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Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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On what we should believe (and when (and why) we should believe what we know we should not believe).Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
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Argument, Inference and Dialectic: Collected Papers on Informal Logic.Robert Pinto - 2001 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett (ed.) - 2021 - Rebus Community.details
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The internalist virtue theory of knowledge.Ralph Wedgwood - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5357–5378.details
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Ecological laws of perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn.Michael T. Turvey, R. E. Shaw, Edward S. Reed & William M. Mace - 1981 - Cognition 9 (3):237-304.details
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The structure of a scientific paper.Frederick Suppe - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (3):381-405.details
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Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence1.Martin Smith - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):273-295.details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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Inference from the best systematization.Nicholas Rescher - 2016 - Mind and Society 15 (2):147-154.details
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Four Problems of Abduction: A Brief History.Anya Plutynski - 2011 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-248.details
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F. P. Ramsey on Knowledge and Fallibilism.Erik J. Olsson - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):549-557.details
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F. P. Ramsey on knowledge and fallibilism.Erik J. Olsson - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):549–557.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Epistemic intuitions.Jennifer Nagel - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.details
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Gibbons on Epistemic Internalism.Andrew Moon - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):143-151.details
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Lotteries, Quasi-Lotteries, and Scepticism.Eugene Mills - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):335-352.details
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Moral Confirmation vs. Moral Explanation: A Tale of Two Challenges.Sarah McGrath - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):1-21.details
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Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):263-327.details
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On Social Defeat.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):719-734.details
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Partial convergence and approximate truth.Duncan Macintosh - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):153-170.details
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Knowledge laundering: Testimony and sensitive invariantism.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):132–138.details
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Evidence one does not possess.William G. Lycan - 1977 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):114 – 126.details
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The Easy Argument.Steven Luper - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):321 - 331.details
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The Nature of Darwin’s Support for the Theory of Natural Selection.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (1):112-129.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Justification, knowledge, and normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609.details
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Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge.Steven R. Levy - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):115 - 123.details
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Personal and social knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):87 - 107.details
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Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation.Krista Lawlor - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):1-27.details
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Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection.Jennifer Lackey - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):163-190.details
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Memory as a generative epistemic source.Jennifer Lackey - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):636–658.details
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Who's afraid of absolute space?John Earman - 1970 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):287-319.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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The lovely and the probable. [REVIEW]Christopher Hitchcock - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):433–440.details
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The Lovely and the Probable.Christopher Hitchcock - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):433-440.details
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Causal explanation and scientific realism.Christopher Hitchcock - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (2):151 - 178.details
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In defense of type materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1984 - Synthese 59 (June):295-320.details
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Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge.Yacin Hamami - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):77-89.details
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Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):148-166.details
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Profiling and Proof: Are Statistics Safe?Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (2):161-183.details
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Is probabilistic evidence a source of knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.details
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An attempt to add a little direction to "the problem of the direction of time".John Earman - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (1):15-47.details
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A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.details
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Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?Marcello Di Bello - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1045-1084.details
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Knowledge, assertion and lotteries.Keith DeRose - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568–580.details
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Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder.Claudio de Almeida & J. R. Fett - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):152-169.details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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