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  1. Transparency, Belief, Intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21.
    This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.
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  • Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency.Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
    Recently representationalists have cited a phenomenon known as the transparency of experience in arguments against the qualia theory. Representationalists take transparency to support their theory and to work against the qualia theory. In this paper I argue that representationalist assessment of the philosophical importance of transparency is incorrect. The true beneficiary of transparency is another theory, naïve realism. Transparency militates against qualia and the representationalist theory of experience. I describe the transparency phenomenon, and I use my description to argue for (...)
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  • Naïve Realism In Kantian Phrase.Anil Gomes - 2016 - Mind:fzw009.
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  • The Perceptual Present.Abigail Connor & Joel Smith - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly (277):1-21.
    Phenomenologically speaking, we perceive the present, recall the past, and anticipate the future. We offer an account of the temporal content of the perceptual present that distinguishes it from the recalled past and the anticipated future. We distinguish two views: the Token Reflexive Account and the Minimal Account. We offer reasons to reject the Token Reflexive Account, and defend the Minimal Account, according to which the temporal content of the perceptual present is exhausted by its direct reference to the interval (...)
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  • What Physicalists Have to Say About the Knowledge Argument.Frank Jackson - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):511-524.
    Suppose that, for one reason or another, the knowledge argument fails as a refutation of physicalism. Even so, it remains the case that there is a pressing question for physicalists raised by the argument. Does Mary acquire old information or misinformation when she leaves the black and white room? Answering this question requires physicalists to address the tricky question of the informational content of colour experiences – what information do colour experiences deliver by virtue of being the kinds of experiences (...)
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  • What Does It Mean to Have an Open MIND?Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer Windt - 2015 - Open MIND.
    We decided to use our editors’ introduction to briefly address a difficult, somewhat deeper, and in some ways more classical problem: that of what genuine open mindedness really is and how it can contribute to the Mind Sciences. The material in the collection speaks for itself. Here, and in contrast to the vast collection that is Open MIND, we want to be concise. We want to point to the broader context of a particular way of thinking about the mind. And (...)
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  • Conference to Commemorate the 1893 World's Parliament of Religions, February 21-22.Cornelis de Waal, Avik Mukherjee, Ewoud Halewijn, Pangratios Papacosta, Suyan Budhoo, Roger Adams & Elizabeth Hartman - unknown
    In 1893, The World’s Parliament of Religions met in Chicago from the 15th of May until the 28th of October. 2013 marked the 120th anniversary of this gathering where the leading representatives of the religions of the world engaged in dialogue. To commemorate this event, Special Collections Research Center at Southern Illinois University Carbondale in conjunction with the Hegeler Carus Foundation hosted a symposium on the relationship between science, religion, and philosophy. One of the themes of the Parliament was “…the (...)
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  • The Skeptic's Dogmatism: A Constructive Response to the Skeptical Problem.Kaplan Levent Hasanoglu - 2011 - Dissertation,
    The problem of philosophical skepticism relates to the difficulty involved in underwriting the claim that we know anything of spatio-temporal reality. It is often claimed, in fact, that proper philosophical scrutiny reveals quite the opposite from what common sense suggests. Knowledge of external reality is thought to be even quite obviously denied to us as a result of the alleged fact that we all fail to know that certain skeptical scenarios do not obtain. A skeptical scenario is one in which (...)
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  • Knowing What I See.Alex Byrne - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    How do I know that I see a cat? A curiously under-asked question. The paper tries to answer it.
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  • A Defense of the Knowledge Argument.John Martin DePoe - unknown
    Defenders of the Knowledge Argument contend that physicalism is false because knowing all the physical truths is not sufficient to know all the truths about the world. In particular, proponents of the Knowledge Argument claim that physicalism is false because the truths about the character of conscious experience are not knowable from the complete set of physical truths. This dissertation is a defense of the Knowledge Argument. Chapter one characterizes what physicalism is and provides support for the claim that if (...)
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  • The Recent Renaissance of Acquaintance.Thomas Raleigh - forthcoming - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This is the introductory essay to the collection of essays: 'Acquaintance: New Essays' (eds. Knowles & Raleigh, forthcoming, OUP). In this essay I provide some historical background to the concept of acquaintance. I examine various Russellian theses about acquaintance that contemporary acquaintance theorists may wish to reject. I consider a number of questions that acquaintance theorists face. I provide a survey of current debates in philosophy where acquaintance has recently been invoked. And I also provide brief summaries of the other (...)
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  • Two Theories of Transparency.Edward W. Averill & Joseph Gottlieb - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Perceptual experience is often said to be transparent; that is, when we have a perceptual experience we seem to be aware of properties of the objects around us, and never seem to be aware of properties of the experience itself. This is a (purported) introspective fact. It is also often said that we can infer a metaphysical fact from this introspective fact, e.g. a fact about the nature of perceptual experience. A transparency theory fills in the details for these two (...)
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  • Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism.Dave Ward - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):650-680.
