Switch to: References

Citations of:

Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

Analysis 23 (6):121-123 (1963)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Scientific Knowledge and Extended Epistemic Virtues.Linton Wang & Wei-Fen Ma - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):273-295.
    This paper investigates the applicability of reliabilism to scientific knowledge, and especially focuses on two doubts about the applicability: one about its difficulty in accounting for the epistemological role of scientific instruments, and the other about scientific theories. To respond to the two doubts, we extend virtue reliabilism, a reliabilist-based virtue epistemology, with a distinction of two types of epistemic virtues and the extended mind thesis from Clark and Chalmers (Analysis 58:7–19, 1998 ). We also present a case study on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Epistemic comparative conditionals.Linton Wang - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):133 - 156.
    The interest of epistemic comparative conditionals comes from the fact that they represent genuine ‘comparative epistemic relations’ between propositions, situations, evidences, abilities, interests, etc. This paper argues that various types of epistemic comparative conditionals uniformly represent comparative epistemic relations via the comparison of epistemic positions rather than the comparison of epistemic standards. This consequence is considered as a general constraint on a theory of knowledge attribution, and then further used to argue against the contextualist thesis that, in some cases, considering (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Diamonds are a philosopher's best friends.Heinrich Wansing - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):591-612.
    The knowability paradox is an instance of a remarkable reasoning pattern (actually, a pair of such patterns), in the course of which an occurrence of the possibility operator, the diamond, disappears. In the present paper, it is pointed out how the unwanted disappearance of the diamond may be escaped. The emphasis is not laid on a discussion of the contentious premise of the knowability paradox, namely that all truths are possibly known, but on how from this assumption the conclusion is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • The epistemology of scientific evidence.Douglas Walton & Nanning Zhang - 2013 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 21 (2):173-219.
    In place of the traditional epistemological view of knowledge as justified true belief we argue that artificial intelligence and law needs an evidence-based epistemology according to which scientific knowledge is based on critical analysis of evidence using argumentation. This new epistemology of scientific evidence (ESE) models scientific knowledge as achieved through a process of marshaling evidence in a scientific inquiry that results in a convergence of scientific theories and research results. We show how a dialogue interface of argument from expert (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Enquiry and the Value of Knowledge.Barney Walker - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (1):93-112.
    In this paper I challenge the orthodox view of the significance of Platonic value problems. According to this view, such problems are among the central questions of epistemology, and answering them is essential for justifying the status of epistemology as a major branch of philosophical enquiry. I challenge this view by identifying an assumption on which Platonic value problems are based – the value assumption – and considering how this assumption might be resisted. After articulating a line of thought that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Un desafío al contextualismo epistémico.Ignacio Vilaró - 2014 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 46:9-50.
    Una teoría de las oraciones de adscripción de conocimiento debe lidiar con el desafío escéptico cartesiano. El Contextualismo Epistémico ofrece una manera atractiva de hacerlo, lo que se considera una de sus virtudes principales. Pero, una vez que uno comienza a pedir más claridad sobre cómo se supone que funciona la estrategia, no tardan en aparecer los problemas. Recuerdo muy brevemente algunas versiones no promisorias del Contextualismo, ya reseñadas por Keith DeRose, y luego presento su propia versión del Contextualismo, diseñada (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • I Know I am Not Gettiered.Michael Veber - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):401-420.
    In a Normal Case, a subject has a justified true belief that P and also knows that P. In a Gettier Case, a subject has a justified true belief that P but does not know that P. The received view (endorsed by Lycan and others) is that if one is in a Normal Case then one cannot know that he is not in a Gettier case. I argue that the received view is mistaken and I discuss the implications this has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Knowledge with and Without Belief.Michael Veber - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):120-132.
    This article argues for the thesis that the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification should be extended to knowledge. A consequence of this thesis is that there is a type of knowledge that requires belief and a type that does not. A familiar example strikingly similar to the sort of example used to introduce the propositional/doxastic justification makes a prima facie case. Additional theoretical advantages are revealed when the distinction is applied within the context of some recent epistemological debates. These (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Real Knowledge Undermining Luck.Raphael van Riel - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):325-344.
