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The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory

Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1986)

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  1. A pragmatic, existentialist approach to the scientific realism debate.Curtis Forbes - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3327-3346.
    It has become apparent that the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists has come to a stalemate. Neither view can reasonably claim to be the most rational philosophy of science, exclusively capable of making sense of all scientific activities. On one prominent analysis of the situation, whether we accept a realist or an anti-realist account of science actually seems to depend on which values we antecedently accept, rather than our commitment to “rationality” per se. Accordingly, several philosophers have attempted (...)
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  • Bohr as a Phenomenological Realist.Towfic Shomar - 2008 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (2):321-349.
    There is confusion among scholars of Bohr as to whether he should be categorized as an instrumentalist (see Faye 1991) or a realist (see Folse 1985). I argue that Bohr is a realist, and that the confusion is due to the fact that he holds a very special view of realism, which did not coincide with the philosophers’ views. His approach was sometimes labelled instrumentalist and other times realist, because he was an instrumentalist on the theoretical level, but a realist (...)
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  • The Ontic Account of Scientific Explanation.Carl F. Craver - 2014 - In Marie I. Kaiser, Oliver R. Scholz, Daniel Plenge & Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), Explanation in the special science: The case of biology and history. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 27-52.
    According to one large family of views, scientific explanations explain a phenomenon (such as an event or a regularity) by subsuming it under a general representation, model, prototype, or schema (see Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421–441; Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge: MIT Press; Darden (2006); Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific (...)
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  • Explanatory Rivals and the Ultimate Argument.Finnur Dellsén - 2015 - Theoria 82 (3):217-237.
    Although many aspects of Inference to the Best Explanation have been extensively discussed, very little has so far been said about what it takes for a hypothesis to count as a rival explanatory hypothesis in the context of IBE. The primary aim of this article is to rectify this situation by arguing for a specific account of explanatory rivalry. On this account, explanatory rivals are complete explanations of a given explanandum. When explanatory rivals are conceived of in this way, I (...)
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  • Unconceived alternatives and the cathedral problem.Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):3933-3945.
    Kyle Stanford claims we have historical evidence that there likely are plausible unconceived alternatives in fundamental domains of science, and thus evidence that our best theories in these domains are probably false. Accordingly, we should adopt a form of instrumentalism. Elsewhere, I have argued that in fact we do not have historical evidence for the existence of plausible unconceived alternatives in particular domains of science, and that the main challenge to scientific realism is rather to provide evidence that there are (...)
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  • Disregarding the 'Hole Argument'.Bryan W. Roberts - unknown
    Jim Weatherall has suggested that Einstein's hole argument, as presented by Earman and Norton, is based on a misleading use of mathematics. I argue on the contrary that Weatherall demands an implausible restriction on how mathematics is used. The hole argument, on the other hand, is in no new danger at all.
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  • Statistical VS Wave Realism in the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics.Claudio Calosi, Vincenzo Fano, Pierluigi Graziani & Gino Tarozzi - unknown
    Different realistic attitudes towards wavefunctions and quantum states are as old as quantum theory itself. Recently Pusey, Barret and Rudolph on the one hand, and Auletta and Tarozzi on the other, have proposed new interesting arguments in favor of a broad realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics that can be considered the modern heir to some views held by the fathers of quantum theory. In this paper we give a new and detailed presentation of such arguments, propose a new taxonomy of (...)
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  • Quantum mechanics unscrambled.Jean-Michel Delhotel - 2014
    Is quantum mechanics about ‘states’? Or is it basically another kind of probability theory? It is argued that the elementary formalism of quantum mechanics operates as a well-justified alternative to ‘classical’ instantiations of a probability calculus. Its providing a general framework for prediction accounts for its distinctive traits, which one should be careful not to mistake for reflections of any strange ontology. The suggestion is also made that quantum theory unwittingly emerged, in Schrödinger’s formulation, as a ‘lossy’ by-product of a (...)
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  • A Geometric Model of the Universe with Time Flow.Andrew Holster - manuscript
    This study presents a new type of foundational model unifying quantum theory, relativity theory and gravitational physics, with a novel cosmology. It proposes a six-dimensional geometric manifold as the foundational ontology for our universe. The theoretical unification is simple and powerful, and there are a number of novel empirical predictions and theoretical reductions that are strikingly accurate. It subsequently addresses a variety of current anomalies in physics. It shows how incomplete modern physics is by giving an example of a theory (...)
