Philosophy of immunology is a subfield of philosophy of biology dealing with ontological and epistemological issues related to the studies of the immune system. While speculative investigations and abstract analyses have always been part of immune theorizing, until recently philosophers have largely ignored immunology. Yet the implications for understanding the philosophical basis of organismal functions framed by immunity offer new perspectives on fundamental questions of biology and medicine. Developed in the context of history of medicine, theoretical biology, and medical anthropology, (...) philosophy of immunology differs from these related branches of study in its focus on traditional philosophical questions concerning identity, individuality, ecology, cognition, scientific methodology and theory construction. This broad agenda derives from immunology’s multifaceted research program that has developed from its initial clinical challenges of host defense, transplantation, autoimmunity, tumor immunology, and allergy. In addition to these well-established research areas, immunity is now understood to play a central role in other physiological functions, development, ecology, and evolutionary mechanics. Holding together these diverse domains of inquiry lie philosophical commitments oriented by organismal identity. In this regard, pertinent issues are raised concerning cognition (organization of immune perception and information processing), the character of individuality (framed by the ecological context of immune-mediated assimilation and rejection), and the dynamics of complex systems (understood as holistic systems biology). Indeed, immunology, in the context of cognitive science, evolutionary biology, environmental sciences, and development provides multi-focal perspectives for philosophy of science. (shrink)

The idiotypic network theory (INT) was conceived by the Danish immunologist Niels Kaj Jerne in 1973/1974. It proposes an overall view of the immune system as a network of lymphocytes and antibodies. The paper tries to offer a reconstruction of the genesis of the theory, now generally discarded and of mostly historical interest, first of all, by taking into account the context in which Jerne’s theoretical proposal was advanced. It is argued the theory challenged, in a sense, the supremacy of (...) the clonal selection theory (CST), this being regarded as the predominant paradigm in the immunological scenario. As CST found shortcomings in explaining certain phenomena, anomalies, one could view INT as a competing paradigm claiming to be able to make sense of such phenomena in its own conceptual framework. After a summary outline of the historical background and some relevant terminological elucidations, a narrative of the various phases of elaboration of the theory is proposed, up to its official public presentation. (shrink)

RESUMOA climatologia está no centro de um dos debates mais polarizados da atualidade, apresentado como confronto entre os defensores da existência de um aquecimento global antropogênico e aqueles que rejeitam sua existência. A instituição chave para esse tema é o Painel Intergovernamental sobre Mudanças Climáticas, um corpo simultaneamente científico e político. O debate surge aí mesclado com a discussão política sobre as respostas adequadas ao aquecimento global. Mas, rechaçados nesse terreno, os negacionistas transpõem o debate para a mídia, onde mobilizam (...) a pseudociência para deslegitimar as conclusões das disciplinas científicas ligadas ao entendimento do clima. Temos, assim, uma produção consciente da ignorância em larga escala sobre o tema do aquecimento global, demandando o uso da agnotologia para desvendar o mecanismo de produção da ignorância. A climatologia revela-se, então, um campo exemplar para o estudo da inserção histórico-social do conhecimento científico e das tensões e trajetórias conflitivas no seu interior, dos dilemas éticos que coloca e das possibilidades universalistas do conhecimento científico na era da tecnociência. ABSTRACTClimatology is at the center of one of the most polarized debates of today. It is presented as a confrontation between supporters of the existence of anthropogenic global warming and those who deny its existence. The key institution for this theme is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which is both a scientific and political body. In this context, the debate arises merged with the political discussion on appropriate responses to global warming. However, contested on this ground, the deniers transfer the debate to the media, mobilizing pseudo-science to delegitimize the conclusions of the scientific disciplines related to climate understanding. Therefore, we have a deliberate production of large-scale ignorance on this subject, which requires the use of agnotology to unravel it. Thus, climatology reveals itself an exemplary space to study the historical and social roots of scientific knowledge and the tensions and conflicting trajectories inside it, the ethical dilemmas posed and the universalist possibilities of scientific knowledge in the age of technoscience. (shrink)

This article analyses three basic concepts of Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. It shows first that Fleck’s notion of „directed perception“ is closely linked to Jakob von Uexküll’s writings on the „Umwelt“ of animals and humans. The article then proposes to regard the epistemological debates surrounding parapsychology as an important testing ground for the Fleckian concept of „mood“ and his concomitant hypotheses about „the tenacity of systems of opinion and the harmony of illusions“. It finally argues (...) that Fleck’s modification of Wilhelm Jerusalem’s idea of the „social consolidation“ of knowledge helps us to understand the indebtedness of Fleck towards early functionalist sociology as well as his strong belief in „specific historical laws governing the development of ideas“. The historical semantics of Fleck’s works hence proves that his insights are neither marginal nor revolutionary but rather deeply rooted within scientific traditions from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. (shrink)

Summary The model underlying the hippocratic humoral theory, as well as the corresponding part of hippocratic aetiology is reconstructed in precise, structuralist terms. Stress is laid on the presentation of the model, historical and philological derivations are suppressed. The global net structure of humoral theory in which the different diseases are described as specializations of the basic model is worked out, and the particular metatheoretical features of ‘therapeutical’ theories, as contrasted to ‘descriptive’ theories, are exemplified and stated in general.

Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie zeichnen sich durch ein widersprüchliches Verhältnis aus: Sie werden gleichzeitig häufig genutzt und vielfältig kritisiert. Im Zentrum der Kritik steht dabei das Szenario sowie seine teilweise als absurd wahrgenommenen Details. Als Verteidigungsstrategie der Methode wird daher zum einen versucht, realistische Gedankenexperimente zu bevorzugen, zum anderen, das Argument hinter dem Szenario deutlicher in den Fokus zu rücken. Im Zuge dessen wird jedoch das eigentlich Charakteristische an einem Gedankenexperiment – das Szenario – vernachlässigt. Um die Relevanz des Szenarios (...) zu betonen, soll in diesem Aufsatz ein Blick in die Wissenschaftsforschung geworfen werden. Mithilfe von Überlegungen Ludwik Flecks, Bruno Latours und David Kirbys wird die Bedeutsamkeit von Transformationsprozessen wissenschaftlicher Theorien gezeigt. Mit Veränderungsstrategien wie dem Visualisieren und Generieren von Aufmerksamkeit versuchen Wissenschaftler*innen, ihre Theorien sowohl im Kreis der Kolleg*innen als auch in der breiten Öffentlichkeit zu verbreiten. Wissenschaftskommunikation hat dabei einen epistemologischen Stellenwert für die wissenschaftliche Praxis. Die These, die in diesem Aufsatz vertreten wird, ist, dass Gedankenexperimente hierbei die Funktion von Vermittlungsinstrumenten zwischen den beiden Kreisen der wissenschaftsinternen und -externen Kommunikation einnehmen. Dies soll mit der Analyse eines konkreten Beispiels – dem Geiger-Gedankenexperiment aus der angewandten Ethik – plausibel gemacht werden. Bei der Untersuchung, wie dieses Gedankenexperiment wissenschaftlich bzw. populär dargestellt und diskutiert wird, fällt auf, dass dabei das Szenario im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit steht. Die eigentliche Argumentation hingegen wird meist nur aus dem Szenario missverständlich abgeleitet. Aus dieser Analyse lassen sich zwei mögliche Reaktionen ableiten: Zum einen kann sie als Begründung dafür verstanden werden, kritisch mit der Methode Gedankenexperiment umzugehen. Zum anderen – und dies ist die Position, die in diesem Aufsatz starkgemacht werden soll – kann die Beobachtung, dass das absurde Szenario des Geiger-Gedankenexperiments so populär ist, die These untermauern, dass Gedankenexperimente strategisch zur Vermittlung genutzt werden können. Absurde Szenarien können dabei hilfreich sein, weil sie Aufmerksamkeit wecken, in Erinnerung bleiben und zur Diskussion anregen. Insbesondere im Bereich der angewandten Ethik, die interdisziplinär diskutierte Themen behandelt, können Gedankenexperimente genutzt werden, um einen Diskurs zu öffnen und eine gemeinsame Diskussionsbasis zu schaffen. (shrink)

Over the last decades, science has grown increasingly collaborative and interdisciplinary and has come to depart in important ways from the classical analyses of the development of science that were developed by historically inclined philosophers of science half a century ago. In this paper, I shall provide a new account of the structure and development of contemporary science based on analyses of, first, cognitive resources and their relations to domains, and second of the distribution of cognitive resources among collaborators and (...) the epistemic dependence that this distribution implies. On this background I shall describe different ideal types of research activities and analyze how they differ. Finally, analyzing values that drive science towards different kinds of research activities, I shall sketch the main mechanisms underlying the perceived tension between disciplines and interdisciplinarity and argue for a redefinition of accountability and quality control for interdisciplinary and collaborative science. (shrink)

Scientific revolution has been one of the most controversial topics in the history and philosophy of science. Yet it has been no consensus on what is the best unit of analysis in the historiography of scientific revolutions. Nor is there a consensus on what best explains the nature of scientific revolutions. This chapter provides a critical examination of the historiography of scientific revolutions. It begins with a brief introduction to the historical development of the concept of scientific revolution, followed by (...) an overview of the five main philosophical accounts of scientific revolutions. It then challenges two historiographical assumptions of the philosophical analyses of scientific revolutions. (shrink)

Der Beitrag beleuchtet die Struktur und Funktion forschender Laborpraxis vor dem Hintergrund verschiedener erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretischer Positionen. Das Labor kann in seiner Relevanz unterschätzt werden – mit Blick auf die darin verrichteten praktischen Tätigkeiten, auf dabei erforderliche Urteilsbildungen und nicht zuletzt auf unverzichtbare Impulse für die Wissenschaft. Die abstrakte Gegenüberstellung von Theorie und Praxis ist aufzugeben. Zugleich sollte Wissenschaft weder allein über das Labor noch über die Theoriebildung bestimmt werden. Abschließend plädiert der Beitrag dafür, die skizzierten Fragestellungen in die Labordidaktik (...) sowie in die Planung und Durchführung von Lernlaboren einzubeziehen. (shrink)

La filosofía de la ciencia se desarrolló durante la primera mitad del siglo xx bajo el supuesto de que la ciencia podía caracterizarse por la estructura lógica tanto del conocimiento articulado en las teorías más exitosas como de sus explicaciones. En la segunda mitad del siglo xx se cuestiona fuertemente esa idea, pero se sigue asumiendo que la filosofía de la ciencia debe hacerse siguiendo los cánones de una epistemología fundamentalista que considera que el avance de la ciencia pasa por (...) una ontología cada vez mas austera guiada por la idea de "mientras menos mejor". Desde esta perspectiva fundamentalista, el que las diferentes ciencias hablen de diferentes tipos de cosas es un obstáculo al entendimiento, producto de la imperfección del conocimiento actual. Este ideal nos invita a pensar que la epistemología debe hacerse reflexionando sobre el conocimiento articulado en nuestras teorías más austeras y nos compromete con propuestas reduccionistas problemáticas que no permiten explicar la diversidad de recursos epistémicos que de hecho utilizan los científicos. En este libro promovemos una epistemología que no sigue el lema de "mientras menos mejor", sino el de "organizar nuestros recursos epistémicos de manera que se genere entendimiento". Así, la misma estructura de las explicaciones y las prácticas (que incluye métodos y normas respecto de lo que se considera plausible y valioso) es lo que nos da la pauta para responder a la pregunta de qué es lo que hay. Esta estrategia epistémica nos obliga a hacer una filosofía de la ciencia muy cercana a la ciencia, reconociendo la pluralidad de sus métodos, objetivos y prácticas, sin reducir la filosofía de la ciencia a la sociología o a cualquier otra ciencia en particular. (shrink)

