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  1. Collective Responsibility for Oppression.Titus Stahl - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (3):473-501.
    Many contemporary forms of oppression are not primarily the result of formally organized collective action nor are they an unintended outcome of a combination of individual actions. This raises the question of collective responsibility. I argue that we can only determine who is responsible for oppression if we understand oppression as a matter of social practices that create obstacles for social change. This social practice view of oppression enables two insights: First, that there is an unproblematic sense in which groups (...)
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  • Dignity, Self-Respect, and Bloodless Invasions.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - In Ryan Jenkins & Bradley Strawser (eds.), Who Should Die? The Ethics of Killing in War. Oxford University Press.
    In Chapter 7, “Dignity, Self-Respect, and Bloodless Invasions”, Saba Bazargan-Forward asks How much violence can we impose on those attempting to politically subjugate us? According to Bazargan-Forward, “reductive individualism” answers this question by determining how much violence one can impose on an individual wrongly attempting to prevent one from political participation. Some have argued that the amount of violence one can permissibly impose in such situations is decidedly sub-lethal. Accordingly, this counterintuitive response has cast doubt on the reductive individualist project. (...)
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  • On the Responsibilities of Dominated States.Anahi Wiedenbrug - 2017 - Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 10 (2).
    While global justice theorists heatedly discuss the responsibilities of the affluent and powerful, those states which can legitimately be seen as victims of global injustice have seldom, if ever, been considered as duty bearers to whom responsibilities can be attached. However, recognising agents whose options are constrained not only as victims, but also as duty bearers is necessary as a proof of respect for their agency and indispensable to mobilise the type of action required to alter global injustices. In this (...)
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  • A Theory of Resistance.Phillip Ricks - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Iowa
    The dissertation attempts to answer the question of how to theorize resistance from within the philosophy of social science. To answer this question we must consider more than just the philosophy of social science; we also must look to political and moral philosophy. Resistance to the social norms of one’s community is possible to theorize from within the philosophy of social science once we develop a sufficiently nuanced account of social and moral communities, according to which membership in a community (...)
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  • Structural Injustice, Epistemic Opacity, and the Responsibilities of the Oppressed.Tamara Jugov & Lea Ypi - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 50 (1):7-27.
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  • Kant, Oppression, and the Possibility of Nonculpable Failures to Respect Oneself.Erica A. Holberg - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):285-305.
    I argue that Kant's ethical framework cannot countenance a certain kind of failure to respect oneself that can occur within oppressive social contexts. Kant's assumption that any person, qua rational being, has guaranteed epistemic access to the moral law as the standard of good action and the capacity to act upon this standard makes autonomy an achievement within the individual agent's power, but this is contrary to a feminist understanding of autonomy as a relational achievement that can be thwarted by (...)
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  • Resisting for Other Reasons.Daniel Silvermint - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):18-42.
    Does a victim have to intend to resist oppression in order to discharge her obligation to do so, or is it sufficient to resist oppression intentionally in the course of pursuing other plans and projects of importance to her? I argue that resisting intentionally can be sufficient: given the ways that oppression interferes with the lives of victims, trying to counteract that interference by living the life you want is genuine resistance. Requiring that victims have justice-oriented or agency-preserving reasons before (...)
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  • Resistance and Well-Being†.Daniel Silvermint - 2013 - Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (4):405-425.
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  • Educating for Autonomy: Liberalism and Autonomy in the Capabilities Approach.Luara Ferracioli & Rosa Terlazzo - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):443-455.
    Martha Nussbaum grounds her version of the capabilities approach in political liberalism. In this paper, we argue that the capabilities approach, insofar as it genuinely values the things that persons can actually do and be, must be grounded in a hybrid account of liberalism: in order to show respect for adults, its justification must be political; in order to show respect for children, however, its implementation must include a commitment to comprehensive autonomy, one that ensures that children develop the skills (...)
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  • Social Constraints On Moral Address.Vanessa Carbonell - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):167-189.
    The moral community is a social community, and as such it is vulnerable to social problems and pathologies. In this essay I identify a particular way in which participation in the moral community can be constrained by social factors. I argue that features of the social world—including power imbalances, oppression, intergroup conflict, communication barriers, and stereotyping—can make it nearly impossible for some members of the moral community to hold others responsible for wrongdoing. Specifically, social circumstances prevent some marginalized people from (...)
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  • Radical Moral Imagination and Moral Luck.Mavis Biss - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (4-5):558-570.
    To a greater extent than other theorists, Claudia Card in her analysis of moral luck considers the impact of attempts to transform moral meanings on the development of the agent's character and her responsibilities, over time and in relation to other agents. This essay argues that this wider frame of reference captures more of what is at stake in the efforts of those who resist oppression by attempting to implement radically revised meanings.
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  • Microaggressions: A Kantian Account.Ornaith O’Dowd - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1219-1232.
    In this paper, I offer an explanation of the moral significance of microaggressions, seemingly minor incidents in which someone is demeaned in virtue of an oppressed social identity, often without the full awareness of the perpetrator. I argue for a broadly Kantian account of the wrongs of microaggressions and the moral responsibilities of various actors with respect to these incidents.
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  • How to Take Offense: Responding to Microaggression.Regina Rini - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):332-351.
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  • Complicit Suffering and the Duty to Self-Care.Alycia W. LaGuardia-LoBianco - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (2):251-277.
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