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  • The importance of the Strasbourg period in L. I. Mandelstam's life for his further work in science.Alexander A. Pechenkin - 1999 - NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin 7 (1):93-104.
    L.I. Mandelstam, the outstanding Soviet physicist, leader of a prominent and productive scientific community, was educated as a physicist and started as a researcher and an university teacher at Strasbourg University. We consider the intellectual influence of the main currents in contemporary German science on Mandelstam's work in science.
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  • Do Disputes over Priority Tell Us Anything about Science?Alan G. Gross - 1998 - Science in Context 11 (2):161-179.
    The ArgumentConflicts between scientists over credit for their discoveries are conflicts, not merely in, but of science because discovery is not a historical event, but a retrospective social judgment. There is no objective moment of discovery; rather, discovery is established by means of a hermeneutics, a way of reading scientific articles. The priority conflict between Roger Guillemin and Andrew Schally over the discovery of the brain hormone, TRF, serves as an example. The work of Robert Merton, Thomas Kuhn, Augustine Brannigan, (...)
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  • Einstein, Cassirer, and General Covariance — Then and Now.T. A. Ryckman - 1999 - Science in Context 12 (4):585-619.
    The ArgumentRecent archival research has brought about a new understanding of the import of Einstein's puzzling remarks (1916) attributing a physical meaning to general covariance. Debates over the scope and meaning of general covariance still persist, even within physics. But already in 1921 Cassirer identified the significance of general covariance as a novel stage in the development of the criterion of objectivity within physics; an account of this development, and its implications, is the primary task undertaken in his monograph of (...)
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  • Realism: Metaphysical, Scientific, and Semantic.Panu Raatikainen - 2014 - In Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.), Realism, Science, and Pragmatism. New York: Routledge. pp. 139-158.
    Three influential forms of realism are distinguished and interrelated: realism about the external world, construed as a metaphysical doctrine; scientific realism about non-observable entities postulated in science; and semantic realism as defined by Dummett. Metaphysical realism about everyday physical objects is contrasted with idealism and phenomenalism, and several potent arguments against these latter views are reviewed. -/- Three forms of scientific realism are then distinguished: (i) scientific theories and their existence postulates should be taken literally; (ii) the existence of unobservable (...)
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  • The Early History of David Bohm’s Quantum Mechanics Through the Perspective of Ludwik Fleck’s Thought-Collectives.Christian Forstner - 2008 - Minerva 46 (2):215-229.
    This paper analyses the early history of David Bohm’s mechanics from the perspective of Ludwik Fleck’s thought-collectives and shows how the thought-style of the scientific community limits the possible modes of thinking and what new possibilities for the construction of a new theory arise if these limits are removed.
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  • Einstein, Incompleteness, and the Epistemic View of Quantum States.Nicholas Harrigan & Robert W. Spekkens - 2010 - Foundations of Physics 40 (2):125-157.
    Does the quantum state represent reality or our knowledge of reality? In making this distinction precise, we are led to a novel classification of hidden variable models of quantum theory. We show that representatives of each class can be found among existing constructions for two-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Our approach also provides a fruitful new perspective on arguments for the nonlocality and incompleteness of quantum theory. Specifically, we show that for models wherein the quantum state has the status of something real, (...)
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  • The EPR Paper and Bohr's Response: A Re-Assessment. [REVIEW]M. A. B. Whitaker - 2004 - Foundations of Physics 34 (9):1305-1340.
    For many years after Bohr's response to the EPR argument, Bohr was considered to have provided an authoritative rebuttal of the ideas of the paper, and more generally of Einstein's stance on quantum theory. More recently, however, there has been great difficulty even in achieving general agreement on Bohr's meaning. Two recent papers, by Dickson, and by Clifton and Halvorson, have sought to establish the structure of Bohr's argument. In the present paper, the papers of EPR and Bohr are re-assessed (...)
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  • Generalization of the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger algebraic proof of nonlocality.Robert K. Clifton, Michael L. G. Redhead & Jeremy N. Butterfield - 1991 - Foundations of Physics 21 (2):149-184.