Ludwik Fleck is a pioneer of the contemporary social constructionist trend in scientific theory, where his central concept of thinking style has become standard fare. Yet the concept is too often misunderstood and simplified with serious consequences not only for Fleck studies. My essay situates Fleck’s concept of thinking style in the historical context of the 1920s and ‘30s, when the notion of style was first applied to the natural sciences, in order to illustrate the uniqueness of Fleck’s concept among (...) the uses of style by his contemporaries and, finally, to examine the epistemological, methodological, and political consequences of this distinction. (shrink)

I shall elaborate more on the idea of anti-irrationalism proposed by the Polish analytic philosopher Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, a prominent member of the Lvov-Warsaw School of philosophy and logic. In my reading, anti-irrationalism stands in opposition not only to overt irrationalism, which is made clear by the term itself, but also to all forms of rationalism that tip toward something like worship of reason. Having characterized anti-irrationalism as it originally appeared in Ajdukiewicz’s works, I shall propose a certain reformulation of it, (...) so as to capture a broader philosophical legacy in Poland, primarily, yet not exclusively the Lvov-Warsaw School. (shrink)

The Higher Self is a concept introduced by Roberto Assagioli, the founder of psychosynthesis, into transpersonal psychology. This notion is explained and linked up with the Western mystical tradition. Here, coming from antiquity and specifically from the neo-Platonic tradition, a similiar concept has been developed which became known as the spark of the soul, or summit of the mind. This history is sketched and the meaning of the term illustrated. During the middle ages it was developed into a psychology of (...) mysticism by Thomas Gallus, popularized by Bonaventure, and radicalized by the Carthusian writer Hugh of Balma. Spark of the soul signifies an "organ of the mystical experience." It is argued that the split introduced into history between outer and inner experience has lain dormant ever since the 13th century, with inner experience relegated to the private and mystical realm. By introducing this concept, transpersonal psychology reconnects with this tradition and has to be aware of the legacy: to achieve the theoretical, and if possible scientific, integration of both types of experience by drawing on the experiential nature of this concept and fostering good research. (shrink)

Science is always presupposing some basic concepts that are held to be useful. These absolute presuppositions (Collingwood) are rarely debated and form the framework for what has been termed paradigm by Kuhn. Our currently accepted scientific model is predicated on a set of presuppositions that have difficulty accommodating holistic structures and relationships and are not geared towards incorporating non-local correlations. Since the theoretical models we hold also determine what we perceive and take as scientifically viable, it is important to look (...) for an alternative model that can deal with holistic relationships. One approach is to generalise algebraic quantum theory, which is an inherently holistic framework, into a generic model. Relaxing some restrictions and definitions from quantum theory proper yields an axiomatic framework that can be applied to any type of system. Most importantly, it keeps the core of the quantum theoretical formalism. It is capable of handling complementary observables, i.e. descriptors which are non-commuting, incompatible and yet collectively required to fully describe certain situations. It also predicts a generalised form of non-local correlations that in quantum theory are known as entanglement. This generalised version is not quantum entanglement but an analogue form of holistic, non-local connectedness of elements within systems, predicted to occur whenever elements within systems are described by observables which are complementary to the description of the whole system. While a considerable body of circumstantial evidence supports the plausibility of the model, we are not yet in a position to use it for clear cut predictions that could be experimentally falsified. The series of papers offered in this special issue are the beginning of what we hope will become a rich scientific debate. (shrink)

This article examines the notion of the `scientist as a moral person' in the light of the early stages of the commodification of science and the transformation of research into a big enterprise, operating on the principle of the division of labour. These processes were set in train at the end of the 19th century. The article focuses on the concomitant changes in the public persona and the habitus of scientific entrepreneurs. I begin by showing the significance of the professional (...) networks that were built up and maintained to further a group's research ideas and the careers of its members, thus demonstrating one condition on which depended their practice of science and their ability to earn a living. This leads to a characterization of the changing styles of work, thought and life, and to a consideration of public perceptions and of the ways in which a new self-image of scholarship and science was fashioned. A critical discussion of the public role of these mandarin scientists follows in order to highlight the strains created by the commodification of science at a time of international tensions and conflicts, when shared beliefs in scholarly cosmopolitanism were subverted by appeals to science and scholarship to work in the service of one's own nation as its `courtiers'. Various considerations of peculiar analogies between national styles of research and the style of social organization are then noted. In the final section, the article queries the long-term impact of these developments on the ideal of the scientist as a `moral person'. Taking a cue from Max Weber and pursuing reflections by Zygmunt Bauman on `science moralized', I argue that the emergence of a type of `specialists without spirit' was an unintended but fatal consequence of the changes in research practices promoted by scientific entrepreneurs such as Du Bois-Reymond. I conclude that the temptation to sever the ties to a general ethos of civil virtues lay in the rationalization, specialization and potential de-humanization of the objectifying scientific outlook once advocated for its efficiency. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the question of how a philosophically enriched view of method might inform both educational theory and educational research. The first part of the paper elaborates recent discussions on “philosophical method” in the educational–philosophical discourse. These discussions point toward the importance of analyzing the conceptual or categorical frameworks of educational processes. The second part of the paper discusses Martin Heidegger’s work Being and Time to capture fully the challenges that a philosophical method faces in investigations of (...) subjectivity: The focus lies on Heidegger’s strategy to situate his philosophical work as a descriptive undertaking and simultaneously as a categorical outline of human existentiality (“ Dasein ”). This work serves to reflect a philosophical as well as empirical attitude or conduct in the final part of the paper, which briefly introduces “categorical research” with some examples. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Die Überwindung von Theorie-Praxis-Differenzen wird entlang der Unterscheidung zwischen wissenschaftlicher Rigorosität und Relevanz geführt. Der direkte Übertrag von wissenschaftlichen Befunden in die Praxis könnte im Sport auch durch die Übernahme von Führungspositionen gelingen. Forschungen, in welchem Maße und warum WissenschaftlerInnen Führungspositionen im Sport parallel zu einer Position an der Hochschule begleiten, liegen bislang noch nicht vor. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass nur ein geringer Teil der Vorstandsämter in DOSB/dsb, Landessportbünden und olympischen Spitzenverbänden durch forschende WissenschaftlerInnen besetzt ist und diese bei (...) Amtsübernahme und -ausübung nicht die Lösung der Theorie-Praxis-Differenz priorisieren. (shrink)