    Based on the discussion of a novel version of the Barn County scenario, the paper argues for a new explication of knowledge undermining luck. In passing, an as yet undetected form of benign luck is identified.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Introduction: Knowledge through imagination.René van Woudenberg - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (2):151–161.
    This introduction presents an overview of the articles in this special issue, within the framework of an argument for the conclusion that there are various roads leading from imagination to knowledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Emotion and the new epistemic challenge from cognitive penetrability.Jona Vance - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):257-283.
    Experiences—visual, emotional, or otherwise—play a role in providing us with justification to believe claims about the world. Some accounts of how experiences provide justification emphasize the role of the experiences’ distinctive phenomenology, i.e. ‘what it is like’ to have the experience. Other accounts emphasize the justificatory role to the experiences’ etiology. A number of authors have used cases of cognitively penetrated visual experience to raise an epistemic challenge for theories of perceptual justification that emphasize the justificatory role of phenomenology rather (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • A Causal Safety Criterion for Knowledge.Jonathan Vandenburgh - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Safety purports to explain why cases of accidentally true belief are not knowledge, addressing Gettier cases and cases of belief based on statistical evidence. However, problems arise for using safety as a condition on knowledge: safety is not necessary for knowledge and cannot always explain the Gettier cases and cases of statistical evidence it is meant to address. In this paper, I argue for a new modal condition designed to capture the non-accidental relationship between facts and evidence required for knowledge: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier.Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (2):175-200.
    Nós tentamos mostrar neste ensaio que as propostas anulabilistas de Peter Klein e de Marshall Swain não resolvem o problema de Gettier. Klein postula que, para qualquer contra-exemplo de tipo-Gettier, há uma proposição verdadeira que, ao ser conjugada com a evidência e de S, anula de modo legítimo a justificação de p para S. Swain postula que, para qualquer contra-exemplo de tipo-Gettier, há uma proposição verdadeira que, ao ser conjugada com o conjunto de razões R de S, anula de modo (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Empirical Conceptual Analysis: An Exposition.Hristo Valchev - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):757-776.
    Conceptual analysis as traditionally understood can be improved by allowing the use of a certain kind of empirical investigation. The conceptual analysis in which the kind of empirical investigation in question is used can be called “empirical conceptual analysis”. In the present inquiry, I provide a systematic exposition of empirical conceptual analysis, so understood, considering what exactly empirical conceptual analysis is, the different kinds of empirical conceptual analysis, and the main application of the method within philosophy. It can be defined (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Knowledge and varieties of epistemic luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351–362.
    It is generally thought that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck as the post‐Gettier literature makes it abundantly clear. Examples are produced where although a belief is true and justified, it nevertheless falls short of being an instance of knowledge because of the intrusion of luck. Knowledge is regarded as being distinct from lucky guesses. It is, nevertheless, acknowledged by a number of epistemologists that some kind of luck is in fact an inevitable component of the process of knowledge acquisition. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Knowledge and Varieties of Epistemic Luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351-362.
    It is generally thought that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck as the post‐Gettier literature makes it abundantly clear. Examples are produced where although a belief is true and justified, it nevertheless falls short of being an instance of knowledge because of the intrusion of luck. Knowledge is regarded as being distinct from lucky guesses. It is, nevertheless, acknowledged by a number of epistemologists that some kind of luck is in fact an inevitable component of the process of knowledge acquisition. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Epistemic Justification of Testimonial Beliefs and the Categories of Egophoricity and Evidentiality in Natural Languages: An Insoluble Paradox of Thomas Reid's Anti-Reductionism.Elżbieta Łukasiewicz - 2020 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 62 (1):137-168.
    The paper is concerned with the epistemological status of testimony and the question of what may confer justification on true testimonial beliefs and enable us to call such beliefs knowledge. In particular, it addresses certain anti-reductionist arguments in the epistemology of testimony and their incompatibility with the grammatical categories of egophoricity (conjunct/disjunct marking) and evidentiality (information source marking) present in the architecture of natural languages. First, the tradition of epistemological individualism and its rationale are discussed, as well as certain attempts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Kantian Pragmatism and the Habermasian Anti-Deflationist Account of Truth.Tomoo Ueda - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (2):105-127.
