- Inference Without the Taking Condition.Declan Smithies - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 130-146.details
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Akratic Beliefs and Seemings.Chenwei Nie - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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What the tortoise should do: A knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation.Lisa Miracchi Titus & J. Adam Carter - 2024 - Noûs.details
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Carroll’s Regress Times Three.Gilbert Plumer - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):551-571.details
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What does formal logic have to do with arguments?Matthew W. McKeon - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):696-708.details
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A limitation on agency in judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.details
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The guise of good reason.Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):204-224.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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Lewis Carroll’s regress and the presuppositional structure of arguments.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (1):1-38.details
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Infinite Reasoning.Jared Warren - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):385-407.details
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Why you cannot make people better by telling them what is good.Ulf Hlobil - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):986-996.details
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Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Acheivement.Kirk Ludwig & Wade Munroe - 2019 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Hoo Wai Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. London: Routledge. pp. 15-39.details
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How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):221-241.details
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Inferring by Attaching Force.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):701-714.details
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Goodness-Fixing Isn’t Good Enough: A Reply to McHugh and Way.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1309-1318.details
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Inferring as a way of knowing.Nicholas Koziolek - 2017 - Synthese (Suppl 7):1563-1582.details
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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Inference Without Reckoning.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.details
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What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.details
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Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.details
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What reasoning might be.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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Reason, reasoning, and the taking condition.Hamid Vahid - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Functionalism About Inference.Jared Warren - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Reasoning and Presuppositions.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):203-224.details
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Defending Understanding-Assent Links.Jared Warren - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9219-9236.details
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The Hereby-Commit Account of Inference.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):86-101.details
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Inference and the taking condition.Christian Kietzmann - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):294-302.details
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Judgment's Aimless Heart.Matthew Vermaire - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Knowledge, Objectivity, and Self-Consciousness: A Kantian Articulation of Our Capacity to Know.Maximilian Tegtmeyer - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburghdetails
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Reasoning and grasping objects.Rea Golan - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):699-711.details
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Have Mercier and Sperber untied the knot of human reasoning?Ladislav Koreň - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):849-862.details
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A dilemma for the knowledge despite falsehood strategy.Christopher Buford & Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):166-182.details
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(1 other version)No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Episteme:1-16.details
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Reasoning and normative beliefs: not too sophisticated.Andreas Müller - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (1):2-15.details
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Inferential practical knowledge of meaning.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Argument, Inference, and Persuasion.Matthew William McKeon - 2020 - Argumentation 35 (2):339-356.details
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(1 other version)No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):337-352.details
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Inference and the structure of concepts.Matías Osta Vélez - 2020 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Münchendetails
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