Debates about the legitimacy of embryonic stem-cell research have largely focused on the type of ethical value that should be accorded to the human embryo in␣vitro. In this paper, I try to show that, to broaden the scope of these debates, one needs to articulate an ontology that does not limit itself to biological accounts, but that instead focuses on the embryo’s place in a totality of relevance surrounding and guiding a human practice. Instead of attempting to substantiate the ethical (...) value of the embryo exclusively by pointing out that it has potentiality for personhood, one should examine the types of practices in which the embryo occurs and focus on the ends inherent to these practices. With this emphasis on context, it becomes apparent that the embryo’s ethical significance can only be understood by elucidating the attitudes that are established towards it in the course of specific activities. The distinction between fertilized embryos and cloned embryos proves to be important in this contextual analysis, since, from the point of view of practice, the two types of embryos appear to belong to different human practices: (assisted) procreation and medical research, respectively. In my arguments, I highlight the concepts of practice, technology, and nature, as they have been analyzed in the phenomenological tradition, particularly by Martin Heidegger. I come to the conclusion that therapeutic cloning should be allowed, provided that it turns out to be a project that benefits medical science in its aim to battle diseases. Important precautions have to be taken, however, in order to safeguard the practice of procreation from becoming perverted by the aims and attitudes of medical science when the two practices intersect. The threat in question needs to be taken seriously, since it concerns the structure and goal of practices which are central to our very self understanding as human beings. (shrink)

This paper presents a passage from book 10 of Plato’s Republic as a text on food poisoning. The official aim of the passage is an argument for the indestructibility of the soul in the context of a theory of specific bad-makers. Food poisoning is treated in considerable theoretical detail as part of a complex body soul analogy. Focusing on this aspect uncovers an elaborate analysis of how things get worse and a remarkable view on disease.

Fleck’s “comparative epistemology” approached its main object, thought, as human action. Using English and Swedish translations as test cases, this article ascribes significance to Fleck’s preference for the verb denken in forming his core terminology. Fleck referred to “thinking” as Tätigkeit. This is juxtaposed with an anglophone tradition in intellectual history harking back to Collingwood and speech-act philosophy. Still, Fleck’s stress on the profoundly social nature of denken is his distinctive characteristic as a theorist of thought as things done. Furthermore (...) Fleck’s approach was formed to deal with any kind of thought, and this was important to his dealing with the special cases of science. The term Denkverkehr is also examined within an argument stressing the deliberateness of Fleck’s linguistic choices and his flair for pursuing deeply serious intents by means of playfulness and humor. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungNach zwölf Jahren intensiver Forschung etablierte der Ophthalmologe Theodor Leber (1840–1917) am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts in der Entzündungsforschung die Chemotaxis der Leukozyten. Obwohl sich seine Theorie damals reibungslos in die immunologische Forschung einschrieb, wird sein Name jedoch bis heute nur in der englischsprachigen Fachliteratur mit der Chemotaxis verknüpft. In seinem Experimentalsystem hatte Leber zwar schon Anfang der 1880er Jahre eine Theorie der chemischen Attraktion der Leukozyten beim Entzündungsprozess entwickeln können. Aber seine unkonventionelle Methodik—die Einführung von chemisch indifferentem Fremdmaterial zur (...) Auslösung einer Entzündung am Kaninchenauge—widersprach schon vom Ansatz her dem zu diesem Zeitpunkt dominant bakteriologischen Denkstil der Entzündungsforschung. In diesem Forschungsfeld hielt Leber an einer Forschungspraxis fest, die aus einer engen Verzahnung von experimenteller und theoretischer Arbeit bestand. Erst als eine Öffnung des bakteriologischen Denkstils eingetreten war, gelang es Leber seine auf losen Protokollseiten festgehaltenen Versuchsbeobachtungen in überzeugende Belege seiner Entzündungstheorie zu transformieren. Die mikrohistorische Rekonstruktion von Lebers experimenteller und schriftlicher Arbeit anhand seiner Laborprotokolle erschließt die Forschungspraxis eines Wissenschaftlers, der in der damals etablierten mikrobiologischen Entzündungsforschung kaum Anerkennung fand. Durch Verbindung der mikrohistorischen Rekonstruktion mit einer makrohistorischen Analyse lassen sich außerdem Beharrungsfaktoren im Prozess der Wissensentstehung offenlegen. Leber entwickelte eine spezifische Papiertechnik, durch die er seine experimentellen Erkenntnisse zwar mobilisierte und stabilisierte, aber nicht mit dem Fortschreiten der Wissenschaft mithalten konnte. (shrink)

