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  1. Investigations in Radical Temporality.Joshua Soffer - manuscript
    My central research focus over the past 30 years has been the articulation of what I call a radically temporal approach to philosophy. In the papers below, written between 2001 and 2022, I treat the varying ways in which radically temporal thinking manifests itself in the phenomenological perspectives of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Eugene Gendlin. I also discuss Jacques Derrida's deconstructive project and George Kelly's personal construct theory as examples of radically temporal thinking. With the aim of clarifying and (...)
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  • Autism, Social Comprehension, and Cognitive Impenetrability.Matthew E. Hudgens-Haney - unknown
    Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder featuring severe social and communicative deficits. Cognitive impenetrability is the inability of systems to be affected by an individual’s beliefs and desires. Individuals with autism have delayed performance on "mindreading" tasks. Mindreading is the interpretation of others which enables successful social interactions. This task performance is not correlated with "everyday" social function in autism. These deficits are in contrast with general intelligence and reasoning abilities within the normal range, resistant to cognitive behavioral training, and partially (...)
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  • Time as Relevance: Gendlin's Phenomenology of Radical Temporality.Joshua Soffer - manuscript
    In this paper, I discuss Eugene Gendlin’s contribution to radically temporal discourse , situating it in relation to Husserl and Heidegger’s analyses of time, and contrasting it with a range of interlinked approaches in philosophy and psychology that draw inspiration from, but fall short in their interpretation of the phenomenological work of Husserl and Heidegger. Gendlin reveals the shortcomings of these approaches with regard to the understanding of the relation between affect, motivation and intention, intersubjectivity, attention , reflective and pre-reflective (...)
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  • Enactive Ethics: Difference Becoming Participation.Ezequiel A. Di Paolo & Hanne De Jaegher - 2021 - Topoi 41 (2):241-256.
    Enactive cognitive science combines questions in epistemology, ontology, and ethics by conceiving of bodies as open-ended and mutually transforming through activity. While enaction is not a theory of ethics, it can contribute to its foundations. We present a schematization of enactive ideas that underlie traditional distinctions between Being, Knowing, and Doing. Ethics in this scheme begins in the relation between knowing and becoming. Critical of dichotomous thinking, we approach the questions of alterity and ethical reality. Alterity is relevant to the (...)
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  • Seeing and inviting participation in autistic interactions.Hanne De Jaegher - forthcoming - Transcultural Psychiatry.
    What does it take to see how autistic people participate in social interactions? And what does it take to support and invite more participation? Western medicine and cognitive science tend to think of autism mainly in terms of social and communicative deficits. But research shows that autistic people can interact with a skill and sophistication that are hard to see when starting from a deficit idea. Research also shows that not only autistic people, but also their non-autistic interaction partners can (...)
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  • Understanding others by doing things together: an enactive account.Glenda Satne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):507-528.
    Enactivists claim that social cognition is constituted by interactive processes and even more radically that there is ‘no observation without interaction’. Nevertheless, the notion of interaction at the core of the account has not yet being characterized in a way that makes good the claim that interactions actually constitute social understanding rather than merely facilitating or causally contributing to it. This paper seeks to complement the enactivist approach by offering an account of basic joint action that involves and brings with (...)
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  • Cognição e linguagem: seria a linguagem um desafio para abordagens enativistas?Hugo Mota & Iana Valença - 2019 - A Mente Humana Para Além Do Cérebro – Perspectivas a Partir Dos 4Es da Cognição.
    Investigamos o problema da continuidade entre (1) cognições básicas e (2) complexas, especificamente em relação à linguagem. Nossa hipótese é a de que visões contemporâneas da linguagem não inviabilizam necessariamente a abordagem bottom-up ― abordagens tipicamente enativistas. Primeiro apresentamos a posição de Daniel Hutto e Erik Myin (2013, 2017), representantes do Radically Enactive Cognition (REC), a qual assume o desafio da continuidade e identifica na linguagem o critério para uma distinção de tipo entre (1) e (2). Em seguida, estabelecemos a (...)
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  • Karma, Rebirth, and Mental Causation.Christian Coseru - 2007 - In Charles Prebish, Damien Kewon & Dale Wright (eds.), Revisioning Karma. Journal of Buddhist Ethics Online Books. pp. 133-154.