    The transparency of perceptual experience has been invoked in support of many views about perception. I argue that it supports a form of enactivism—the view that capacities for perceptual experience and for intentional agency are essentially interdependent. I clarify the perceptual phenomenon at issue, and argue that enactivists should expect to find a parallel instance of transparency in our agentive experience, and that the two forms of transparency are constitutively interdependent. I then argue that i) we do indeed find such (...)
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  • The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and Siegel.David J. Chalmers - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):345-368.
    This is a reply to commentaries on my book, The Character of Consciousness, by Benj Hellie, Christopher Peacocke, and Susanna Siegel. The reply to Hellie focuses on issues about acquaintance and transparency. The reply to Peacocke focuses on externalism about spatial experience. The reply to Siegel focuses on whether there can be Frege cases in perceptual experience.
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  • Metamerism, Constancy, and Knowing Which.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):549-585.
    When Norm perceives a red tomato in his garden, Norm perceives the tomato and its sensible qualities.
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  • The Puzzle of Perceptual Precision.Ned Block - 2015 - Open Mind.
    Argues for a failure of correspondence between perceptual representation and what it is like to perceive. If what it is like to perceive is grounded in perceptual representation, then, using considerations of veridical representation, we can show that inattentive peripheral perception is less representationally precise than attentive foveal perception. However, there is empirical evidence to the contrary. The conclusion is that perceptual representation cannot ground what it is like to perceive.
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  • Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities.Alex Byrne - 2011 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers of mind have distinguished (and sometimes conflated) various qualities. This article tries to sort things out.
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  • Bthompso@Smu.Edu.Brad Thompson - unknown
    When I open my eyes and look at a Rubik’s cube, there is something it is like for me visually in looking at it. Various color qualities are presented to me, and they are arranged in a specific pattern. By having an experience with this particular phenomenal character I am also thereby visually representing the world outside my experience as being a certain way. If I experience a blue square to the left of a red square, the world outside my (...)
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  • Introspecting in the 20th Century.Maja Spener - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries. London: Rutledge. pp. 148-174.
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  • Intentionality and Phenomenality: Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):63-92.
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  • Oxford Realism: Knowledge and Perception I.Mathieu Marion - 2000 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):299 – 338.
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  • Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):63-92.
    In his book The Conscious Mind David Chalmers introduced a by now familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers, 1996, 4, 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means (...)
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  • Transformative Experience.William Talbott - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):380-388.
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  • Perception and Its Objects.Berit Brogaard - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):374-380.
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  • Something About Mary.Alex Byrne - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):27-52.
    Jackson's black-and-white Mary teaches us that the propositional content of perception cannot be fully expressed in language.
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  • Self-Awareness: Issues in Classical Indian and Contemporary Western Philosophy.Matthew D. Mackenzie - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    In this dissertation I critically engage and draw insights from classical Indian, Anglo-American, phenomenological, and cognitive scientific approaches to the topic of self-awareness. In particular, I argue that in both the Western and the Indian tradition a common and influential view of self-awareness---that self-awareness is the product of an act of introspection in which consciousness takes itself as an object---distorts our understanding of both self-awareness and consciousness as such. In contrast, I argue for the existence and primacy of pre-reflective self-awareness (...)
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  • Intentionalität und erfahrung.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):299-318.
    Seit der Veröffentlichung von Chalmers einflussreichem Werk The Conscious Mind war es üblich, die philosophischen Probleme des Bewusstseins in zwei Gruppen zu teilen. Während sich das sogenannte „schwere Problem des Bewusstseins“ auf die Natur des phänomenalen Bewusstseins und die Perspektive der ersten Person bezieht, befasst sich das „leichte Problem des Bewusstseins“ vor allem mit dem Begriff der Intentionalität. Doch es stellt sich die Frage, ob es tatsächlich möglich ist, Intentionalität eingehend zu erforschen, ohne dabei die erfahrungsbezogenen Dimensionen zu berücksichtigen? Und (...)
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  • What We Can Learn About Phenomenal Concepts From Wittgenstein’s Private Language.Roberto Sá Pereira - 2016 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (2):125-152.
    This paper is both systematic and historical in nature. From a historical viewpoint, I aim to show that to establish Wittgenstein’s claim that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” there is an enthymeme in Wittgenstein’s private language argument overlooked in the literature, namely Wittgenstein’s suggestion that both perceptual and bodily experiences are _transparent_ in the relevant sense that one cannot point to a mental state and wonder “What is that?” From a systematic viewpoint, I aim to show (...)
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  • Descartes Discarded? Introspective Self-Awareness and the Problems of Transparency and Compositionality☆.Markus Werning - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):751-761.
    What has the self to be like such that introspective awareness of it is possible? The paper asks if Descartes’s idea of an inner self can be upheld and discusses this issue by invoking two principles: the phenomenal transparency of experience and the semantic compositionality of conceptual content. It is assumed that self-awareness is a second-order state either in the domain of experience or in the domain of thought. In the former case self-awareness turns out empty if experience is transparent. (...)
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