Much recent work on the intellectual background of Austrian economics reveals an unfortunate lack of awareness of the distinct nature of the Austrian contribution to philosophy, from which the Austrian economists drew many of their ideas. The present essay offers a sketch of this contribution, contrasting Austrian philosophy especially with the modes of philosophy dominant in Germany. This makes it possible to throw new light on the relations on Mises, Kant and the Vienna circle, and it allows us also to (...) establish the extent to which Austrian economics might properly be seen as being allied to the German hermeneutic tradition of Dilthey, Gadamer, et al. The essay concludes with a criticism of the hermeneutic relativism recently canvassed by some Austrian economists, concentrating especially on the work of Don Lavoie, whose writing are treated as symptomatic of a wider and somewhat regrettable trend. (shrink)

This book is a survey of the most important developments in Austrian philosophy in its classical period from the 1870s to the Anschluss in 1938. Thus it is intended as a contribution to the history of philosophy. But I hope that it will be seen also as a contribution to philosophy in its own right as an attempt to philosophize in the spirit of those, above all Roderick Chisholm, Rudolf Haller, Kevin Mulligan and Peter Simons, who have done so much (...) to demonstrate the continued fertility of the ideas and methods of the Austrian philosophers in our own day. For some time now, historians of philosophy have been gradually coming to terms with the idea that post-Kantian philosophy in the German-speaking world ought properly to be divided into two distinct traditions which we might refer to as the German and Austrian traditions, respectively. The main line of the first consists in a list of personages beginning with Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling and ending with Heidegger, Adorno and Bloch. The main line of the second may be picked out similarly by means of a list beginning with Bolzano, Mach and Meinong, and ending with Wittgenstein, Neurath and Popper. As should be clear, it is the Austrian tradition that has contributed most to the contemporary mainstream of philosophical thinking in the Anglo-Saxon world. For while there are of course German thinkers who have made crucial contributions to the development of exact or analytic philosophy, such thinkers were outsiders when seen from the perspective of native German philosophical culture, and in fact a number of them found their philosophical home precisely in Vienna. When, in contrast, we examine the influence of the Austrian line, we encounter a whole series of familiar and unfamiliar links to the characteristic concerns of more recent philosophy of the analytic sort. As Michael Dummett points out in his Origins of Analytic Philosophy, the newly fashionable habit of referring to analytic philosophy as "Anglo-American" is in this light a "grave historical distortion". If, he says, we take into account the historical context in which analytic philosophy developed, then such philosophy "could at least as well be called "Anglo-Austrian" (1988, p. 7). Much valuable scholarly work has been done on the thinking of Husserl and Wittgenstein, Mach and the Vienna Circle. The central axis of Austrian philosophy, however, which as I hope to show in what follows is constituted by the work of Brentano and his school, is still rather poorly understood. Work on Meinong or Twardowski by contemporary philosophers still standardly rests upon simplified and often confused renderings of a few favoured theses taken out of context. Little attention is paid to original sources, and little effort is devoted to establishing what the problems were by which the Austrian philosophers in general were exercised -- in spite of the fact that many of these same problems have once more become important as a result of the contemporary burgeoning of interest on the part of philosophers in problems in the field of cognitive science. (shrink)

The Greenough stereomicroscope, or “Stemi” as it is colloquially known among microscopists, is a stereoscopic binocular instrument yielding three-dimensional depth perception when working with larger microscopic specimens. It has become ubiquitous in laboratory practice since its introduction by the unknown scientist Horatio Saltonstall Greenough in 1892. However, because it enabled new experimental practices rather than new knowledge, it has largely eluded historical and epistemological investigation, even though its design, production, and reception in the scientific community was inextricably connected to the (...) new epistemological ideals of the life sciences caught between natural history and modern science. The development of the microscope will be contextualized within the scientific and technological landscape, showing how Greenough navigated his way through this terrain, and what led him to sow the seeds for the stereoscopic microscope. The historical controversy over the optical mechanism, through which the instrument would generate the desired depth perception, and how this quality was embedded into laboratory practice, will be examined. Subsequently, it will become evident that the specific image of nature produced by the stereoscopic microscope corresponded to the new ideals of the life sciences and their representation. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore a rationalistic orientation in Western society. We suggest that this orientation is one of the predominant ways in which Western society tends to frame, understand and deal with a majority of problems and questions – namely in terms of mathematical analysis, calculation and quantification, relying on logic, numbers, and statistics. Our main goal in this paper is to uncover the affective structure of this rationalistic orientation. In doing so, we illustrate how this orientation structures the (...) way not only individuals but society as a whole frames and solves problems. We firstly point towards some exemplary instances of the rationalistic orientation, specifically regarding science, society, and lifeworld practice. Crucially, we argue that the rationalistic orientation is not merely based on a set of beliefs we could easily correct; but rather, that it is an affective condition tacitly shaping our engagement with the world in an encompassing way. Relating to the work of Martin Heidegger, we argue that what we have called an orientation in the beginning is in fact a rationalistic attunement. This attunement fundamentally shapes the pre-reflective level of how individuals approach the world. We elaborate this claim by showing how the rationalistic attunement concretely manifests in tangible socio-material affect dynamics. In the end, we motivate a critical stance towards this attunement, providing the ability to reflect upon and question instances where this way of framing and solving problems is counterproductive. (shrink)