    Attempts to provide a thoroughly naturalized reading of the doctrine of karma have raised important issues regarding its role in the overall economy of the Buddhist soteriological project. This paper identifies some of the most problematic aspects of a naturalized interpretation of karma: (1) the strained relationship between retributive action and personal identity, and (2) the debate concerning mental causation in modern reductionist accounts of persons. The paper explores the benefits of a phenomenological approach in which reductionist accounts of karma (...)
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  • Loving and knowing: reflections for an engaged epistemology.Hanne De Jaegher - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):847-870.
    In search of our highest capacities, cognitive scientists aim to explain things like mathematics, language, and planning. But are these really our most sophisticated forms of knowing? In this paper, I point to a different pinnacle of cognition. Our most sophisticated human knowing, I think, lies in how we engage with each other, in our relating. Cognitive science and philosophy of mind have largely ignored the ways of knowing at play here. At the same time, the emphasis on discrete, rational (...)
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  • (1 other version)No Empathy for Empathy: An Existential Reading of Husserl’s Forgotten Question.Iraklis Ioannidis - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (2):201-223.
    Empathy is a term used to denote our experience of connecting or feeling with an Other. The term has been used both by psychologists and phenomenologists as a supplement for our biological capacity to understand an Other. In this paper I would like to challenge the possibility of such empathy. If empathy is employed to mean that we know another person’s feelings, then I argue that this is impossible. I argue that there is an equivocation in the use of the (...)
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  • Acting Oneself as Another: An Actor’s Empathy for her Character.Shaun Gallagher & Julia Gallagher - 2020 - Topoi 39 (4):779-790.
    What does it mean for an actor to empathize with the character she is playing? We review different theories of empathy and of acting. We then consider the notion of “twofoldness”, which has been used to characterize the observer or audience perspective on the relation between actor and character. This same kind of twofoldness or double attunement applies from the perspective of the actor herself who must, at certain points of preparation, distinguish between the character portrayed and her own portrayal (...)
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  • Absent Aspects, Possible Perceptions and Open Intersubjectivity: A Critical Analysis of Dan Zahavi’s Account of Horizontal Intentionality.Gunnar Declerck - 2018 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 49 (4):321-341.
    ABSTRACTThe aim of this narrow-focused text is to argue against the claim that the appresentation of unperceived features of objects that is implied in perceptual intentionality presupposes a reference to perceptions other subjects could have of these objects. This claim, as it has been defended by Dan Zahavi, rests upon an erroneous supposition about the modal status of the perceptual possibilities to which the perceived object refers, which shall not be interpreted as effectively realizable but as mere de jure possibilities, (...)
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  • The Role of Second-Person Information in the Development of Social Understanding.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Beyond Cognition: Philosophical Issues in Autism.Emma Peng Chien - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Alberta
    This dissertation explores philosophical issues in autism and defends a new version of the enactive approach to autism and social cognition. The discussion in this dissertation centres around the question “why do autistics encounter social interaction problems?”, addressing this question in ways that raise broader philosophical issues. Within the philosophy of mind, these include the problem of other minds, the nature of emotions, and narratives and their role in understanding the self. Beyond cognition, such issues are intertwined with questions in (...)
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  • Empathy, Group Identity, and the Mechanisms of Exclusion: An Investigation into the Limits of Empathy.Thomas Fuchs - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):239-250.
    There is a conspicuous tendency of humans to experience empathy and sympathy preferentially towards members of their own group, whereas empathetic feelings towards outgroup members or strangers are often reduced or even missing. This may culminate in a “dissociation of empathy”: a historical example are the cases of Nazi perpetrators who behaved as compassionate family men on the one hand, yet committed crimes of utter cruelty against Jews on the other. The paper aims at explaining such phenomena and at determining (...)
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  • Enkinaesthesia: Proto-moral value in action-enquiry and interaction.Susan A. J. Stuart - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):411-431.
    It is now generally accepted that human beings are naturally, possibly even essentially, intersubjective. This chapter offers a robust defence of an enhanced and extended intersubjectivity, criticising the paucity of individuating notions of agency and emphasising the community and reciprocity of our affective co-existence with other living organisms and things. I refer to this modified intersubjectivity, which most closely expresses the implicit intricacy of our pre-reflective neuro-muscular experiential entanglement, as ‘enkinaesthesia’. The community and reciprocity of this entanglement is characterised as (...)