    In this paper, I aim to characterize the pragmatist and anti-deflationist notions of truth. I take Habermas’s rather recent discussion and present the interpretation that his notion of truth relies on the reliabilist conception of knowledge rather than the internalist conception that defines knowledge as a justified true belief. Then, I show that my interpretation is consistent with Habermas’s project of weak naturalism. Finally, I draw some more general implications about the pragmatist notion of truth.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • La justification pragmatique des croyances.Giovanni Tuzet - 2008 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 133 (4):465-476.
    La justification des croyances peut être de nature pragmatique – à savoir, une justification qui dépende des enjeux pratiques de la situation dans laquelle le sujet ayant une certaine croyance se trouve. De plus, dans des contextes spécifiques, comme par exemple le contexte juridique, il y a des cas où une connaissance est attribuée à un sujet ayant une croyance vraie en faisant abstraction de la justification qu’il peut avoir ou non à propos de sa croyance. Dans ces cas, l’attribution (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Ethics, Kawa, and the Constitution: Transformation of the System of Ethical Review in Aotearoa New Zealand.Hope Tupara - 2011 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 20 (3):367-379.
    New Zealand is a South Pacific nation with a history of British colonization since the 19th century. It has a population of over four million people and, like other indigenous societies such as in Australia and Canada, Māori are now a minority in their land, and their experience of colonization is that of being dominated by settlers to the detriment of their own systems of society.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Group knowledge analyzed.Raimo Tuomela - 2004 - Episteme 1 (2):109-127.
    The main task of the present paper is to investigate the nature of collective knowledge and discuss what kind of justificatory aspects are involved in it to discuss it from collective belief. The central kind of collective knowledge investigated is normatively binding knowledge attributed to a social group. A distinction is made between natural knowledge and constitutive knowledge related to social (especially institutional) matters. In the case of the latter kind of knowledge, in contrast to the former kind, justification and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Evidential support, reliability, and Hume's problem of induction.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):503-519.
    Necessity holds that, if a proposition A supports another B, then it must support B. John Greco contends that one can resolve Hume's Problem of Induction only if she rejects Necessity in favor of reliabilism. If Greco's contention is correct, we would have good reason to reject Necessity and endorse reliabilism about inferential justification. Unfortunately, Greco's contention is mistaken. I argue that there is a plausible reply to Hume's Problem that both endorses Necessity and is at least as good as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and Triviality.Barbara Trybulec - 2017 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 8 (1):183-207.
    In the paper, I distinguish the bottom-up strategy and the intentional stance strategy of analyzing group intentional states, and show that the thesis of distributed group subject of knowledge could be accommodated by either of them. Moreover, I argue that when combined with virtue reliabilism the thesis satisfactorily explains the phenomenon of group knowledge. To justify my argument, in the second part of the paper, I distinguish two accounts of justification pointing to conditions of group knowledge. The first, which I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Strengthened, and weakened, by belief.Tue Trinh - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy 47 (1):37-76.
    This paper discusses a set of observations, many of which are novel, concerning differences between the adjectival modals _certain_ and _possible_ and their adverbial counterparts _certainly_ and _possibly_. It argues that the observations can be derived from a standard interpretation of _certain_/_certainly_ as universal and _possible_/_possibly_ as existential quantifiers over possible worlds, in conjunction with the hypothesis that the adjectives quantify over knowledge and the adverbs quantify over belief. The claims on which the argument relies include the following: (i) knowledge (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • » Credo* me* cogitare ergo scio* me* esse1/2 « — Descartes' »cogito ergo sum« reinterpreted.Rainer Trapp - 1988 - Erkenntnis 28 (2):253-267.
    At first sight one might be tempted to regard Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" as logically true by existential generalisation. This however would neither exhaust the specific epistemic content of "cogito" nor reveal the philosophical peculiarities of "sum" which the author takes to have two ontologically different meanings. The full sense of "cogito ergo sum" finally turns out to be "Credo* me* cogitare ergo scio* me* $\text{esse}_{1/2}$ ". Furthermore this proposition can formally be proved to be true by means of epistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Saving Sensitivity.Brett Topey - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):177-196.