Images from the nanoworld are not at all disorienting or bewildering, as one might expect from contemplating the strange and surprising features that arise where classical physics comes to an end and quantum effects begin to appear. Instead, we see the traces of explorers in a world that appears to be infinitely malleable. The paper shows that the capability to visualize processes and phenomena at the nanoscale is a matter not only of research technologies and the advancement of observational techniques, (...) but also a matter of developing a visual setting that exhibits knowledge and practice, surprise and control. The surface is such a stage and so is the landscape: they invite us to become immersed and move around like someone who goes for a walk. In order to appreciate this pictorial, as well as discursive, setting we turn to “strollology” as a method of reconstructing the world that is experienced in the manner of walking. With the notion of imagescape this method is applied to the modes of partaking in the nanoworld and its specific features. Rather than articulate theoretical or metaphysical presuppositions these nanoscapes serve to validate the very idea of nanotechnology. (shrink)

This work gives a new argument for ‘Empirical Philosophy of Mathematical Practice’. It analyses different modalities on how empirical information can influence philosophical endeavours. We evoke the classical dichotomy between “armchair” philosophy and empirical/experimental philosophy, and claim that the latter should in turn be subdivided in three distinct styles: Apostate speculator, Informed analyst, and Freeway explorer. This is a shift of focus from the source of the information towards its use by philosophers. We present several examples from philosophy of mind/science (...) and ethics on one side and a case study from philosophy of mathematics on the other. We argue that empirically informed philosophy of mathematics is different from the rest in a way that encourages a Freeway explorer approach, because intuitions about mathematical objects are often unavailable for non-mathematicians. This consideration is supported by a case study in set theory. (shrink)

Patrick Suppes'' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed''s metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms perception and truth are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.

Patrick Suppes' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed's metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms ‘perception’ and ‘truth’ are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.

If our thinking is socially conditioned, then how, at the end of 1900, did Max Planck, whose thinking was shaped by classical mechanics, manage to think that energy is quantized? After all, the idea was incommensurable with the principles of Newton’s mechanics. My thesis is that Planck did not intend to think about it. Trying to reconcile the time reversibility of the laws of mechanics with the time irreversibility of the laws of classical thermodynamics, he was constantly thinking according to (...) rules inherited from others. Trying to find a theoretical explanation of the formula describing the distribution of the energy of black-body radiation — arrived at by fitting theoretical parameters to new experimental data — he in “an act of despair” applied Boltzmann’s statistical concept of entropy. Then he noticed — on a sheet of paper — that classical and statistical formulas are identical if and only if the energy of resonators was a multiple of _hν_. What cannot appear in the human mind — as the mind is socially conditioned — can appear on paper. This gives a clear example of how computations in a “world on paper” can create new concepts. (shrink)

If our thinking is socially conditioned, then how, at the end of 1900, did Max Planck, whose thinking was shaped by classical mechanics, manage to think that energy is quantized? After all, the idea was incommensurable with the principles of Newton’s mechanics. My thesis is that Planck did not intend to think about it. Trying to reconcile the time reversibility of the laws of mechanics with the time irreversibility of the laws of classical thermodynamics, he was constantly thinking according to (...) rules inherited from others. Trying to find a theoretical explanation of the formula describing the distribution of the energy of black-body radiation — arrived at by fitting theoretical parameters to new experimental data — he in “an act of despair” applied Boltzmann’s statistical concept of entropy. Then he noticed — on a sheet of paper — that classical and statistical formulas are identical if and only if the energy of resonators was a multiple of hν. What cannot appear in the human mind — as the mind is socially conditioned — can appear on paper. This gives a clear example of how computations in a “world on paper” can create new concepts. (shrink)

The current discussion on the role of the universities often starts off with a perspective on the university as a scientific and/or pedagogical institution and consequently runs into a conflict between both logics in which each element is somehow devalued from the other perspective. Therefore, it may be productive to analyse the university from a standpoint in between, a perspective of knowledge as such. In order to conceptualise such a third perspective of knowledge, the history of the European university is (...) reconstructed and interpreted as a process of reflection on the ‘spiral of knowledge’. Before this background the idea of the university is renewed in terms of knowledge and summarised in the idea of a ‘deliberate university’. (shrink)

In ancient as well as in early modern theories of emotion, philosophy is often described as some kind of therapy. However, the assumption that philosophical reflection can influence our emotional life is only plausible, if the following requirements are met. First, one has to defend a realist account of self-knowledge. Second, one must allow for some kind of constructivism in regard to the description of one′s own experience. Finally, one has to maintain a strictly cognitivist conception of emotion. The article (...) discusses these three conditions and shows that, while the idea of a therapeutic influence of philosophical reflection is valid in principle, it is only of a restricted use. (shrink)

