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On Some Ways in Which A Thing Can be Good.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1992 - Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2):96-117.details
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(1 other version)7 Consequentialism.Douglas W. Portmore - 2011 - In Christian Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum. pp. 143.details
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‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Practical Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):363-73.details
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(1 other version)Consequentializing.Douglas Portmore - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.details
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(1 other version)Two dogmas of deontology: Aggregation, rights, and the separateness of persons: Alastair Norcross.Alastair Norcross - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):76-95.details
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Value theory.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The heart of consequentialism.Frances Howard-Snyder - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (1):107 - 129.details
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Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2006 - Ethics 116 (4):707-741.details
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Modern moral philosophy again: Isolating the promulgation problem.Candace Vogler - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):345–362.details
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Consequentializing moral theories.Douglas W. Portmore - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):39–73.details
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Geach on `good'.Charles R. Pigden - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):129-154.details
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Save the Five: Meeting Taurek's Challenge.Zach Barnett - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Moral Twin Earth Strikes Back: Against a Neo-Aristotelian Hope.Michael Rubin - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-25.details
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Utilitarianism and the Social Nature of Persons.Nikhil Venkatesh - 2023 - Dissertation, University College Londondetails
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2024 - Noûs 58 (2):333-359.details
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Social Reality, Law, and Justice.David Koepsell - 2016 - In Leo Zaibert (ed.), The Theory and Practice of Ontology. Palgrave Macmillian. pp. 79-94.details
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Reasons for Rule Consequentialists.Christopher Woodard - 2022 - Ratio (4):1-10.details
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Veritism and ways of deriving epistemic value.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3617-3633.details
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The Fundamental Divisions in Ethics.Matthew Hammerton - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.details
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(1 other version)Consequentializing.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Against ‘Good for’/‘Well-Being’, for ‘Simply Good’.Thomas Hurka - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):803-22.details
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Virtues are excellences.Paul Bloomfield - 2021 - Ratio 35 (1):49-60.details
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Consequentializing agent‐centered restrictions: A Kantsequentialist approach.Douglas W. Portmore - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (4):443-467.details
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(1 other version)Consequentialism.Douglas W. Portmore - 2023 - In Christian B. Miller (ed.), The Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics. Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Consequentialists Must Kill.Christopher Howard - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):727-753.details
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An Ebola-Like Microbe and The Limits of Kind-Based Goodness.Berman Chan - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (2):451-471.details
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Act Consequentialism without Free Rides.Preston Greene & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):88-116.details
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Buyer Beware: A Critique of Leading Virtue Ethics Defenses of Markets.Roberto Fumagalli - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (3):457-482.details
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Contractualism and the paradox of deontology.Victor Mardellat - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3749-3774.details
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Patriotism and Character: Some Aristotelian Observations.Noell Birondo - 2020 - In Mitja Sardoč (ed.), Handbook of Patriotism. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.details
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Effective Justice.Roger Crisp & Theron Pummer - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (4):398-415.details
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On what we should believe (and when (and why) we should believe what we know we should not believe).Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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The principle of sufficient reason and necessitarianism.Kris McDaniel - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):230-236.details
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In Defense of an End-Relational Account of Goodness.Brian Coffey - 2014 - Dissertation, University of California, Davisdetails
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Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-555.details
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Non-Compensable Harms.Todd Karhu - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):222–230.details
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The guise of the good and the problem of partiality.Allan Hazlett - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):851-872.details
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Simply Good: A Defence of the Principia.Miles Tucker - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (3):253-270.details
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Agent-Relativity and the Foundations of Moral Theory.Matthew Hammerton - 2017 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Population axiology.Hilary Greaves - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (11):e12442.details
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Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Why Consequentialism’s "Compelling Idea" Is Not.Paul Hurley - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (1):29-54.details
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Consequentializing and its consequences.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1475-1497.details
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What Is Goodness Good For?Christian Piller - 2014 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies Normative Ethics, Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 179-209.details
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Probability in ethics.David McCarthy - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 705–737.details
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Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action.Frans Svensson - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (3):255-271.details
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Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
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The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-47.details
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