- Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.details
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The probability of war in then-crises problem: Modeling new alternatives to Wright's solution.Claudio Cioffi-Revilla & Raymond Dacey - 1988 - Synthese 76 (2):285-305.details
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An interchange on the Popper-Miller argument.Charles S. Chihara & Donald A. Gillies - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (1):1 - 8.details
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Eliciting beliefs.Robert Chambers & Tigran Melkonyan - 2008 - Theory and Decision 65 (4):271-284.details
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Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End.Peter Brössel & Franz Huber - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.details
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Revising incomplete attitudes.Richard Bradley - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):235 - 256.details
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Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson.Luc Bovens, Branden Fitelson, Stephan Hartmann & Josh Snyder - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):539-563.details
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The Rules of Logic Composition for the Bayesian Epistemic e-Values.Wagner Borges & Julio Michael Stern - 2007 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 15 (5-6):401-420.details
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Incompatibility and the pessimistic induction: a challenge for selective realism.Florian J. Boge - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-31.details
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A minimal extension of Bayesian decision theory.Ken Binmore - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (3):341-362.details
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Immunity to error through misidentification and past-tense memory judgements.J. L. Bermudez - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):211-220.details
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Two dogmas of strong objective bayesianism.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon Brittan - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):45 – 65.details
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Non-Bayesian Accounts of Evidence: Howson’s Counterexample Countered.Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper & Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):291-298.details
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Dynamic Oppositional Symmetries for Color, Jungian and Kantian Categories.Julio Michael Stern - manuscriptdetails
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The assumptions on knowledge and resources in models of rationality.Pei Wang - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (01):193-218.details
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Knowledge, Evidence, and Naked Statistics.Sherrilyn Roush - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games.Gerhard Schurz - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):200-220.details
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David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems.Sven Ove Hansson (ed.) - 2013 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Coherence as an ideal of rationality.Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):175 - 216.details
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Probability kinematics and commutativity.Carl G. Wagner - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):266-278.details
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On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.details
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Inductive reasoning and chance discovery.Ahmed Y. Tawfik - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (4):441-451.details
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Software Intensive Science.John Symons & Jack Horner - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (3):461-477.details
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Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):1-21.details
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Distention for Sets of Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):604-620.details
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Should I pretend I'm perfect?Julia Staffel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.details
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The flow of information in signaling games.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):155 - 165.details
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The Meta‐inductivist’s Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game: A New Approach to Hume’s Problem.Gerhard Schurz - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (3):278-305.details
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Reward versus risk in uncertain inference: Theorems and simulations.Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):574-612.details
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A simplification of the theory of simplicity.Samuel A. Richmond - 1996 - Synthese 107 (3):373 - 393.details
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On the impossibility of inductive probability.Michael Redhead - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):185-191.details
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Reviews. [REVIEW]Jerome R. Ravetz - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):265-268.details
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On the Evidential Import of Unification.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (1):92-114.details
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A Bayesian Account of the Virtue of Unification.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (2):399-423.details
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Why scientists gather evidence.Patrick Maher - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):103-119.details
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Decisions with indeterminate probabilities.Ronald P. Loui - 1986 - Theory and Decision 21 (3):283-309.details
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Bayesian Informal Logic and Fallacy.Kevin Korb - 2004 - Informal Logic 24 (1):41-70.details
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Two Conceptions of Weight of Evidence in Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science.Jeff Kasser - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):629-648.details
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The Value of a Probability Forecast from Portfolio Theory.D. J. Johnstone - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (2):153-203.details
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Economic Darwinism: Who has the Best Probabilities? [REVIEW]David Johnstone - 2007 - Theory and Decision 62 (1):47-96.details
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On Ratio Measures of Confirmation: Critical Remarks on Zalabardo’s Argument for the Likelihood-Ratio Measure.Valeriano Iranzo & Ignacio Martínez de Lejarza - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):193-200.details
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Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity.Thomas Icard - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):863-903.details
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Reviews. [REVIEW]Colin Howson - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):268-272.details
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Modelling uncertain inference.Colin Howson - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):475-492.details
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How Pseudo-hypotheses Defeat a Non-Bayesian Theory of Evidence: Reply to Bandyopadhyay, Taper, and Brittan.Colin Howson - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):299-306.details
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Exhuming the No-Miracles Argument.Colin Howson - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):205-211.details
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A historical comment concerning novel confirmation.I. J. Good - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):184-185.details
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The Turing—Good Weight of Evidence Function and Popper's Measure of the Severity of a Test.Donald Gillies - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):143-146.details
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Non-bayesian foundations for statistical estimation, prediction, and the ravens example.Malcolm R. Forster - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (3):357 - 376.details
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Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.details
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