    We further develop a recent new proof (by Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger—GHZ) that local deterministic hidden-variable theories are inconsistent with certain strict correlations predicted by quantum mechanics. First, we generalize GHZ's proof so that it applies to factorable stochastic theories, theories in which apparatus hidden variables are causally relevant to measurement results, and theories in which the hidden variables evolve indeterministically prior to the particle-apparatus interactions. Then we adopt a more general measure-theoretic approach which requires that GHZ's argument be modified (...)
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  • Fine, Einstein, and ensembles.Reed Guy & Robert Deltete - 1990 - Foundations of Physics 20 (8):943-965.
    Einstein insisted that the only acceptable interpretation of the quantum theory was an ensemble interpretation, that this way of understanding the quantum formalism eliminated all the problems associated with interpreting the theory as a complete description of individual systems. But he never developed his ensemble interpretation in any detail or explained how it was supposed to resolve the difficulties with the individual interpretation. We offer a reconstruction of Einstein's position that is consonant with his other beliefs and examine the “prism” (...)
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  • El debate sobre el realismo científico: confirmación, éxito predictivo y probabilidad.Manuel Comesaña - 2004 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 29 (2):59-71.
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  • Warum Gott nicht würfelt: Einstein und die Quantenmechanik im Licht neuerer Forschungen.Gregor Schiemann - 2010 - In R. Breuniger (ed.), Bausteine zur Philosophie. Bd. 27: Einstein.
    Zuerst werden die Argumente rekonstruiert, die dafür sprechen, Einsteins Wort, dass Gott nicht würfelt, als Ausdruck eines überholten deterministischen Weltbildes anzusehen. Anschließend werden Forschungsergebnisse der letzten Jahrzehnte benannt, die für eine Neubewertung seiner Position zur dominanten Interpretation der Quantenmechanik sprechen. Den Abschluß bildet die Diskussion der Möglichkeiten einer Reinterpretation seines Satzes vom nicht würfelnden Gott.
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  • Konwencjonalizm a realizm: Poincaré i Duhem wobec statusu poznawczego nauk przyrodniczych.Mateusz Kotowski - 2016 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 99 (3):103-118.
    W pierwszej połowie XX wieku przyjęło się upatrywać w poglądach H. Poincarégo i P. Duhema przykładów antyrealistycznego stanowiska odnośnie do nauki i jej teorii. Etykietka ta przylgnęła do tych autorów tak mocno, że coraz częstszym dzisiaj głosom tych, którzy sprzeciwiają się takiemu szufladkowaniu ich filozofii, trudno jest przebić się do głównego nurtu dyskusji filozoficznych. W artykule wskazuję, że odczytywanie poglądów obu francuskich autorów jako antyrealistycznych nie znajduje potwierdzenia w ich własnych wypowiedziach. Przeciwnie, ich prace dostarczają mocnych świadectw na rzecz upatrywania (...)
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  • Bohr on EPR, the Quantum Postulate, Determinism, and Contextuality.Zachary Hall - 2024 - Foundations of Physics 54 (3):1-35.
    The famous EPR article of 1935 challenged the completeness of quantum mechanics and spurred decades of theoretical and experimental research into the foundations of quantum theory. A crowning achievement of this research is the demonstration that nature cannot in general consist in noncontextual pre-measurement properties that uniquely determine possible measurement outcomes, through experimental violations of Bell inequalities and Kochen-Specker theorems. In this article, I reconstruct an argument from Niels Bohr’s writings that the reality of the Einstein-Planck-de Broglie relations alone implies (...)
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  • Reflective Metaphysics: Understanding Quantum Mechanics from a Kantian Standpoint.Michel Bitbol - 2010 - Philosophica 83 (1):53-83.
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  • Patterns in the Fabric of Nature.Steven Weinstein - unknown
    From classical mechanics to quantum field theory, the physical facts at one point in space are held to be independent of those at other points in space. I propose that we can usefully challenge this orthodoxy in order to explain otherwise puzzling correlations at both cosmological and microscopic scales.
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  • Karl Popper, Science and Enlightenment.Nicholas Maxwell - 2017 - London: UCL Press.
