- (1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
|
|
Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
|
|
Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest.Matthew Talbert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.details
|
|
Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
|
|
Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance.Gregg D. Caruso & Stephen G. Morris - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):837-855.details
|
|
Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.details
|
|
Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.details
|
|
The Bounds of freedom.Galen Strawson - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 441-460.details
|
|
Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.details
|
|
Agents' abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.details
|
|
Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Soft facts and ontological dependence.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.details
|
|
The Physiognomy of Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):381-417.details
|
|
Incompatibilism and the Past.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.details
|
|
On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.details
|
|
The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.details
|
|
Composition and the cases.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):453-470.details
|
|
Compatibilism and personal identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):317-334.details
|
|
Arguments for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
A theory of the normative force of pleas.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):479-502.details
|
|
Local miracle compatibilism.Helen Beebee - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):258-277.details
|
|
Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.details
|
|
Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.details
|
|
Everyone thinks that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will and moral responsibility.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.details
|
|
Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):346-367.details
|
|
Freedom With a Human Face.Timothy O'Connor - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.details
|
|
Uncompromising source incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.details
|
|
Collective responsibility and an agent meaning theory.Michael McKenna - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):16–34.details
|
|
The Epistemic Norm of Blame.D. Justin Coates - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):457-473.details
|
|
Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy.Michael S. McKenna - 1997 - Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):71-85.details
|
|
Priming Effects and Free Will.Ezio Di Nucci - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):725-734.details
|
|
Frankfurt's argument against alternative possibilities: Looking beyond the examples.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):770-793.details
|
|
Neo-Frankfurtians and buffer cases: The new challenge to the principle of alternative possibilities.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.details
|
|
Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals.John Martin Fischer - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):117-143.details
|
|
Fairness, Agency and the Flicker of Freedom.Helen Steward - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):64 - 93.details
|
|
Outsourcing the deep self: Deep self discordance does not explain away intuitions in manipulation arguments.Gunnar Björnsson - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):637-653.details
|
|
Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.details
|
|
'Ought-implies-can', causal determinism and moral responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):244-250.details
|
|
Frankfurt cases and the (in)significance of timing: a defense of the buffering strategy.David Hunt & Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622.details
|
|
Where Frankfurt and Strawson meet.Michael McKenna - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):163-180.details
|
|
Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry.Randolph Clarke - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.details
|
|
XV—Intelligent Capacities.Victoria McGeer - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):347–376.details
|
|
Frankfurt examples, derivative responsibility, and the timing objection1.Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.details
|
|
Variantism about responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.details
|
|
Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases.David Palmer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272.details
|
|
Reasons reactivity and incompatibilist intuitions.Michael McKenna - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):131-143.details
|
|
Moral responsibility and agents’ histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161-181.details
|
|
Modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples and flickers of freedom.Michael Robinson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):177-194.details
|
|
Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.details
|
|