O. The idea of scientific progress in contemporary philosophy of science. Explicating the concept of cognitive progress means at the same time articulating an ideal of science. A desirable ideal: explain a lot and offer certainty. 1. Working out the ideal with the "foundationalist-positivist" approach. If the question, "When is it rational to accept a theory?" is answered, "When it has sufficient inductive support," this leads to insoluble problems. Reactions to the collapse of this approach - especially relativism and theory (...) instrumentalism. 2. The Popperian alternative: rational theory preference despite fallibility of methods for determining truth or greater accuracy of representations. What good reasons can there be for the conjecture that one theory is superior to a competing theory in its achievement as a description? Achievements to date as fallible but objective indicators of strength in describing. The sorts of risks for a theory differ in explanation and in prediction. Corresponding to the risks are the chances for cognitive progress. Instead of a cumulative index, itemized indication of success and failure in explanation and prediction with regard for importance of the questions at issue. On the concept of the "scientific importance" of questions. Postscript: On the political consequences of the sceptical position in philosophy of science. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders the relation between Kantian transcendental reflection (including transcendental idealism) and 20th century philosophy of science. As has been pointed out by Michael Friedman and others, the notion of a "relativized a priori" played a central role in Rudolf Carnap's, Hans Reichenbach's and other logical empiricists' thought. Thus, even though the logical empiricists dispensed with Kantian synthetic a priori judgments, they did maintain a crucial Kantian doctrine, viz., a distinction between the (transcendental) level of establishing norms for empirical (...) inquiry and the (empirical) level of norm-governed inquiry itself. Even though Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is often taken to be diametrically opposed to the received view of science inherited from logical empiricism, a version of this basically Kantian distinction is preserved in Kuhn's thought. In this respect, as Friedman has argued, Kuhn is closer to Carnap's theory of linguistic frameworks than, say, W.V. Quine's holistic naturalism. Kuhn, indeed, might be described as a "new Kant" in post-empiricist philosophy of science. This article examines, first, the relativization of the Kantian a priori in Reichenbach's work, arguing that while Reichenbach (after having given up his original Kantianism) criticized "transcendentalism", he nevertheless retained, in a reinterpreted form, a Kantian-like transcendental method, claiming that the task of philosophy (of science) is to discover and analyze the presuppositions underlying the applicability of conceptual systems. Then, some reflections on Kuhn's views on realism are offered, and it is suggested that Kuhn (as well as some other influential contributors to the realism debate, such as Hilary Putnam) can be reinterpreted as a (relativized, naturalized) Kantian transcendental idealist. Given the central importance of Kuhnian themes in contemporary philosophy of science, it is no exaggeration to claim that Kantian transcendental inquiry into the constitutive principles of empirical knowledge, and even transcendental idealism (as the framework for such inquiry), still have a crucial role to play in this field and deserve further scrutiny. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders the relation between Kantian transcendental reflection and 20th century philosophy of science. As has been pointed out by Michael Friedman and others, the notion of a "relativized a priori" played a central role in Rudolf Carnap's, Hans Reichenbach's and other logical empiricists' thought. Thus, even though the logical empiricists dispensed with Kantian synthetic a priori judgments, they did maintain a crucial Kantian doctrine, viz., a distinction between the level of establishing norms for empirical inquiry and the level (...) of norm-governed inquiry itself. Even though Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is often taken to be diametrically opposed to the received view of science inherited from logical empiricism, a version of this basically Kantian distinction is preserved in Kuhn's thought. In this respect, as Friedman has argued, Kuhn is closer to Carnap's theory of linguistic frameworks than, say, W.V. Quine's holistic naturalism. Kuhn, indeed, might be described as a "new Kant" in post-empiricist philosophy of science. This article examines, first, the relativization of the Kantian a priori in Reichenbach's work, arguing that while Reichenbach criticized "transcendentalism", he nevertheless retained, in a reinterpreted form, a Kantian-like transcendental method, claiming that the task of philosophy is to discover and analyze the presuppositions underlying the applicability of conceptual systems. Then, some reflections on Kuhn's views on realism are offered, and it is suggested that Kuhn can be reinterpreted as a Kantian transcendental idealist. Given the central importance of Kuhnian themes in contemporary philosophy of science, it is no exaggeration to claim that Kantian transcendental inquiry into the constitutive principles of empirical knowledge, and even transcendental idealism, still have a crucial role to play in this field and deserve further scrutiny. (shrink)

Academic misconduct distorts the relationship between scientific practice and the knowledge it produces. The relationship between science and the knowledge it produces is, however, not something universally agreed upon. In this paper I will critically discuss the moral status of an act of research misconduct, namely plagiarism, in the context of different epistemological positions. While from a positivist view of science, plagiarism only influences trust in science but not the content of the scientific corpus, from a constructivist point of view (...) both are at stake. Consequently, I argue that discussions of research misconduct and responsible research ought to be explicitly informed by the authors’ views on the relationship between science and the knowledge it produces. (shrink)

Writing reflects some of the different characteristics of the language being used and of the people who are communicating. The present paper focusses on the internal written communication in international and inter-disciplinary research projects. Using a case study of an international public health research project, it argues that the authorship and the languages used in internal project communication are not neutral but help to generate or reinforce power hierarchies. Within research partnerships, language thus raises ethical issues that have so far (...) been neglected. Current ethics guidelines often focus on interactions between scientists and participants of social research and clinical trials, with less attention paid to the interactions among the scientists themselves. Describing all the different project phases based on writing within a research project, the paper distinguishes different influences on the distribution of power that emerge through a focus on written communication. The focus of the present paper is to illuminate the issues of ethics, power and the dimensions of hierarchy, physical location and native versus non-native English speakers that arise from paying attention to such communications. (shrink)

Taking into account how much modern medicine is a function of—and at the same time has a function in—science and technology, it is hardly surprising that both the approach of science studies and the idea of the social and cultural construction of health, disease, and bodies overlap, generally and specifically, in the realm of the novel field of MEDICINE STUDIES. The work already done in science and technology studies as well as in social studies of medicine, together with the rich (...) tradition of medical history and philosophy of medicine, may be considered a solid base and a good vantage point for further analysis. By exploring the shifts of knowledge production in medicine we may be able to see the driving forces behind the ongoing development of medicine and the associated transformation of its social functions in a new light. Based on historiographical reconstructions we may come up with a much more broadly contextualized understanding of the ways in which science, technology, medicine and society interact and in what regard their mutual interdependencies have been undergoing profound changes for a number of decades. By tracing the channels through which key concepts defining the relationship of medicine and its social context are negotiated, we may further explore how our notions of health, disease, and humanity are continuously morphing alongside the incessant transformations of medicine. This editorial explores the aims and scope of MEDICINE STUDIES as a truly transdisciplinary endeavor. (shrink)