    Karl Popper is famous for having proposed that science advances by a process of conjecture and refutation. He is also famous for defending the open society against what he saw as its arch enemies – Plato and Marx. Popper’s contributions to thought are of profound importance, but they are not the last word on the subject. They need to be improved. My concern in this book is to spell out what is of greatest importance in Popper’s work, what its failings (...)
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  • A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism.Alex Rosenberg - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):1-29.
    This review of recent work in the philosophy of science motivated by a commitment to 'naturalism' begins by identifying three key axioms and one theorem shared by philosophers thus self-styled. Owing much to Quine and Ernest Nagel, these philosophers of science share a common agenda with naturalists elsewhere in philosophy. But they have disagreed among themselves about how the axioms and the theorems they share settle long-standing disputes in the philosophy of science. After expounding these disagreements in the work of (...)
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  • Pragmatic concerns and images of the world.Fernando Birman - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):715-731.
    I defend a pragmatist reinterpretation of Sellars’s famous manifest-scientific distinction. I claim that in order to do justice to this important distinction we must first recognize, despite what philosophers—including, arguably, Sellars—often make of it, that the distinction does not draw an epistemological or metaphysical boundary between different kinds of objects and events, but a pragmatic boundary between different ways in which we interact with objects and events. Put differently, I argue that the manifest-scientific distinction, in my view, can be best (...)
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  • Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2011 - In Henk W. De Regt, Stephan Hartmann & Samir Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.
    Philosophers of science have often favoured reductive approaches to how-possibly explanation. This article identifies three alternative conceptions making how-possibly explanation an interesting phenomenon in its own right. The first variety approaches “how possibly X?” by showing that X is not epistemically impossible. This can sometimes be achieved by removing misunderstandings concerning the implications of one’s current belief system but involves characteristically a modification of this belief system so that acceptance of X does not result in contradiction. The second variety offers (...)
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  • The No-Miracles Argument, reliabilism, and a methodological version of the generality problem.Mark Newman - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.
    The No-Miracles Argument (NMA) is often used to support scientific realism. We can formulate this argument as an inference to the best explanation this accusation of circularity by appealing to reliabilism, an externalist epistemology. In this paper I argue that this retreat fails. Reliabilism suffers from a potentially devastating difficulty known as the Generality Problem and attempts to solve this problem require adopting both epistemic and metaphysical assumptions regarding local scientific theories. Although the externalist can happily adopt the former, if (...)
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  • Normative epistemology and naturalized epistemology.Harold I. Brown - 1988 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):53 – 78.
    A number of philosophers have argued that a naturalized epistemology cannot be normative, and thus that the norms that govern science cannot themselves be established empirically. Three arguments for this conclusion are here developed and then responded to on behalf of naturalized epistemology. The response is developed in three stages. First, if we view human knowers as part of the natural world, then the attempt to establish epistemic norms that are immune to scientific evaluation faces difficulties that are at least (...)
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  • (1 other version)Optimism about the pessimistic induction.Sherrilyn Roush - 2009 - In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New waves in philosophy of science. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 29-58.
    How confident does the history of science allow us to be about our current well-tested scientific theories, and why? The scientific realist thinks we are well within our rights to believe our best-tested theories, or some aspects of them, are approximately true.2 Ambitious arguments have been made to this effect, such as that over historical time our scientific theories are converging to the truth, that the retention of concepts and claims is evidence for this, and that there can be no (...)
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  • The ghost of Wittgenstein: Forms of life, scientific method, and cultural critique.William T. Lynch - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (2):139-174.
    In developing an "internal" sociology of science, the sociology of scientific knowledge drew on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to reinterpret traditional epistemological topics in sociological terms. By construing scientific reasoning as rule following within a collective, sociologists David Bloor and Harry Collins effectively blocked outside criticism of a scientific field, whether scientific, philosophical, or political. Ethnomethodologist Michael Lynch developed an alternative, Wittgensteinian reading that similarly blocked philosophical or political critique, while also disallowing analytical appeals to historical or institutional contexts. I criticize (...)
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  • Bohr's Response to EPR: Criticism and Defense.Arthur Fine - 2007 - Iyyun 56:31.
    If a specific question has meaning, it must be possible to find operations by which an answer may be given to it. It will be found in many cases that the operations cannot exist, and the question therefore has no meaning. —Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics..
