114.details
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Two Shapes of Pragmatism.Léna Mudry - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):151-165.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2016 - Theoria 83 (1):4-28.details
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The Weight of Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2573-2596.details
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Correct Responses and the Priority of the Normative.Jennie Louise - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):345-364.details
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Does doxastic transparency support evidentialism?Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):541-547.details
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From Impossibility to Evidentialism?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):384-406.details
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Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
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Against the Doctrine of Infallibility.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa082.details
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Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Reasons and Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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The value of practical usefulness.Rob van Someren Greve - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):167-177.details
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Staying true with the help of others: doxastic self-control through interpersonal commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.details
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The No Guidance Argument.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):279-283.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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An Instrumentalist Explanation of Pragmatic Encroachment.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Discussion Note: Selim Berker’s Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Adam Shmidt - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):763-776.details
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Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
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Consequentialism and Moral Worth.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):117-136.details
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The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy.Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy.Olle Risberg - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):542-559.details
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No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
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Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.details
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Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism).Florencia Rimoldi & Federico Penelas - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.details
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Abandoning the buck passing analysis of final value.Andrew E. Reisner - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.details
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How Genealogies Can Affect the Space of Reasons.Matthieu Queloz - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2005-2027.details
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The value of truth and the normativity of evidence.Tommaso Piazza - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5067-5088.details
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The very idea of rational irrationality.Spencer Paulson - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (1):3-21.details
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Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):573-587.details
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Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency.Veli Mitova - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):707-722.details
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The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):4-28.details
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Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):199-216.details
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Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.details
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Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.details
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Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.details
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Responding to Skepticism About Doxastic Agency.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):627-645.details
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The Ethics of Belief.Berislav Marušić - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):33-43.details
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The buck-passing account of value: lessons from Crisp.S. Matthew Liao - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.details
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In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):529-542.details
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Epistemic reasons for action: a puzzle for pragmatists.Stephanie Leary - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.details
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Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment.Stephanie Leary - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):657-676.details
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The uncomfortable truth about wrongful life cases.Hyunseop Kim - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):623-641.details
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Controlling our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Noûs 57 (4):832-849.details
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