The discovery of emotional value in conceptual history Resumen: Este artículo aborda histórica y metodológicamente la cuestión del papel atribuido a las emociones en la investigación de la historia conceptual. No se trata, por tanto, de la historia de la metaconceptualización de las emociones ni de la historia de las propias emociones. Me gustaría rastrear una vertiente conceptual de la larga prehistoria de la historia de los conceptos y la semántica histórica, a saber, la del concepto de valor emocional. Junto (...) a este concepto, la atención se centra también en la carga sentimental y afectiva de los conceptos, que no puede describirse con predicados semánticos, pero que es esencialmente responsable de la posición de los conceptos en el discurso, de su ascenso y decadencia. Mi impresión es que tanto el concepto como el problema del valor emocional de un término han ido retrocediendo en la historia conceptual koselleckiana. En el artículo también se presentan las consideraciones de por qué esto es así.: This article approaches historically and methodologically the question of the role attributed to emotions in conceptual history research. It is therefore neither about the history of the metaconceptualization of emotions nor about the history of emotions themselves. I would like to trace one conceptual strand of the long prehistory of the history of concepts and historical semantics, namely that of the concept of emotional value. Alongside this concept, attention is also focused on the sentimental and affective charge of concepts, which cannot be described by semantic predicates, but which is essentially responsible for the position of concepts in discourse, for their rise and decline. My impression is that both the concept and the problem of the emotional value of a term have been receding in Koselleckian conceptual history. The article also presents considerations as to why this is so. Palabras clave: sentimiento, emoción, historia conceptual, semántica histórica. Keywords: feeling, emotion, conceptual history, historical semantics. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza la teoría humoral de la inmunidad propuesta por Paul Ehrlich en 1900, precedida de un conjunto de brillantes investigaciones que al tiempo que parecieran refutar a la teoría anterior –la teoría celular de la inmunidad– fueron el terreno privilegiado en el que se sustentó. Historiaremos esas teorías y experiencias previas, para presentar a continuación el artículo fundacional de la teoría humoral. Nos basaremos en estos hallazgos para caracterizar la estructura de la teoría, utilizando una versión (...) modificada de la concepción estructuralista. Mostraremos cómo teorías previas de otros campos son utilizadas por Ehrlich para proponer su propia teoría, y cómo las experiencias y teorías anteriores del campo inmunológico integran su base empírica. Al hacerlo incursionaremos en el contexto de descubrimiento de la inmunología, proponiendo que consiste en un proceso constructivo. Finalmente, mostraremos la forma que adopta la transición entre la teoría celular y la humoral de la inmunidad. (shrink)

Disciplinary Non-Consolidation. On the Origins of Medieval Archaeology in the 1920s and the 1930s. This article investigates the roots of the sub-discipline medieval archaeology that emerged in German-speaking universities in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1930s, research practices crucial for the formation of medieval archaeology, such as the investigation of medieval castles and peasant houses, became more prominent in the humanities, especially in the context of völkisch research. After the Nazis took power in Germany, they encouraged such research because (...) it built a scientific basis for their nationalist policy. This politically motivated funding did not result in a new discipline, in contrast to research fields such as prehistory and folklore studies. In this article, I propose two explanations for why medieval archaeology did not emerge as an interdisciplinary research field in the 1930s and 1940s, even though the course was set for its development. First, for archaeologists, art historians, and regional medieval historians, research objects such as medieval castles were semantically too indeterminate. Archaeologists would investigate a castle as a building completely destroyed and buried under rubble, while art historians would be interested in its building technique, and regional medieval historians in its written record. Second, disciplines that were important for the creation of medieval archaeology, such as prehistoric archaeology, art history, and regional medieval history, structurally did not allow for the emergence of an interdisciplinary research field in the 1930s. In particular, prehistoric archaeology, which was crucial for the development of medieval archaeology, itself was not fully institutionalized at universities in the 1930s. This institutionalization process prevented the emergence and development of an interdisciplinary research field such as medieval archaeology. To demonstrate this argument, I draw on two examples of investigations of castles, one in Nazi Germany and the other in the German-speaking part of Switzerland. (shrink)

Interdisciplinarity and the Development of Knowledge. The author is engaged in the question how to explain the development of scientific meanings of facts which does not coincide with producing them rather with processes of the scientists' public communication. So long as the facts are adjustable to the conventional theories of those discipline which the researcher belongs to this connection does not reveal perfectly clear. More instructive is a consideration of so-called 'anomalies'. The author demonstrates with an example of the history (...) of science that researchers in case of new phenomena use to borrow concepts from other disciplines for resolving the interpretative problems. It emerges a loose net-work of concepts. In this way the researchers are producing a disciplinary mixed public at the same time. This process is seen as an important phase of the development of new theories and, complementary, new disciplines. (shrink)

The ways in which the sciences have been delineated and categorized throughout history provide insights into the formation, stabilization, and establishment of scientific systems of knowledge. The Dresdener school’s approach for explaining and categorizing the genesis of the engineering disciplines is still valid, but needs to be complemented by further-reaching methodological and theoretical reflections. Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social practice is applied to the question of how individual agents succeed in influencing decisively a discipline’s changing object orientation, institutionalisation and self-reproduction. (...) Through the accumulation of social, cultural and economic capital, they succeed in realising their own organisational ideas and scientific programs. Key concepts for the analysis include the struggle for power and resources, monopolies of interpretation, and the degree of autonomy. A case study from the Aachener Technische Hochschule shows that the consolidation of ferrous metallurgy can be conceived as a symbolical struggle between Fritz Wüst, professor for ferrous metallurgy, and the German Iron and Steel Institute, leading to a construction of a system of differences in which scientists accepted being scientists rather than entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs accepted becoming entrepreneurs and renounced science. (shrink)

The article discusses the beginnings of the reception of Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought styles and thought collectives in Polish, from his first polemics with Izydora Dąmbska in 1936 to the first edition of the Polish translation of Entstehung und Entwicklung.