- Explaining and Evaluating Types of Liberal Incompatibilism in Solving the Conflict between Human Free Will and the Determined World.Zeynab Abolghasemi Dehaghani & Mohammad Saeedi Mehr - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 20 (77):5-21.details
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Ethics and the Nature of Action.Heine A. Holmen - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Oslodetails
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A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will?David Widerker - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):296-306.details
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Luck’s Extended Reach.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):191-218.details
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(1 other version)Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-583.details
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Goetz on the Noncausal Libertarian View of Free Will.David Palmer - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):99-107.details
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Free Will and Contextualism.Steven Rieber - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):223-252.details
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Intentions are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):235-262.details
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Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.details
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The Physical Action Theory of Trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2015 - Methode 4 (6).details
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Storia e teorie dell'intenzionalità.Simone Gozzano - 1997details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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Hume and the phenomenology of agency.Joshua M. Wood - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):496-517.details
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Powers, Necessity, and Determinism.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):225-229.details
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The contours of control.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.details
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A New Kantian Response to Maxim-Fiddling.Andrew Sneddon - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (1):67-88.details
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Minimal authorship (of sorts).Christy Mag Uidhir - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):373 - 387.details
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Choosing your poison and the time of a killing.Auke J. K. Pols - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):719-733.details
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(1 other version)Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 22.details
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Making a Difference in a Deterministic World.Carolina Sartorio - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):189-214.details
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Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.details
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Causation, Action, and Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2009 - In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press UK.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Side-effect actions, acting for a reason, and acting intentionally.John Michael McGuire - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):317 - 333.details
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The disappearing agent objection to event-causal libertarianism.Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-11.details
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The metaphysical importance of the compatibility question: comments on Mark Balaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Michael McKenna - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-12.details
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Crimes of Negligence: Attempting and Succeeding. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):387-398.details
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Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest.Matthew Talbert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.details
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A Critique of Carl Ginet's Intrinsic Theory of Volition.Beverly K. Hinton - 2001 - Behavior and Philosophy 29:101 - 120.details
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Minimally Creative Thought.Dustin Stokes - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (5):658-681.details
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Action individuation: a normative functionalist approach.Chauncey Maher - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):99-116.details
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Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?Christian Miller - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.details
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Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.details
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The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.details
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Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires.Attila Tanyi - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2):67-89.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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The Explanatory Power of Local Miracle Compatibilism.Garrett Pendergraft - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):249-266.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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Reasons and Causes.Kieran Setiya - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):129-157.details
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In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations.Carl Ginet - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):229 - 237.details
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Action.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 137-151.details
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Motivation in agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.details
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What is self-control?Edmund Henden - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.details
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Intentions, reasons, and beliefs: Morals of the toxin puzzle.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (2):171 - 194.details
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(1 other version)Indeterminist free will.Storrs McCall & E. J. Lowe - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):681–690.details
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Emotion and action.Jing Zhu & Paul Thagard - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):19 – 36.details
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Trying slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby account for mistakes and slips?Kay Peabody - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):173-216.details
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Skill, luck, control, and intentional action.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):341 – 352.details
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Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.details
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The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.details
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