    Sensitivity has sometimes been thought to be a highly epistemologically significant property, serving as a proxy for a kind of responsiveness to the facts that ensure that the truth of our beliefs isn’t just a lucky coincidence. But it's an imperfect proxy: there are various well-known cases in which sensitivity-based anti-luck conditions return the wrong verdicts. And as a result of these failures, contemporary theorists often dismiss such conditions out of hand. I show here, though, that a sensitivity-based understanding of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Identity, intensionality, and intentionality.James E. Tomberlin - 1984 - Synthese 61 (1):111 - 131.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Deciding for Others.John Tillson - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (5):1349-1355.
    Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Properties of Being in Heidegger’s Being and Time.Joshua Tepley - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (3):461-481.
    While it is well known that the early Heidegger distinguishes between different ‘kinds of being’ and identifies various ‘structures’ that compose them, there has been little discussion about what these kinds and structures of being are. This paper defends the ‘Property Thesis’, the position that kinds of being (and their structures) are properties of the entities that have them. I give two arguments for this thesis. The first is grounded in the fact that Heidegger refers to kinds and structures of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Assertion, Lying and the Norm of Truth.Roger Teichmann - forthcoming - Topoi:1-9.
    In chapter four of Truth and Truthfulness Bernard Williams presents an account of assertion that relies heavily on the ‘psychological’ notions of belief and intention. In chapter five his definition of lying similarly relies on such notions. For Williams, insofar as there are norms governing assertion as such or norms broken by lying as such, these norms relate to saying what you think to be true, as distinct from saying what is true. I argue that this ‘psychologized’ account of assertion (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Qualities and translations.Christopher Tancredi & Yael Sharvit - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (3):303-343.
    We argue for a new mode of interpretation for attributed attitudes, what we call de translato interpretation. De translato interpretation assigns a meaning to an expression based on the interpretation given to that expression by the attitude subject rather than that standardly given by the attributor. We argue that this new mode of interpretation is distinct from but compatible with de dicto, de re and de qualitate interpretation. Formally, de translato interpretation is analyzed as introducing a modification in the language (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Supermaxim of Conversation.P. Swiggers - 1981 - Dialectica 35 (3):303-306.
    SummaryThe Gricean maxims of conversation are regulated by a supermaxim which determines what is relevant or not for a particular conversation. This maxim, involving a pragmatical knowledge, imposes specific restrictions on conversational strategy. It is called the “maxim of conversation topology” because it fixes the topos of a conversation.RésuméDans cet article nous démontrons que les maximes de la conversation, établies par H.P. Grice, sont dominées par une supermaxime qui détermine ce qui est pertinent et ce qui n'est pas pertinent pour (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Getting from P to Q: Valid Inferences and Heuristics.Norman Swartz - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (4):689-.
    Epistemologists have known for two-and-a-half centuries that there are serious difficulties surroundingnon-demonstrativeinference. The best-known problem,theproblem of induction, was first diagnosed by Hume in theTreatise. In our own century, several more problems were added, e.g., by Hempel —the paradox of the ravens—and by Goodman —the “new,” or exacerbated, problem of induction. But an even greater blow lay ahead: within the decade after Goodman's problem appeared, Gettier was to publish his famous challenge to the traditional analysis of knowledge which, again, underscored how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Artykuł O treści logicznej zawarte W czasopismach nadesłanych do redakcji.Stanisław Surma, Klemens Szaniawski, Jan Franciszek Drewnowski, Ewa Żarnecka-Biały, Jerzy Kmita, Jerzy Giedymin & Leon Koj - 1964 - Studia Logica 15 (1):311-343.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Probaility and information.Patrick Suppes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):81-82.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Why the Method of Cases Doesn’t Work.Christopher Suhler - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):825-847.
    In recent years, there has been increasing discussion of whether philosophy actually makes progress. This discussion has been prompted, in no small part, by the depth and persistence of disagreement among philosophers on virtually every major theoretical issue in the field. In this paper, I examine the role that the Method of Cases – the widespread philosophical method of testing and revising theories by comparing their verdicts against our intuitions in particular cases – plays in creating and sustaining theoretical disagreements (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Modal Humeanism and Arguments from Possibility.Margot Strohminger - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):391-401.
    Sider (2011, 2013) proposes a reductive analysis of metaphysical modality—‘(modal) Humeanism’—and goes on to argue that it has interesting epistemological and methodological implications. In particular, Humeanism is supposed to undermine a class of ‘arguments from possibility’, which includes Sider's (1993) own argument against mereological nihilism and Chalmers's (1996) argument against physicalism. I argue that Sider's arguments do not go through, and moreover that we should instead expect Humeanism to be compatible with the practice of arguing from possibility in philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • ‘Unlucky’ Gettier Cases.Jim Stone - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):421-430.