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  • Husserl and Stein on the phenomenology of empathy: perception and explication.James Jardine - 2014 - Synthesis Philosophica 29 (2):273-288.
    Within the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interpersonal understanding is rooted in a sui generis form of intentional experience, most commonly labeled empathy (Einfühlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its defense by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. After offering in section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to some characterizations of its distinctive (...)
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  • Grasping intersubjectivity: an invitation to embody social interaction research.Hanne De Jaegher, Barbara Pieper, Daniel Clénin & Thomas Fuchs - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):491-523.
    Underlying the recent focus on embodied and interactive aspects of social understanding are several intuitions about what roles the body, interaction processes, and interpersonal experience play. In this paper, we introduce a systematic, hands-on method for investigating the experience of interacting and its role in intersubjectivity. Special about this method is that it starts from the idea that researchers of social understanding are themselves one of the best tools for their own investigations. The method provides ways for researchers to calibrate (...)
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  • The neural mediators of kindness-based meditation: a theoretical model.Jennifer S. Mascaro, Alana Darcher, Lobsang T. Negi & Charles L. Raison - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Using minimal human-computer interfaces for studying the interactive development of social awareness.Tom Froese, Hiroyuki Iizuka & Takashi Ikegami - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility.Victoria McGeer - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):259-281.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a “regulative view” of folk-psychology as against the “standard view”. On the regulative view, folk-psychology is conceptualized in fundamentally interpersonal terms as a “mind-making” practice through which we come to form and regulate our minds in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms. It is not, as the standard view maintains, simply an epistemic capacity for coming to know about the (...)
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  • Developing open intersubjectivity: On the interpersonal shaping of experience.Matt Bower - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):455-474.
    The aim of this paper is to motivate the need for and then present the outline of an alternative explanation of what Dan Zahavi has dubbed “open intersubjectivity,” which captures the basic interpersonal character of perceptual experience as such. This is a notion whose roots lay in Husserl’s phenomenology. Accordingly, the paper begins by situating the notion of open intersubjectivity – as well as the broader idea of constituting intersubjectivity to which it belongs – within Husserl’s phenomenology as an approach (...)
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  • Facial expression of pain: An evolutionary account.Amanda C. De C. Williams - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):439-455.
    This paper proposes that human expression of pain in the presence or absence of caregivers, and the detection of pain by observers, arises from evolved propensities. The function of pain is to demand attention and prioritise escape, recovery, and healing; where others can help achieve these goals, effective communication of pain is required. Evidence is reviewed of a distinct and specific facial expression of pain from infancy to old age, consistent across stimuli, and recognizable as pain by observers. Voluntary control (...)
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  • Editorial: The social and enactive mind. [REVIEW]Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):409-415.
    The life–mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent ‘cognitive gap’ between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a (...)
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  • Medicine and the individual: is phenomenology the answer?Tania L. Gergel - 2012 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):1102-1109.
    The issue of how to incorporate the individual's first‐hand experience of illness into broader medical understanding is a major question in medical theory and practice. In a philosophical context, phenomenology, with its emphasis on the subject's perception of phenomena as the basis for knowledge and its questioning of naturalism, seems an obvious candidate for addressing these issues. This is a review of current phenomenological approaches to medicine, looking at what has motivated this philosophical approach, the main problems it faces and (...)
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  • Primates, monks and the mind.Frans de Waal, Evan Thompson & J. Proctor - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):38-54.
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  • The Brain--A Mediating Organ.Thomas Fuchs - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):7-8.
    Cognitive neuroscience has been driven by the idea that by reductionist analysis of mechanisms within a solitary brain one can best understand how the human mind is constituted and what its nature is. The brain thus came to appear as the creator of the mind and the experienced world. In contrast, the paper argues for an ecological view of mind and brain as both being embedded in the relation of the living organism and its environment. This approach is crucially dependent (...)
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  • Skepticism, Empathy, and Animal Suffering.Elisa Aaltola - 2013 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (4):457-467.
    The suffering of nonhuman animals has become a noted factor in deciding public policy and legislative change. Yet, despite this growing concern, skepticism toward such suffering is still surprisingly common. This paper analyzes the merits of the skeptical approach, both in its moderate and extreme forms. In the first part it is claimed that the type of criterion for verification concerning the mental states of other animals posed by skepticism is overly (and, in the case of extreme skepticism, illogically) demanding. (...)
