- What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):255-272.details
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Virtue epistemology and the acquisition of knowledge.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):229 – 243.details
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Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.details
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Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and Closure.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - Theoria 68 (2):129-161.details
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Epistemically useful false beliefs.Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):4-20.details
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Epistemological disjunctivism and the basis problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):434-455.details
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Epistemic Deflationism.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):103-134.details
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Epistemic dependence.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):305-324.details
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Extended cognition, assistive technology and education.Duncan Pritchard, Andrea R. English & John Ravenscroft - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8355-8377.details
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Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):133 - 151.details
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There is no need for (even fully fleshed out) mental models to map onto formal logic.Paul Pollard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):363-364.details
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Questioning as an Epistemic Process of Critical Thinking.Polycarp Ikuenobe - 2001 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 33 (3-4):325-341.details
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On the Theoretical Unification and Nature of Fallacies.Polycarp Ikuenobe - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (2):189-211.details
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Mental models, more or less.Thad A. Polk - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):362-363.details
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Epistemic norms.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Synthese 71 (1):61 - 95.details
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Evaluating Inferences: the Nature and Role of Warrants.Robert C. Pinto - 2006 - Informal Logic 26 (3):287-317.details
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A metaphilosophical dilemma for epistemic externalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (5):688-707.details
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Popper and nursing theory.Peter Allmark - 2003 - Nursing Philosophy 4 (1):4-16.details
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Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2009 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.details
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Is knowledge a natural kind?Tuomas K. Pernu - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):371 - 386.details
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What is ignorance?Rik Peels - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):57-67.details
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Why Responsible Belief Is Permissible Belief.Rik Peels & Anthony Booth - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):75-88.details
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Responsible belief and epistemic justification.Rik Peels - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2895-2915.details
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Philosophers against “truth”: The cases of Harreacute and Laudan.A. Paya - 1995 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (3):255-284.details
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The Unreliable Intuitions Objection Against Reflective Equilibrium.Norbert Paulo - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (3):333-353.details
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Justified until proven guilty: Alston's new epistemology. [REVIEW]Robert Pasnau - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (1):1 - 33.details
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Knowledge of Mathematics without Proof.Alexander Paseau - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):775-799.details
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Externalism and “knowing what” one thinks.T. Parent - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1337-1350.details
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Probability and normativity.David Papineau - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):484-485.details
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Knowledge and cognitive integration.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1931-1951.details
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Deduction and degrees of belief.David Over - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):361-362.details
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Coherence and abduction.Paul O'Rorke - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):484-484.details
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The Value of Knowledge.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):874-883.details
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Reply to Kvanvig on the Swamping Problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Social Epistemology 25 (2):173 - 182.details
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Knowledge, truth, and bullshit: Reflections on Frankfurt.Erik J. Olsson - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):94-110.details
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F. P. Ramsey on knowledge and fallibilism.Erik J. Olsson - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):549–557.details
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A simulation approach to veritistic social epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):127-143.details
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A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2016 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Hilary Kornblith (eds.), Goldman and His Critics. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley. pp. 178–199.details
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Mental models and the tractability of everyday reasoning.Mike Oaksford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):360-361.details
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Epistemological contextualism: Its past, present, and prospects.Andrew P. Norman - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):383-418.details
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Analytical marxism: A form of critical theory. [REVIEW]Kai Nielsen - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (1):1 - 21.details
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Theoretical Understanding in Science.Mark P. Newman - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).details
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The No-Miracles Argument, reliabilism, and a methodological version of the generality problem.Mark Newman - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.details
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Error in action and belief.Natika Newton - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (4):363-401.details
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Do mental models provide an adequate account of syllogistic reasoning performance?Stephen E. Newstead - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):359-360.details
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Epistemology Factualized: New Contractarian Foundations for Epistemology.Ram Neta - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):247-280.details
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Clear and Distinct Perception in the Stoics, Augustine, and William of Ockham.Tamer Nawar - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):185-207.details
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Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification.Jeremy Koons - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):203-218.details
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Reliability connections between conceivability and inconceivability.Peter Murphy - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):195-205.details
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