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  • Lost wanderers in the forest of knowledge: Some thoughts on the discovery-justification distinction.Don Howard - 2006 - In Jutta Schickore & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on the Context Distinction. Springer. pp. 3--22.
    Neo-positivism is dead. Let that imperfect designation stand for the project that dominated and defined the philosophy of science, especially in its Anglophone form, during the fifty or so years following the end of the Second World War. While its critics were many,1 its death was slow, and some think still to find a pulse.2 But die it did in the cul-de-sac into which it was led by its own faulty compass.
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  • Non-relativistic quantum mechanics.Michael Dickson - unknown
    This essay is a discussion of the philosophical and foundational issues that arise in non-relativistic quantum theory. After introducing the formalism of the theory, I consider: characterizations of the quantum formalism, empirical content, uncertainty, the measurement problem, and non-locality. In each case, the main point is to give the reader some introductory understanding of some of the major issues and recent ideas.
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  • How (not) to write the history of pragmatist philosophy of science?Sami Pihlström - 2008 - Perspectives on Science 16 (1):26-69.
    This survey article discusses the pragmatist tradition in twentieth century philosophy of science. Pragmatism, originating with Charles Peirce's writings on the pragmatic maxim in the 1870s, is a background both for scientific realism and, via the views of William James and John Dewey, for the relativist and/or constructivist forms of neopragmatism that have often been seen as challenging the very ideas of scientific rationality and objectivity. The paper shows how the issue of realism arises in pragmatist philosophy of science and (...)
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  • Genes and generalizations: Darden's strategies and the question of context. [REVIEW]Lenny Moss - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (4):483-488.
    In her recent book Lindley Darden has endeavored to reclaim for philosophy an active role in the elaboration of good science. She has done this, not by holding up some set of rational standards derived from outside of scientific practice, but rather by delving into the history of science and coming out with a set of scientific strategies. Unconcerned about whether any particular strategy wasin fact employed in a given historical case her project depends upon two claims, first that these (...)
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  • On the need for properties: The road to pythagoreanism and back.C. B. Martin - 1997 - Synthese 112 (2):193-231.
    The development of a compositional model shows the incoherence of such notions as levels of being and both bottom-up and top-down causality. The mathematization of nature through the partial considerations of physics qua quantities is seen to lead to Pythagoreanism, if what is not included in the partial consideration is denied. An ontology of only probabilities, if not Pythagoreanism, is equivalent to a world of primitive dispositionalities. Problems are found with each. There is a need for properties as well as (...)
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  • Truth, selection and scientific inquiry.Stephen M. Downes - 2000 - Biology and Philosophy 15 (3):425-442.
    In this paper I examine various ways in whichphilosophers have made connections between truth andnatural selection. I introduce several versions ofthe view that mechanisms of true belief generationarise as a result of natural selection and argue thatthey fail to establish a connection between truth andnatural selection. I then turn to scientific truthsand argue that evolutionary accounts of the origin ofscientific truth generation mechanisms also fail. Iintroduce David Hull's selectionist model ofscientific development and argue that his account ofscientific success does not (...)
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  • Aberrations of the realism debate.Michael Devitt - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):43--63.
    The issue of realism about the physical world is distinct from the semantic issue of correspondence truth. So it is an aberration to identify the two issues (Dummett), to dismiss the realism issue out of hostility to correspondence truth (Rorty, Fine), to think that that issue is one of interpretation, or to argue against realism by criticizing various claims about truth and reference (Putnam, Laudan). It is also an aberration to identify realism with nonskepticism, truth-as-the-aim-of-science, or scientific convergence. Realism is (...)
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  • Putting inference to the best explanation in its place.Timothy Day & Harold Kincaid - 1994 - Synthese 98 (2):271-295.
    This paper discusses the nature and the status of inference to the best explanation. We outline the foundational role given IBE by its defenders and the arguments of critics who deny it any place at all ; argue that, on the two main conceptions of explanation, IBE cannot be a foundational inference rule ; sketch an account of IBE that makes it contextual and dependent on substantive empirical assumptions, much as simplicity seems to be ; show how that account avoids (...)
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  • Notions of Cause: Russell’s Thesis Revisited.Don Ross & David Spurrett - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1):45-76.
    We discuss Russell's 1913 essay arguing for the irrelevance of the idea of causation to science and its elimination from metaphysics as a precursor to contemporary philosophical naturalism. We show how Russell's application raises issues now receiving much attention in debates about the adequacy of such naturalism, in particular, problems related to the relationship between folk and scientific conceptual influences on metaphysics, and to the unification of a scientifically inspired worldview. In showing how to recover an approximation to Russell's conclusion (...)
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  • Mandelstam's interpretation of quantum mechanics in comparative perspective.A. A. Pechenkin - 2002 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (3):265 – 284.
    In his 1939 Lectures, the prominent Soviet physicist L. I. Mandelstam proposed an interpretation of quantum mechanics that was understood in different ways. To assess Mandelstam's interpretation, we classify contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics and compare his interpretation with others developed in the 1930s. We conclude that Mandelstam's interpretation belongs to the family of minimal statistical interpretations and has much in common with interpretations developed by American physicists. Mandelstam's characteristic message was his theory of indirect measurement, which influenced his discussion (...)
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  • Induction and scientific realism: Einstein versus Van Fraassen part three: Einstein, aim-oriented empiricism and the discovery of special and general relativity.Nicholas Maxwell - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):275-305.
    In this paper I show that Einstein made essential use of aim-oriented empiricism in scientific practice in developing special and general relativity. I conclude by considering to what extent Einstein came explicitly to advocate aim-oriented empiricism in his later years.
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  • Einstein, bell, and nonseparable realism.Federico Laudisa - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):309-329.
    In the context of stochastic hidden variable theories, Howard has argued that the role of separability—spatially separated systems possess distinct real states—has been underestimated. Howard claims that separability is equivalent to Jarrett‘s completeness: this equivalence should imply that the Bell theorem forces us to give up either separability or locality. Howard's claim, however, is shown to be ill founded since it is based on an implausible assumption. The necessity of sharply distinguishing separability and locality is emphasized: a quantitative formulation of (...)
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  • Why Does Laudan’s Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail?Antonio Diéguez-Lucena - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):393 - 403.
    In his paper "A Confutation of Convergent Realism", Larry Laudan offered one of the most powerful criticisms of scientific realism. I defend here that although Laudan's criticism is right, this does not refute the realist position. The thesis that Laudan confutes is a much stronger thesis than realist needs to maintain. As I will exemplify with Salmon's statistical-relevance model, a less strict notion of explanation would allow us to claim that (approximate) truth is the best explanation for such success, even (...)
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  • Quantum Mechanics and 3 N - Dimensional Space.Bradley Monton - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):778-789.
    I maintain that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about a system of N particles evolving in three-dimensional space, not the wave function evolving in 3N-dimensional space.
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  • What should we retain from a plain person's concept of free will?Gilberto Gomes - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):40-43.
    Hodgson’s (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12 (1), 2005) defense of the plain person’s view that free will exists in conscious voluntary action is discussed. His position against the view that human action is automatically determined is favored, but his view that free will is incompatible with natural causation is countered. Eccles’ hypothesis to account for the presence of a readiness potential prior to a conscious decision to act now is discussed. It is argued that it is possible to preserve what (...)
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  • Why Bohm was never a determinist.Marij Van Strien - 2023 - In Andrea Oldofredi (ed.), Guiding Waves In Quantum Mechanics: 100 Years of de Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory. Oxford University Press.
    Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics has generally been received as an attempt to restore the determinism of classical physics. However, although this interpretation, as Bohm initially proposed it in 1952, does indeed have the feature of being deterministic, for Bohm this was never the main point. In fact, in other publications and in correspondence from this period, he argued that the assumption that nature is deterministic is unjustified and should be abandoned. Whereas it has been argued before that Bohm’s commitment (...)
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  • The Radical Naturalism of Naturalistic Philosophy of Science.Joseph Rouse - 2023 - Topoi 42 (3):719-732.
    Naturalism in the philosophy of science has proceeded differently than the familiar forms of meta-philosophical naturalism in other sub-fields, taking its cues from “science as we know it” (Cartwright in The Dappled World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 1) rather than from a philosophical conception of “the Scientific Image.” Its primary focus is scientific practice, and its philosophical analyses are complementary and accountable to empirical studies of scientific work. I argue that naturalistic philosophy of science is nevertheless criterial for (...)
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