- Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.details
|
|
Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
|
|
Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
|
|
Towards a dual process epistemology of imagination.Michael T. Stuart - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-22.details
|
|
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
|
|
Silencing without Convention.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):573-598.details
|
|
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
|
|
Saying Without Knowing What or How.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):351-382.details
|
|
The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents.Agustín Vicente & Marta Jorba - 2017 - Noûs (3):737-759.details
|
|
Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
|
|
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.details
|
|
Must cognition be representational?William Ramsey - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4197-4214.details
|
|
Inner Speech and Metacognition: In Search of a Connection.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):511-533.details
|
|
How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121-138.details
|
|
The apparent illusion of conscious deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.details
|
|
On central cognition.Peter Carruthers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):143-162.details
|
|
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
|
|
Higher-order preferences and the master rationality motive.Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):111 – 127.details
|
|
Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 75--93.details
|
|
Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
|
|
Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.details
|
|
The illusion of conscious will.Peter Carruthers - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):197 - 213.details
|
|
Conscious experience versus conscious thought.Peter Carruthers - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.details
|
|
Reasoning, rational requirements, and occurrent attitudes.Wooram Lee - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1343-1357.details
|
|
Cognitive access and cognitive phenomenology: conceptual and empirical issues.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):188-204.details
|
|
Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory.Keith E. Stanovich - 2009 - In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 55--88.details
|
|
Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.details
|
|
The norms of acceptance.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.details
|
|
Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
|
|
Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):83-102.details
|
|
(1 other version)Bayes and the first person: consciousness of thoughts, inner speech and probabilistic inference.Franz Knappik - 2017 - Synthese:1-28.details
|
|
Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.details
|
|
Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa).Jie Gao - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):1901-1917.details
|
|
Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-doxastic Acceptances.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.details
|
|
Subjective Reasons.Eric Vogelstein - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.details
|
|
Language, Mind, and Cognitive Science: Remarks on Theories of the Language-Cognition Relationships in Human Minds.Guillaume Beaulac - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontariodetails
|
|
Dual systems and dual attitudes.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):41-51.details
|
|
Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning.Keith Frankish - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):914-926.details
|
|
(1 other version)Meta-cognition in animals: A skeptical look.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):58–89.details
|
|
(1 other version)Meta-cognition in animals: A skeptical look.Peter Carruthers - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):58–89.details
|
|
Reasoning, robots, and navigation: Dual roles for deductive and abductive reasoning.Janet Wiles - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):92-92.details
|
|
Trust and the doxastic family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.details
|
|
Conscious belief as constructed memory: an empirical challenge to dispositionalism.Vishnu Sridharan - 2015 - Mind and Society 14 (1):21-33.details
|
|
Evaluación del razonamiento y la argumentación: procesos competentes, productos correctos y función propia.Fabián Bernache Maldonado - 2018 - Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 28 (2):308-324.details
|
|
A Gate‐Based Account of Intentions.Stéphane Lemaire - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):45-67.details
|
|
Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):1-532.details
|
|
Wherein is Human Cognition Systematic?Antoni Gomila, David Travieso & Lorena Lobo - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):101-115.details
|
|
On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.details
|
|
False beliefs and naive beliefs: They can be good for you.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.details
|
|