- Should I pretend I'm perfect?Julia Staffel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.details
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Reasons without principles.Herman E. Stark - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):143 – 167.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
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Stich`s The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation.Miriam Solomon - 1994 - Informal Logic 16 (2).details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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On the Global Ambitions of Phenomenal Conservatism.Declan Smithies - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):206-244.details
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XV—Epistemic Charge.Susanna Siegel - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):277-306.details
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Epistemic Charge.Susanna Siegel - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):277-306.details
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On the explanatory power of truth in logic.Gila Sher - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):348-373.details
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Two Problems for Accepting as Intending.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2018 - Ethics 128 (3):626-641.details
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Re-formulating The Generalized Correspondence Principle.Michael Shaffer - 2008 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):99-115.details
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Bursting Bealer’s Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against Quine.Michael J. Shaffer & Jason A. Warnick - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):87-106.details
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Bursting Bealer’s Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against Quine.Michael J. Shaffer & Jason A. Warnick - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):87-105.details
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Scepticism, defeasible evidence and entitlement.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):439-455.details
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Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding.Karl Schafer - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):639-663.details
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Is there a reliability challenge for logic?Joshua Schechter - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):325-347.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Aiming at Aptness.Joshua Schechter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):438-452.details
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Rationality and psychology.Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich - 2004 - In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 279-300.details
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What logic should we think with?R. M. Sainsbury - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:1-17.details
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Logic isn’t normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.details
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Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):626-652.details
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Modellings for belief change: Prioritization and entrenchment.Hans Rott - 1992 - Theoria 58 (1):21-57.details
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Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning.Luis Rosa - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):156-173.details
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Coherence, Probability and Explanation.William Roche & Michael Schippers - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):821-828.details
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The limits of cognitive theory in anthropology.Mark Risjord - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):281 – 297.details
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Intentionality and Tense.Kenneth Rankin - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (2):383-.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Is There an 'I' in Epistemology?Ted Poston - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):517-541.details
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Is There an ‘I’ in Epistemology?Ted Poston - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):517-541.details
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Basic reasons and first philosophy: A coherentist view of reasons.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.details
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Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities.John L. Pollock - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):317-352.details
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Popper's severity of test as an intuitive probabilistic model of hypothesis testing.Fenna H. Poletiek - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):99-100.details
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New foundations for practical reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (2):113-144.details
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Belief revision and uncertain reasoning.Guy Politzer & Laure Carles - 2001 - Thinking and Reasoning 7 (3):217 – 234.details
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The Uses of Argument in Communicative Contexts.Robert C. Pinto - 2003 - Argumentation 24 (2):227-252.details
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Towards interpretation.Philip Pettit - 1994 - Philosophia 23 (1-4):157-170.details
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Making Up Your Mind: How Language Enables Self‐Knowledge, Self‐Knowability and Personhood.Philip Pettit - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):3-26.details
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Deliberation and Decision.Philip Pettit - 2010 - In Constantine Sandis & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 252–258.details
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
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On the normative variability of truth and logic.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):236-257.details
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II—What Should ‘Impostor Syndrome’ Be?Sarah K. Paul - 2019 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 93 (1):227-245.details
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Capturing Consequence.Alexander Paseau - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):271-295.details
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A simple theory of promising.David Owens - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (1):51-77.details
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Theories of reasoning and the computational explanation of everyday inference.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1995 - Thinking and Reasoning 1 (2):121 – 152.details
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Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification.Jeremy Koons - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):203-218.details
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Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.details
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The inexpressibility of validity.Julien Murzi - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):65-81.details
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Defeaters and Disqualifiers.Daniel Muñoz - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):887-906.details
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