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  • Empathy, Embodiment, and the Unity of Expression.Philip J. Walsh - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):215-226.
    This paper presents an account of empathy as the form of experience directed at embodied unities of expressive movement. After outlining the key differences between simulation theory and the phenomenological approach to empathy, the paper argues that while the phenomenological approach is closer to respecting a necessary constitutional asymmetry between first-personal and second-personal senses of embodiment, it still presupposes a general concept of embodiment that ends up being problematic. A different account is proposed that is neutral on the explanatory role (...)
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  • Bio-machine Hybrid Technology: A Theoretical Assessment and Some Suggestions for Improved Future Design. [REVIEW]Tom Froese - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (4):539-560.
    In sociology, there has been a controversy about whether there is any essential difference between a human being and a tool, or if the tool–user relationship can be defined by co-actor symmetry. This issue becomes more complex when we consider examples of AI and robots, and even more so following progress in the development of various bio-machine hybrid technologies, such as robots that include organic parts, human brain implants, and adaptive prosthetics. It is argued that a concept of autonomous agency (...)
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  • (1 other version)Edith Stein and the Contemporary Psychological Study of Empathy.Michael Larkin & Rita W. Meneses - 2012 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (2):151-184.
    Illuminated by the writings of Edith Stein, this paper presents a model of empathy as a very particular intersubjective understanding. This is commonly a view absent from psychology literature. For Stein, empathy is the experience of experientially and directly knowing another person’s experience, as it unfolds in the present, together with the awareness of the ‘otherness’ of that experience. It can be conceptually distinguished, in terms of process and experience, from current models that propose that empathic understandings are ‘intellectual’ experiences (...)
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  • The extended body: a case study in the neurophenomenology of social interaction. [REVIEW]Tom Froese & Thomas Fuchs - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):205-235.
    There is a growing realization in cognitive science that a theory of embodied intersubjectivity is needed to better account for social cognition. We highlight some challenges that must be addressed by attempts to interpret ‘simulation theory’ in terms of embodiment, and argue for an alternative approach that integrates phenomenology and dynamical systems theory in a mutually informing manner. Instead of ‘simulation’ we put forward the concept of the ‘extended body’, an enactive and phenomenological notion that emphasizes the socially mediated nature (...)
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  • A Three-Person Model of Empathy.Fritz Breithaupt - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):84-91.
    This article proposes a three-step model of empathy. It assumes that people have various empathy-related mechanisms available and thus can be described as hyper-empathic (Step 1). Under these conditions, the question of blocking and controlling empathy becomes a central issue to channel empathic attention and to avoid self-loss (Step 2). It is assumed that empathy can be sustained only when these mechanisms of controlling empathy are bypassed (Step 3). In particular, the article proposes a three-person scenario with one observing a (...)
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  • Pre-Reflective Ethical Know-How.Nigel DeSouza - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):279-294.
    In recent years there has been growing attention paid to a kind of human action or activity which does not issue from a process of reflection and deliberation and which is described as, e.g., ‘engaged coping’, ‘unreflective action’, and ‘flow’. Hubert Dreyfus, one of its key proponents, has developed a phenomenology of expertise which he has applied to ethics in order to account for ‘everyday ongoing ethical coping’ or ‘ethical expertise’. This article addresses the shortcomings of this approach by examining (...)
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  • Empathy, enaction, and shared musical experience.Joel Krueger - 2013 - In Tom Cochrane, Bernardino Fantini & Klaus R. Scherer (eds.), The Emotional Power of Music: Multidisciplinary perspectives on musical arousal, expression, and social control. Oxford University Press. pp. 177-196.
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  • Seeing mind in action.Joel Krueger - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
    Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view (...)
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  • Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW]Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.
    Quite a number of the philosophical arguments and objections currently being launched against simulation (ST) based and theory-theory (TT) based approaches to mindreading have a phenomenological heritage in that they draw on ideas found in the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Stein, Gurwitsch, Scheler and Schutz. Within the last couple of years, a number of ST and TT proponents have started to react and respond to what one for the sake of simplicity might call the phenomenological proposal (PP). This (...)
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  • Philosophical Issues: Phenomenology.Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi - 2007 - In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-87.
    Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousness? What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? What (...)
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  • Self–other contingencies: Enacting social perception.Marek McGann & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):417-437.
    Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand (...)
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  • Alvin I. Goldman, simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology and neuroscience of mindreading. [REVIEW]Susan Stuart - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):279-282.
    Alvin I. Goldman, Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading Content Type Journal Article Pages 279-282 DOI 10.1007/s11023-009-9142-x Authors Susan Stuart, University of Glasgow Humanities Advanced Technology and Information Institute 11 University Gardens Glasgow G12 8QQ Scotland, UK Journal Minds and Machines Online ISSN 1572-8641 Print ISSN 0924-6495 Journal Volume Volume 19 Journal Issue Volume 19, Number 2.
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  • (1 other version)Conclusion: “Opening”. [REVIEW]Amy E. Cohen Varela - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):225-230.
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  • Affect, agency and responsibility: The act of killing in the age of cyborgs. [REVIEW]John Protevi & Roger Pippin - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):405-413.
    Draft 13 April 2007. Under review at Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
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  • Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition.Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.
    As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Neurophenomenology.Antoine Lutz & Evan Thompson - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.
    _sciousness called ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a_ _recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology_ _pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the_ _neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;_ _Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-_ _logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about_ _subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale_ _neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The paper (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers.Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 40.
    • An adequate conceptual framework is still needed to account for phenomena that (i) have a first-person, subjective-experiential or phenomenal character; (ii) are (usually) reportable and describable (in humans); and (iii) are neurobiologically realized.2 • The conscious subject plays an unavoidable epistemological role in characterizing the explanadum of consciousness through first-person descriptive reports. The experimentalist is then able to link first-person data and third-person data. Yet the generation of first-person data raises difficult epistemological issues about the relation of second-order awareness (...)
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  • Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience.Evan Thompson - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.
    The enactive approach offers a distinctive view of how mental life relates to bodily activity at three levels: bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective interaction. This paper concentrates on the second level of sensorimotor coupling. An account is given of how the subjectively lived body and the living body of the organism are related via dynamic sensorimotor activity, and it is shown how this account helps to bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the brain. Arguments by O'Regan, Noë, and (...)
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  • In search of the enactive: Introduction to special issue on enactive experience. [REVIEW]Steve Torrance - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):357-368.
    In the decade and a half since the appearance of Varela, Thompson and Rosch's workThe Embodied Mind,enactivism has helped to put experience and consciousness, conceived of in a distinctive way, at the forefront of cognitive science. There are at least two major strands within the enactive perspective: a broad view of what it is to be an agent with a mind; and a more focused account of the nature of perception and perceptual experience. The relation between these two strands is (...)
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  • The Role of Information in Consciousness.Harry Haroutioun Haladjian - forthcoming - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice.
    This article comprehensively examines how information processing relates to attention and consciousness. We argue that no current theoretical framework investigating consciousness has a satisfactory and holistic account of their informational relationship. Our key theoretical contribution is showing how the dissociation between consciousness and attention must be understood in informational terms in order to make the debate scientifically sound. No current theories clarify the difference between attention and consciousness in terms of information. We conclude with two proposals to advance the debate. (...)
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  • Introduction: Empathy, Fiction, and Imagination.Susanne Schmetkamp & Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2019 - Topoi 39 (4):743-749.
    In contemporary discourses, it has become common sense to acknowledge that humans and some species of animals, from their very inception, are embedded in social and intersubjective contexts. As social beings, we live, interact, communicate, and cooperate with others for a range of different reasons: sometimes we do so for strategic and instrumental reasons, while at other times it is purely for its own sake. Moreover, in one way or another, we encounter others not only as rational but also as (...)
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  • A Life Form is a Lived Body: Toward an Ecological Extension of Intercorporeality and Interaffectivity.Beniamino Cianferoni - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (36).
    Phenomenological approaches to empathy and intersubjectivity have overcome some critical and open issues of traditional representationalist accounts, placing the embodied character of the social encounter at the centre of the debate. At this stage, I suggest that it would be possible and important to take a further step away from Cartesian vestiges by abandoning the affective and ontological dualism between human beings and other living beings. I argue that phenomenological and enactivist accounts based on characteristics such as pre-reflectivity and sensory (...)
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