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  1. The Case of the Disappearing Semicolon: Expressive-Assertivism and the Embedding Problem.Thorsten Sander - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):959-979.
    Expressive-Assertivism, a metaethical theory championed by Daniel Boisvert, is sometimes considered to be a particularly promising form of hybrid expressivism. One of the main virtues of Expressive-Assertivism is that it seems to offer a simple solution to the Frege-Geach problem. I argue, in contrast, that Expressive-Assertivism faces much the same challenges as pure expressivism.
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  • Representationalism and the Intentionality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1515-1526.
    It seems hard to comprehend how, during mood experience, the ‘inner’ meets the ‘outer’. The objective of this paper is to show that a currently popular attempt at providing a neat solution to that problem fails. The attempt comes under the heading of representationalism, according to which the phenomenal aspects of mood are exhausted by its representational content. I examine three accounts of intentionality developed within the representationalist camp, and I show that they incur phenomenological and metaphysical costs.
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  • William James on Emotion and Intentionality.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2005 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.
    William James's theory of emotion is often criticized for placing too much emphasis on bodily feelings and neglecting the cognitive aspects of emotion. This paper suggests that such criticisms are misplaced. Interpreting James's account of emotion in the light of his later philosophical writings, I argue that James does not emphasize bodily feelings at the expense of cognition. Rather, his view is that bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. In reconceptualizing the relationship between cognition and affect, James (...)
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  • Critical Reflection, Self-Knowledge, and the Emotions.Catriona Mackenzie - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):186-206.
    Drawing on recent cognitive theories of the emotions, this article develops an account of critical reflection as requiring emotional flexibility and involving the ability to envisage alternative reasons for action. The focus on the role of emotions in critical reflection, and in agents' resistance to reflection, suggests the need to move beyond an introspective to a more social and relational conception of the process of reflection. It also casts new light on the intractable problem of explaining how oppressive socialisation impairs (...)
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  • Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (6):602-626.
    It is generally maintained that emotions consist of intentional states and /or bodily feelings. This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of guilt in severe depression, in order to illustrate how such conceptions fail to adequately accommodate a way in which some emotional experiences are said to be deeper than others. Many emotions are intentional states. However, I propose that the deepest emotions are not intentional but pre-intentional, meaning that they determine which kinds of intentional state are possible. I go on (...)
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  • The Rationality of Grief.Carolyn Price - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):20-40.
    Donald Gustafson has argued that grief centres on a combination of belief and desire: The belief that the subject has suffered an irreparable loss. The desire that this should not be the case. And yet, as Gustafson points out, if the belief is true, the desire cannot be satisfied. Gustafson takes this to show that grief inevitably implies an irrational conflict between belief and desire. I offer a partial defence of grief against Gustafson's charge of irrationality. My defence rests on (...)
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  • “Screw You!” & “Thank You”.Coleen Macnamara - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):893-914.
    If I do you a good turn, you may respond with gratitude and express that gratitude by saying “Thank you.” Similarly, if I insult you, you may react with resentment which you express by shouting, “Screw you!” or something of the sort. Broadly put, when confronted with another’s morally significant conduct, we are inclined to respond with a reactive attitude and to express that reactive attitude in speech. A number of familiar speech acts have a call-and-response structure. Questions, demands and (...)
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  • Reconciling Emotions with Western Personhood.Agneta H. Fischer & Jeroen Jansz - 1995 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25 (1):59–80.
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  • Indeterminacy of Definitions and Criteria in Mental Health: Case Study of Emotional Disorders.George Nikolaidis - 2013 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (3):531-536.
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  • Implementing Moral Decision Making Faculties in Computers and Robots.Wendell Wallach - 2008 - AI and Society 22 (4):463-475.
    The challenge of designing computer systems and robots with the ability to make moral judgments is stepping out of science fiction and moving into the laboratory. Engineers and scholars, anticipating practical necessities, are writing articles, participating in conference workshops, and initiating a few experiments directed at substantiating rudimentary moral reasoning in hardware and software. The subject has been designated by several names, including machine ethics, machine morality, artificial morality, or computational morality. Most references to the challenge elucidate one facet or (...)
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  • Preface.Peter N. Stearns - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (4):291-293.
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  • Emotions on a Continuum.David D. Franks - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (2):105-106.
    An alternative approach to emotion is presented here, which differs from that of Kagan and others. It orders emotion along a continuum of the embodiment of emotion, starting with a clear but rare case of pure emotion and at the other extreme discusses Damasio’s intelligent prefrontal patients who could not feel emotions critical to social life.
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  • Emotion Experience, Rational Action, and Self-Knowledge.John A. Lambie - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):272-280.
    This article examines the role of emotion experience in both rational action and self-knowledge. A key distinction is made between emotion experiences of which we are unaware, and those of which we are aware. The former motivate action and color our view of the world, but they do not do so in a rational way, and their nonreflective nature obscures self-understanding. The article provides arguments and evidence to support the view that emotion experiences contribute to rational action only if one (...)
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  • The Logic of Emotional Experience: Noninferentiality and the Problem of Conflict Without Contradiction.Sabine A. Döring - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):240-247.
    Almost all contemporary philosophers on the subject agree that emotions play an indispensable role in the justification (as opposed to the mere causation) of other mental states and actions. However, how this role is to be understood is still an open question. At the core of the debate is the phenomenon of conflict without contradiction: why is it that an emotion need not be revised in the light of better judgment and knowledge? Conflict without contradiction has been explained either by (...)
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  • Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion.Rainer Reisenzein - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):214-222.
    Based on the belief that computational modeling (thinking in terms of representation and computations) can help to clarify controversial issues in emotion theory, this article examines emotional experience from the perspective of the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion (CBDTE), a computational explication of the belief–desire theory of emotion. It is argued that CBDTE provides plausible answers to central explanatory challenges posed by emotional experience, including: the phenomenal quality,intensity and object-directedness of emotional experience, the function of emotional experience and its relation (...)
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  • Ten Perspectives on Emotional Experience: Introduction to the Special Issue.Rainer Reisenzein & Sabine A. Döring - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):195-205.
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  • Beyond Belief: Toward a Theory of the Reactive Attitudes.Elisa A. Hurley & Coleen Macnamara - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (3):373-399.
    Most moral theorists agree that it is one thing to believe that someone has slighted you and another to resent her for the insult; one thing to believe that someone did you a favor and another to feel gratitude toward her for her kindness. While all of these ways of responding to another's conduct are forms of moral appraisal, the reactive attitudes are said to 'go beyond' beliefs in some way. We think this claim is adequately explained only when we (...)
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  • At the Core of Our Capacity to Act for a Reason: The Affective System and Evaluative Model-Based Learning and Control.Peter Railton - 2017 - Emotion Review 9 (4):335-342.
    Recent decades have witnessed a sea change in thinking about emotion, which has gone from being seen as a disruptive force in human thought and action to being seen as an important source of situation- and goal-relevant information and evaluation, continuous with perception and cognition. Here I argue on philosophical and empirical grounds that the role of emotion in contributing to our ability to respond to reasons for action runs deeper still: The affective system is at the core of the (...)
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  • Emotions and Formal Objects.Fabrice Teroni - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.
    It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that (...)
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  • On the Rationality of Emotions: Or, When Are Emotions Rational?Klaus R. Scherer - 2011 - Social Science Information 50 (3-4):330-350.
    The connections between emotion and rationality are reexamined. Historically, Plato’s doctrine of the tripartite soul has established the preconception of a strict separation of emotion/passion from cognition/rationality, encouraging the biased perception that emotions are inherently irrational. To examine whether emotions can be rational, one must first examine the various meanings of rationality as developed in philosophy, psychology and the social and economic sciences. In this article, three forms of rationality are distinguished, and it is suggested that they can act as (...)
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  • Affective Arrangements.Jan Slaby, Rainer Mühlhoff & Philipp Wüschner - 2019 - Emotion Review 11 (1):3-12.
    We introduce the working concept of “affective arrangement.” This concept is the centerpiece of a perspective on situated affectivity that emphasizes relationality, dynamics, and performativity. Our proposal relates to work in cultural studies and continental philosophy in the Spinoza–Deleuze lineage, yet it is equally geared to the terms of recent work in the philosophy of emotion. Our aim is to devise a framework that can help flesh out how affectivity unfolds dynamically in a relational setting by which it is at (...)
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  • Relational Understanding and White Antiracist Praxis.Pamela Perry & Alexis Shotwell - 2009 - Sociological Theory 27 (1):33 - 50.
    In this article, we argue that, in order for white racial consciousness and practice to shift toward an antiracist praxis, a relational understanding of racism, the "self, "and society is necessary We find that such understanding arises from a confluence of propositional, affective, and tacit forms of knowledge about racism and one's own situatedness within it. We consider the claims sociologists have made about transformations in racial consciousness, bringing sociological theories of racism into dialogue with research on whiteness and antiracism. (...)
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  • Manipulating Emotion: The Best Evidence for Non-Cognitivism in the Light of Proper Function.Charles Starkey - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):230–237.
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  • Which Empathy? Limitations in the Mirrored “Understanding” of Emotion.Remy Debes - 2010 - Synthese 175 (2):219-239.
    The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading, and usually in cases of action. By contrast, this (...)
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  • The Rationality and Functionality of Emotions.Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 2000 - The European Legacy 5 (1):49-63.
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  • Romantic Love, Altruism, and Self‐Respect: An Analysis of Simone De Beauvoir.Kathryn Pauly Morgan - 1986 - Hypatia 1 (1):117 - 148.
    I examine Beauvoir's moral assessment of Romantic Love in The Second Sex. I first set out Beauvoir's central philosophical assumptions concerning the nature and situations of women, setting the framework for her analysis of the intersubjective dynamic which constitutes the phenomenology of romantic loving. In this process four double-bind paradoxes are generated which can lead, ultimately, to servility in the woman who loves. In a separate analysis, I ask whether it is wrong for a woman to aspire to and/or choose (...)
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  • How Does One Know What Shame Is? Epistemology, Emotions, and Forms of Life in Juxtaposition.Ullaliina Lehtinen - 1998 - Hypatia 13 (1):56 - 77.
    Do women conceptualize-understand, know about, and react to-shame differently from the way men do? Does the experience and knowledge of shame have a gender-specificity, and along what lines could it be analyzed? By introducing a distinction between life or enduring experiences, "Erfahrung," and episodic or occurrent experiences, "Erlebnis," and by juxtaposing this distinction with the Rylean notion that knowledge is dispositional this paper argues for the plausibility of a gender-specificity.
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  • Recasting Scottish Sentimentalism: The Peculiarity of Moral Approval.Remy Debes - 2012 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (1):91-115.
    By founding morality on the particular sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith implied that the nature of moral judgment was far more intuitive and accessible than their rationalist predecessors and contemporaries would, or at least easily could, allow. And yet, these ‘Sentimentalists’ faced the longstanding belief that the human affective psyche is a veritable labyrinth – an obstacle to practical morality if not something literally brutish in us. The Scottish Sentimentalists thus implicitly tasked themselves with distinguishing (...)
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  • Normative, Descriptive and Prescriptive Responses.Jonathan Baron - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):32-42.
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  • The Consequences of Taking Consequentialism Seriously.Philip E. Tetlock - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):31-32.
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  • Actions, Inactions and the Temporal Dimension.Karl Halvor Teigen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):30-31.
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  • What Goals Are to Count?Mark D. Spranca - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):29-30.
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  • Can Goals Be Uniquely Defined?Ilana Ritov - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):28-29.
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  • Goals, Values and Benefits.Frederic Schick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):29-29.
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  • Broadening the Base for Bringing Cognitive Psychology to Bear on Ethics.Peter Railton - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):27-28.
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  • Some Examples of Nonconsequentialist Decisions.Gerald M. Phillips - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):25-26.
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  • A “Should” Too Many.Paul M. Pietroski - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):26-27.
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  • Side Effects: Limitations of Human Rationality.Keith Oatley - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):24-25.
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  • Does Consequentialism Pay?Adam Morton - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):24-24.
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  • Jonathan Baron, Consequentialism and Error Theory.Sanford S. Levy - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):22-23.
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  • Consequentialism in Haste.Roger A. McCain - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):23-24.
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  • On Begging the Question When Naturalizing Norms.Leonard D. Katz - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-22.
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  • Elicitation Rules and Incompatible Goals.Julie R. Irwin - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):20-21.
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  • Departing From Consequentialism Versus Departing From Decision Theory.Frank Jackson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-21.
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  • Truth or Consequences.John Heil - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):19-20.
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  • Moral Errors.Clark Glymour - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):17-18.
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  • Consequences of Consequentialism.Rick Grush - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):18-19.
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  • Is Consequentialism Better Regarded as a Form of Reasoning or as a Pattern of Behavior?Steve Fuller - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):16-17.
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  • Consequentialism and Utility Theory.Deborah Frisch - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):16-16.
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  • Why Care Where Moral Intuitions Come From?Susan Dwyer - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):14-15.
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