    This article argues that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases often are not true due to luck. I offer two ‘unlucky’ Gettier cases, and it's easy enough to generate more. Hence even attaching a broad ‘anti‐luck’ codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge leaves the Gettier problem intact. Also, two related questions are addressed. First, if epistemic luck isn't distinctive of Gettier cases, what is? Second, what do Gettier cases reveal about knowledge?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The epistemic analysis of luck.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):319-334.
    Duncan Pritchard has argued that luck is fundamentally a modal notion: an event is lucky when it occurs in the actual world, but does not occur in more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds. Jennifer Lackey has provided counterexamples to accounts which, like Pritchard’s, only allow for the existence of improbable lucky events. Neil Levy has responded to Lackey by offering a modal account of luck which attempts to respect the intuition that some lucky events occur in more (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Principles of Interpretive Charity and the Semantics of Knowledge Attributions.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (2):153-168.
    Positions in the debate about the correct semantics of “S knows that p” are sometimes motivated in part by an appeal to interpretive charity. In particular, non-skeptical views hold that many utterances of the sentence “S knows that p” are true and some of them think the fact that their views are able to respect this is a reason why their views are more charitable than skeptical invariantism. However, little attention has been paid to why charity should be understood in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
    Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis of the phenomenon, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations  
  • Normativity and epistemic intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
    In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   520 citations  
  • Proper functioning and warrant after seven vodka martinis.Matthias Steup - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (1):89 - 109.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Luck as an epistemic notion.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):361-377.
    Many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, but there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent’s epistemic situation. According to the proposed account, an event is lucky for an agent only if the agent was not in a position to know that the event would occur. It is also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):875-898.
    It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such counterfactual skepticism is to postulate the existence of primitive modal facts that serve as truth-makers for counterfactual claims. Moreover, I defend a new theory of ‘might’ counterfactuals, and develop assertability and knowledge criteria to suit such unobservable ‘counterfacts’.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • The folk conception of knowledge.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):272-283.
    How do people decide which claims should be considered mere beliefs and which count as knowledge? Although little is known about how people attribute knowledge to others, philosophical debate about the nature of knowledge may provide a starting point. Traditionally, a belief that is both true and justified was thought to constitute knowledge. However, philosophers now agree that this account is inadequate, due largely to a class of counterexamples (termed ‘‘Gettier cases’’) in which a person’s justified belief is true, but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   107 citations  
  • On Logics of Knowledge and Belief.Robert Stalnaker - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):169-199.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   137 citations  
  • Misplaced Trust and Distrust: How Not to Engage with Medical Artificial Intelligence.Georg Starke & Marcello Ienca - forthcoming - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics:1-10.
    Artificial intelligence (AI) plays a rapidly increasing role in clinical care. Many of these systems, for instance, deep learning-based applications using multilayered Artificial Neural Nets, exhibit epistemic opacity in the sense that they preclude comprehensive human understanding. In consequence, voices from industry, policymakers, and research have suggested trust as an attitude for engaging with clinical AI systems. Yet, in the philosophical and ethical literature on medical AI, the notion of trust remains fiercely debated. Trust skeptics hold that talking about trust (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (7):e12850.
    Academics across widely ranging disciplines all pursue knowledge, but they do so using vastly different methods. Do these academics therefore also have different ideas about when someone possesses knowledge? Recent experimental findings suggest that intuitions about when individuals have knowledge may vary across groups; in particular, the concept of knowledge espoused by the discipline of philosophy may not align with the concept held by laypeople. Across two studies, we investigate the concept of knowledge held by academics across seven disciplines (N (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional Action.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Sara Konrath - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):353-380.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have advanced a surprising conclusion: people's judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally are pervasively influenced by normative considerations. In this paper, we investigate the ‘Chairman case’, an influential case from this literature and disagree with this conclusion. Using a statistical method called structural path modeling, we show that people's attributions of intentional action to an agent are driven not by normative assessments, but rather by attributions of underlying values and characterological dispositions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations