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Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?

In K. Gödel Collected Works. Oxford University Press: Oxford. pp. 334--355 (1953)

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  1. Gödel and the language of mathematics.Jovana Kostić - 2015 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 28 (28):45-68.
    The aim of this paper is to challenge Hao Wang's presentation of Gödel's views on the language of mathematics. Hao Wang claimed that the language of mathematics is for Gödel nothing but a sensory tool that helps humans to focus their attention on some abstract objects. According to an alternative interpretation presented here, Gödel believed that the language of mathematics has an important role in acquiring knowledge of the abstract mathematical world. One possible explanation of that role is proposed.
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  • Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - 2020 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    What is the source of logical and mathematical truth? This book revitalizes conventionalism as an answer to this question. Conventionalism takes logical and mathematical truth to have their source in linguistic conventions. This was an extremely popular view in the early 20th century, but it was never worked out in detail and is now almost universally rejected in mainstream philosophical circles. Shadows of Syntax is the first book-length treatment and defense of a combined conventionalist theory of logic and mathematics. It (...)
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  • Hitting a Moving Target: Gödel, Carnap, and Mathematics as Logical Syntax.Gregory Lavers - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (2):219-243.
    From 1953 to 1959 Gödel worked on a response to Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics. The drafts display Gödel’s familiarity with Carnap’s position from The Logical Syntax of Language, but they received a dismissive reaction on their eventual, posthumous, publication. Gödel’s two principal points, however, will here be defended. Gödel, though, had wished simply to append a few paragraphs to show that the same arguments apply to Carnap’s later views. Carnap’s position, however, had changed significantly in the intervening years, and to (...)
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  • In Search of Intuition.Elijah Chudnoff - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):465-480.
    What are intuitions? Stereotypical examples may suggest that they are the results of common intellectual reflexes. But some intuitions defy the stereotype: there are hard-won intuitions that take d...
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  • On causality as the fundamental concept of Gödel’s philosophy.Srećko Kovač - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1803-1838.
    This paper proposes a possible reconstruction and philosophical-logical clarification of Gödel's idea of causality as the philosophical fundamental concept. The results are based on Gödel's published and non-published texts (including Max Phil notebooks), and are established on the ground of interconnections of Gödel's dispersed remarks on causality, as well as on the ground of his general philosophical views. The paper is logically informal but is connected with already achieved results in the formalization of a causal account of Gödel's onto-theological theory. (...)
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  • Perception, Intuition, and Reliability.Kai Hauser & Tahsİn Öner - 2018 - Theoria 84 (1):23-59.
    The question of how we can know anything about ideal entities to which we do not have access through our senses has been a major concern in the philosophical tradition since Plato's Phaedo. This article focuses on the paradigmatic case of mathematical knowledge. Following a suggestion by Gödel, we employ concepts and ideas from Husserlian phenomenology to argue that mathematical objects – and ideal entities in general – are recognized in a process very closely related to ordinary perception. Our analysis (...)
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  • Mathematical Knowledge and Naturalism.Fabio Sterpetti - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):225-247.
    How should one conceive of the method of mathematics, if one takes a naturalist stance? Mathematical knowledge is regarded as the paradigm of certain knowledge, since mathematics is based on the axiomatic method. Natural science is deeply mathematized, and science is crucial for any naturalist perspective. But mathematics seems to provide a counterexample both to methodological and ontological naturalism. To face this problem, some naturalists try to naturalize mathematics relying on Darwinism. But several difficulties arise when one tries to naturalize (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Necessity of Mathematics.Juhani Yli‐Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):549-577.
    Some have argued for a division of epistemic labor in which mathematicians supply truths and philosophers supply their necessity. We argue that this is wrong: mathematics is committed to its own necessity. Counterfactuals play a starring role.
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  • Gödel’s philosophical program and Husserl’s phenomenology.Xiaoli Liu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):33-45.
    Gödel’s philosophical rationalism includes a program for “developing philosophy as an exact science.” Gödel believes that Husserl’s phenomenology is essential for the realization of this program. In this article, by analyzing Gödel’s philosophy of idealism, conceptual realism, and his concept of “abstract intuition,” based on clues from Gödel’s manuscripts, I try to investigate the reasons why Gödel is strongly interested in Husserl’s phenomenology and why his program for an exact philosophy is unfinished. One of the topics that has attracted much (...)
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  • Philosophy as conceptual engineering: Inductive logic in Rudolf Carnap's scientific philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbia
    My dissertation explores the ways in which Rudolf Carnap sought to make philosophy scientific by further developing recent interpretive efforts to explain Carnap’s mature philosophical work as a form of engineering. It does this by looking in detail at his philosophical practice in his most sustained mature project, his work on pure and applied inductive logic. I, first, specify the sort of engineering Carnap is engaged in as involving an engineering design problem and then draw out the complications of design (...)
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  • Arithmetic, Mathematical Intuition, and Evidence.Richard Tieszen - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):28-56.
    This paper provides examples in arithmetic of the account of rational intuition and evidence developed in my book After Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic . The paper supplements the book but can be read independently of it. It starts with some simple examples of problem-solving in arithmetic practice and proceeds to general phenomenological conditions that make such problem-solving possible. In proceeding from elementary ‘authentic’ parts of arithmetic to axiomatic formal arithmetic, the paper exhibits some elements of the (...)
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  • Conventionalism, Consistency, and Consistency Sentences.Jared Warren - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1351-1371.
    Conventionalism about mathematics claims that mathematical truths are true by linguistic convention. This is often spelled out by appealing to facts concerning rules of inference and formal systems, but this leads to a problem: since the incompleteness theorems we’ve known that syntactic notions can be expressed using arithmetical sentences. There is serious prima facie tension here: how can mathematics be a matter of convention and syntax a matter of fact given the arithmetization of syntax? This challenge has been pressed in (...)
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  • Presences of the Infinite: J.M. Coetzee and Mathematics.Peter Johnston - 2013 - Dissertation, Royal Holloway, University of London
    This thesis articulates the resonances between J. M. Coetzee's lifelong engagement with mathematics and his practice as a novelist, critic, and poet. Though the critical discourse surrounding Coetzee's literary work continues to flourish, and though the basic details of his background in mathematics are now widely acknowledged, his inheritance from that background has not yet been the subject of a comprehensive and mathematically- literate account. In providing such an account, I propose that these two strands of his intellectual trajectory not (...)
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  • Multitude, tolerance and language-transcendence.Matti Eklund - 2012 - Synthese 187 (3):833-847.
    Rudolf Carnap's 1930s philosophy of logic, including his adherence to the principle of tolerance, is discussed. What theses did Carnap commit himself to, exactly? I argue that while Carnap did commit himself to a certain multitude thesis—there are different logics of different languages, and the choice between these languages is merely a matter of expediency—there is no evidence that he rejected a language-transcendent notion of fact, contrary to what Warren Goldfarb and Thomas Ricketts have prominently argued. (In fact, it is (...)
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  • After Gödel: Mechanism, Reason, and Realism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Richard Tieszen - 2006 - Philosophia Mathematica 14 (2):229-254.
    In his 1951 Gibbs Lecture Gödel formulates the central implication of the incompleteness theorems as a disjunction: either the human mind infinitely surpasses the powers of any finite machine or there exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems (of a certain type). In his later writings in particular Gödel favors the view that the human mind does infinitely surpass the powers of any finite machine and there are no absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems. I consider how one might defend such a view in (...)
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  • Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle.Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.) - 2004 - Dordrecht: Springer Verlag.
    The Institute Vienna Circle held a conference in Vienna in 2003, Cambridge and Vienna a?
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  • Gödel, Wittgenstein and the Sensibility of Platonism.Marcin Poręba - 2021 - Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture 5 (1):108-125.
    The paper presents an interpretation of Platonism, the seeds of which can be found in the writings of Gödel and Wittgenstein. Although it is widely accepted that Wittgenstein is an anti-Platonist the author points to some striking affinities between Gödel’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts of mathematical concepts and the role of feeling and intuition in mathematics. A version of Platonism emerging from these considerations combines realism with respect to concepts with a view of concepts as accessible to feeling and able to (...)
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  • Logical constants.John MacFarlane - 2008 - Mind.
    Logic is usually thought to concern itself only with features that sentences and arguments possess in virtue of their logical structures or forms. The logical form of a sentence or argument is determined by its syntactic or semantic structure and by the placement of certain expressions called “logical constants.”[1] Thus, for example, the sentences Every boy loves some girl. and Some boy loves every girl. are thought to differ in logical form, even though they share a common syntactic and semantic (...)
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  • Objectivity over objects: A case study in theory formation.Kai Hauser - 2001 - Synthese 128 (3):245 - 285.
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  • Hao Wang as philosopher and interpreter of gödel.Charles Parsons - 1998 - Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):3-24.
    The paper undertakes to characterize Hao Wang's style, convictions, and method as a philosopher, centering on his most important philosophical work From Mathematics to Philosophy, 1974. The descriptive character of Wang's characteristic method is emphasized. Some specific achievements are discussed: his analyses of the concept of set, his discussion, in connection with setting forth Gödel's views, of minds and machines, and his concept of ‘analytic empiricism’ used to criticize Carnap and Quine. Wang's work as interpreter of Gödel's thought and the (...)
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  • (1 other version)(2008) Epistemologically Different Worlds.Gabriel Vacariu - 2008
    3.2.2. The principle of conceptual containment ........................... 116 3.3.3. The physical human subject or the “I” ............................... 119 3.4. The hyperverse and its EDWs – the antimetaphysical foundation of the EDWs perspective ........................................... 150 Part II. Applications Chapter 4. Applications to some notions from philosophy of mind .. 159 4.1. Levels and reduction vs. emergence ............................................. 160 4.2. Qualia, Kant and the “I” ............................................................... 181 4.3. Mental causation and supervenience ............................................ 190 Chapter 5. Applications to some notions from cognitive science (...)
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  • A metaphysical foundation for mathematical philosophy.Wójtowicz Krzysztof & Skowron Bartłomiej - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-28.
    Although mathematical philosophy is flourishing today, it remains subject to criticism, especially from non-analytical philosophers. The main concern is that even if formal tools serve to clarify reasoning, they themselves contribute nothing new or relevant to philosophy. We defend mathematical philosophy against such concerns here by appealing to its metaphysical foundations. Our thesis is that mathematical philosophy can be founded on the phenomenological theory of ideas as developed by Roman Ingarden. From this platonist perspective, the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in (...)
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  • (1 other version)Speaking of Logical Form: the Tractatus and Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language.Eric J. Loomis - 2005 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 8 (1):176-202.
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  • A Problem with the Dependence of Informal Proofs on Formal Proofs.Fenner Tanswell - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (3):295-310.
    Derivationists, those wishing to explain the correctness and rigour of informal proofs in terms of associated formal proofs, are generally held to be supported by the success of the project of translating informal proofs into computer-checkable formal counterparts. I argue, however, that this project is a false friend for the derivationists because there are too many different associated formal proofs for each informal proof, leading to a serious worry of overgeneration. I press this worry primarily against Azzouni's derivation-indicator account, but (...)
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  • Causality.Jessica M. Wilson - 2005 - In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge. pp. 90--100.
    Arguably no concept is more fundamental to science than that of causality, for investigations into cases of existence, persistence, and change in the natural world are largely investigations into the causes of these phenomena. Yet the metaphysics and epistemology of causality remain unclear. For example, the ontological categories of the causal relata have been taken to be objects (Hume 1739), events (Davidson 1967), properties (Armstrong 1978), processes (Salmon 1984), variables (Hitchcock 1993), and facts (Mellor 1995). (For convenience, causes and effects (...)
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  • Phenomenological Ideas in the Philosophy of Mathematics. From Husserl to Gödel.Roman Murawski Thomas Bedürftig - 2018 - Studia Semiotyczne 32 (2):33-50.
    The paper is devoted to phenomenological ideas in conceptions of modern philosophy of mathematics. Views of Husserl, Weyl, Becker andGödel will be discussed and analysed. The aim of the paper is to show the influence of phenomenological ideas on the philosophical conceptions concerning mathematics. We shall start by indicating the attachment of Edmund Husserl to mathematics and by presenting the main points of his philosophy of mathematics. Next, works of two philosophers who attempted to apply Husserl’s phenomenological ideas to the (...)
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  • Erratum to: Intuition and Its Object.Kai Hauser - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (3):283-284.
    Erratum to: Axiomathes DOI 10.1007/s10516-014-9234-yIn the original publication of the article, some of the references were published incorrectly. Please find below the corrected version of these references.
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  • Intuition and Its Object.Kai Hauser - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (3):253-281.
    The view that mathematics deals with ideal objects to which we have epistemic access by a kind of perception has troubled many thinkers. Using ideas from Husserl’s phenomenology, I will take a different look at these matters. The upshot of this approach is that there are non-material objects and that they can be recognized in a process very closely related to sense perception. In fact, the perception of physical objects may be regarded as a special case of this more universal (...)
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  • Carnap, gödel, and the analyticity of arithmetic.Neil Tennant - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):100-112.
    Michael Friedman maintains that Carnap did not fully appreciate the impact of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem on the prospect for a purely syntactic definition of analyticity that would render arithmetic analytically true. This paper argues against this claim. It also challenges a common presumption on the part of defenders of Carnap, in their diagnosis of the force of Gödel's own critique of Carnap in his Gibbs Lecture. The author is grateful to Michael Friedman for valuable comments. Part of the research (...)
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  • Intuitionism and logical syntax.Charles McCarty - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):56-77.
    , Rudolf Carnap became a chief proponent of the doctrine that the statements of intuitionism carry nonstandard intuitionistic meanings. This doctrine is linked to Carnap's ‘Principle of Tolerance’ and claims he made on behalf of his notion of pure syntax. From premises independent of intuitionism, we argue that the doctrine, the Principle, and the attendant claims are mistaken, especially Carnap's repeated insistence that, in defining languages, logicians are free of commitment to mathematical statements intuitionists would reject. I am grateful to (...)
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  • Informal provability and dialetheism.Pawel Pawlowski & Rafal Urbaniak - 2023 - Theoria 89 (2):204-215.
    According to the dialetheist argument from the inconsistency of informal mathematics, the informal version of the Gödelian argument leads us to a true contradiction. On one hand, the dialetheist argues, we can prove that there is a mathematical claim that is neither provable nor refutable in informal mathematics. On the other, the proof of its unprovability is given in informal mathematics and proves that very sentence. We argue that the argument fails, because it relies on the unjustified and unlikely assumption (...)
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  • Gödel's Introduction to Logic in 1939.P. Cassou-Nogues - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (1):69-90.
    This article presents three extracts from the introductory course in mathematical logic that Gödel gave at the University of Notre Dame in 1939. The lectures include a few digressions, which give insight into Gödel's views on logic prior to his philosophical papers of the 1940s. The first extract is Gödel's first lecture. It gives the flavour of Gödel's leisurely style in this course. It also includes a curious definition of logic and a discussion of implication in logic and natural language. (...)
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  • Learning Logical Tolerance: Hans Hahn on the Foundations of Mathematics.Thomas E. Uebel - 2005 - History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (3):175-209.
    Hans Hahn's long-neglected philosophy of mathematics is reconstructed here with an eye to his anticipation of the doctrine of logical pluralism. After establishing that Hahn pioneered a post-Tractarian conception of tautologies and attempted to overcome the traditional foundational dispute in mathematics, Hahn's and Carnap's work is briefly compared with Karl Menger's, and several significant agreements or differences between Hahn's and Carnap's work are specified and discussed.
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  • Øystein Linnebo*. Philosophy of Mathematics. [REVIEW]Gregory Lavers - 2018 - Philosophia Mathematica 26 (3):413-417.
    Øystein Linnebo*. Philosophy of Mathematics. Princeton University Press, 2017. ISBN: 978-0-691-16140-2 ; 978-1-40088524-4. Pp. xviii + 203.
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  • Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):151-176.
    Knowledge requires both freedom and friction . Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of (...)
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  • Gödel, percepção racional e compreensão de conceitos.Sérgio Schultz - 2014 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 40 (1):47-65.
    Nosso objetivo neste artigo é o de lançar luz sobre alguns aspectos das concepções de Gödel acerca da percepção de conceitos. Começamos investigando a natureza e o papel da analogia entre percepção sensível e percepção de conceitos. A seguir, examinamos as conexões entre percepção de conceitos, razão e compreensão, tentando mostrar que a percepção de conceitos é compreensão de conceitos. Por fim, examinamos aqueles aspectos da concepção de Gödel em que a percepção de conceitos de fato se aproxima perigosamente da (...)
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  • On the mathematical nature of logic, featuring P. Bernays and K. Gödel.Oran Magal - unknown
    The paper examines the interrelationship between mathematics and logic, arguing that a central characteristic of each has an essential role within the other. The first part is a reconstruction of and elaboration on Paul Bernays’ argument, that mathematics and logic are based on different directions of abstraction from content, and that mathematics, at its core it is a study of formal structures. The notion of a study of structure is clarified by the examples of Hilbert’s work on the axiomatization of (...)
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  • Gödel’s Natural Deduction.Kosta Došen & Miloš Adžić - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (2):397-415.
    This is a companion to a paper by the authors entitled “Gödel on deduction”, which examined the links between some philosophical views ascribed to Gödel and general proof theory. When writing that other paper, the authors were not acquainted with a system of natural deduction that Gödel presented with the help of Gentzen’s sequents, which amounts to Jaśkowski’s natural deduction system of 1934, and which may be found in Gödel’s unpublished notes for the elementary logic course he gave in 1939 (...)
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  • The Notion of Explanation in Gödel’s Philosophy of Mathematics.Krzysztof Wójtowicz - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 30:85-106.
    The article deals with the question of in which sense the notion of explanation can be applied to Kurt Gödel’s philosophy of mathematics. Gödel, as a mathematical realist, claims that in mathematics we are dealing with facts that have an objective character. One of these facts is the solvability of all well-formulated mathematical problems—and this fact requires a clarification. The assumptions on which Gödel’s position is based are: metaphysical realism: there is a mathematical universe, it is objective and independent of (...)
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  • Informal and Absolute Proofs: Some Remarks from a Gödelian Perspective.Gabriella Crocco - 2019 - Topoi 38 (3):561-575.
    After a brief discussion of Kreisel’s notion of informal rigour and Myhill’s notion of absolute proof, Gödel’s analysis of the subject is presented. It is shown how Gödel avoids the notion of informal proof because such a use would contradict one of the senses of “formal” that Gödel wants to preserve. This Gödelian notion of “formal” is directly tied to his notion of absolute proof and to the question of the general applicability of concepts, in a way that overcomes both (...)
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  • Black, White and Gray: Quine on Convention.Yemima Ben-Menahem - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):245-282.
    This paper examines Quine’s web of belief metaphor and its role in his various responses to conventionalism. Distinguishing between two versions of conventionalism, one based on the under-determination of theory, the other associated with a linguistic account of necessary truth, I show how Quine plays the two versions of conventionalism against each other. Some of Quine’s reservations about conventionalism are traced back to his 1934 lectures on Carnap. Although these lectures appear to endorse Carnap’s conventionalism, in exposing Carnap’s failure to (...)
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  • Use and Misuse of G^|^ouml;del's Theorem.Shingo Fujita - 2003 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 12 (1):1-14.
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  • Gödel, Kant, and the Path of a Science.Srećko Kovač - 2008 - Inquiry: Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):147-169.
    Gödel's philosophical views were to a significant extent influenced by the study not only of Leibniz or Husserl, but also of Kant. Both Gödel and Kant aimed at the secure foundation of philosophy, the certainty of knowledge and the solvability of all meaningful problems in philosophy. In this paper, parallelisms between the foundational crisis of metaphysics in Kant's view and the foundational crisis of mathematics in Gödel's view are elaborated, especially regarding the problem of finding the “secure path of a (...)
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  • Some Uses of Logic in Rigorous Philosophy.Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock - 2010 - Axiomathes 20 (2-3):385-398.
    This paper is concerned with the use of logic to solve philosophical problems. Such use of logic goes counter to the prevailing empiricist tradition in analytic circles. Specifically, model-theoretic tools are applied to three fundamental issues in the philosophy of logic and mathematics, namely, to the issue of the existence of mathematical entities, to the dispute between first- and second-order logic and to the definition of analyticity.
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  • Kurt gödel.Juliette Kennedy - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Główne koncepcje i kierunki filozofii matematyki XX wieku.Roman Murawski - 2003 - Zagadnienia Filozoficzne W Nauce 33.
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  • Kategoria wyjaśniania a filozofia matematyki Gödla.Krzysztof Wójtowicz - 2018 - Studia Semiotyczne 32 (2):107-129.
    Artykuł dotyczy zagadnienia, w jakim sensie można stosować kategorię wyjaśnienia do interpretacji filozofii matematyki Kurta Gödla. Gödel – jako realista matematyczny – twierdzi bowiem, że w wypadku matematyki mamy do czynienia z niezależnymi od nas faktami. Jednym z owych faktów jest właśnie rozwiązywalność wszystkich dobrze postawionych problemów matematycznych – i ten fakt domaga się wyjaśnienia. Kluczem do zrozumienia stanowiska Gödla jest identyfikacja założeń, na których się opiera: metafizyczny realizm: istnieje uniwersum matematyczne, ma ono charakter obiektywny, niezależny od nas; optymizm epistemologiczny: (...)
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  • “The boundless ocean of unlimited possibilities”: Logic in carnap'slogical syntax of language. [REVIEW]Sahotra Sarkar - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):191 - 237.
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