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Why Panpsychism doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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Dimensions of Reliability in Phenomenal Judgment.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4):101-127.details
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Marking the Centenary of Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity.A. R. J. Fisher (ed.) - 2021 - Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts on Metaphysics, Language and Mind / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Metafísica, Linguagem e Mente.Rodrigo Cid & Pedro Merlussi (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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Pictures Have Propositional Content.Alex Grzankowski - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):151-163.details
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A Historical Perspective in Support of Direct Realism.K. S. Sangeetha - 2024 - Topoi 43 (1):115-125.details
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Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.details
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The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
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Ontogeny and intentionality.Philip David Zelazo & J. Steven Reznick - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):631-632.details
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Evans, transparency, and Cartesianism.David Zapero - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):685-702.details
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Feeling of knowing and phenomenal consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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More on prosopagnosia.Andrew W. Young - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-271.details
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Consciousness, historical inversion, and cognitive science.Andrew W. Young - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):630-631.details
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Emotion as High-level Perception.Brandon Yip - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7181-7201.details
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Is Vision for Action Unconscious?Wayne Wu - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (8):413-433.details
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The Contents of Perception and the Contents of Emotion.Bill Wringe - 2014 - Noûs 49 (2):275-297.details
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The Contents of Perception and the Contents of Emotion.Bill Wringe - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):275-297.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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Georges Rey, contemporary philosophy of mind: A contentiously classical approach, contemporary philosophy series. [REVIEW]Abraham Witonsky - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (2):287-290.details
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Intentionality and phenomenology.Robert A. Wilson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):413-431.details
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Descartes discarded? Introspective self-awareness and the problems of transparency and compositionality☆.Markus Werning - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):751-761.details
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Attention to mental paint and change detection.Assaf Weksler - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1991-2007.details
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The transparency of experience and the neuroscience of attention.Assaf Weksler, Hilla Jacobson & Zohar Z. Bronfman - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4709-4730.details
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Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective.Assaf Weksler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):91-103.details
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Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
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Dispositionalism, ostension, and austerity.Michael Watkins - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (1):55 - 86.details
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Consciousness and no self?Sebastian Watzl - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):363-375.details
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Bergson on number.Robert Watt - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (1):106-125.details
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Should we continue to study consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.details
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Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky, eds., Readings in language and mind.Ted A. Warfield - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (2):290-293.details
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Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism.Dave Ward - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):650-680.details
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The extra qualia problem: Synaesthesia and representationism.A. Wager - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):263-281.details
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Sensations and the language of thought.Adam Vinueza - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392.details
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Is the mind conscious, functional, or both?Max Velmans - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.details
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Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.details
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Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):333-351.details
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Consciousness is not a natural kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.details
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Conscious and unconscious representation of aspectual shape in cognitive science.Geoffrey Underwood - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):628-629.details
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Unintended thought and nonconscious inferences exist.James S. Uleman & Jennifer K. Uleman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):627-628.details
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Mental Realism Reloaded.János Tözsér - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):337-340.details
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Transparency, qualia realism and representationalism.Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.details
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The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory.Michael Tye - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1):25--50.details
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Are Pains Feelings?Michael Tye - 2017 - The Monist 100 (4):478-484.details
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Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.details
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Blindsight, the absent qualia hypothesis, and the mystery of consciousness.Michael Tye - 1993 - In Christopher Hookway (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 19-40.details
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Blindsight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of Consciousness.Michael Tye - 1993 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34:19-40.details
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