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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
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Émotions et Valeurs.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.details
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Joint actions and group agents.Philip Pettit & David Schweikard - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.details
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Perception and action: Alternative views.Susan Hurley - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):3-40.details
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How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.details
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The shared circuits model (SCM): How control, mirroring, and simulation can enable imitation, deliberation, and mindreading.Susan Hurley - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.details
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In defence of error theory.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):209-230.details
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The Emotional Mind: the affective roots of culture and cognition.Stephen T. Asma & Rami Gabriel - 2019 - Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Thick Concepts.Debbie Roberts - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):677-688.details
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Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction.Paul Thagard & Karsten Verbeurgt - 1998 - Cognitive Science 22 (1):1-24.details
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(1 other version)Believing at Will.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):36-52.details
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The logic of team reasoning.Robert Sugden - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):165 – 181.details
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Subjective Reasons.Eric Vogelstein - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.details
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Thick Evaluation.Simon Kirchin - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Davidsonian Causalism and Wittgensteinian Anti-Causalism: A Rapprochement.Matthieu Queloz - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5 (6):153-172.details
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Animal action in the space of reasons.Susan Hurley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):231-256.details
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Theories of team agency.Robert Sugden & Natalie Gold - 2007 - In Fabienne Peter (ed.), rationality and commitment. Oxford University Press USA.details
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Akratic believing?Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.details
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Two Arguments for Sentimentalism.Justin D’Arms - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1-21.details
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(1 other version)Hybrid Theories.Christopher Woodard - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge. pp. 161-174.details
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Are My Temporal Parts Agents?Alexander Dietz - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):362-379.details
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Weakness of will.Sarah Stroud - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The priority view.David McCarthy - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (2):215–57.details
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Three conceptions of group-based reasons.Christopher Woodard - 2017 - Journal of Social Ontology 3 (1):102-127.details
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Utilitarianism and prioritarianism II.David McCarthy - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):1-33.details
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Practical unreason.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):53-79.details
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Value Judgements and Value Neutrality in Economics.Philippe Mongin - 2006 - Economica 73 (290):257-286.details
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Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):669-690.details
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Fraternity: Why the Market Need Not Be a Morally Free Zone.Luigino Bruni - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):35-64.details
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Shared Agency.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Expansion View of Thick Concepts.Brent G. Kyle - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):914-944.details
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What Is Minimally Cooperative Behavior?Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Springer. pp. 9-40.details
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Coherence as an ideal of rationality.Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):175 - 216.details
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Essential Contestability and Evaluation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):471-488.details
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How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
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Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican1.Philip Pettit - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):15-38.details
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On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy.Nicholas Bardsley - 2007 - Synthese 157 (2):141-159.details
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Depending on the Thick.Debbie Roberts - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):197-220.details
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Putting together morality and well-being.Ruth Chang - 2004 - In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 118--158.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Brian Ribeiro - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.details
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The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason.Jean Hampton - 1994 - Economics and Philosophy 10 (2):195.details
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We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach’s theory.Alessandra Smerilli - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (4):539-560.details
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Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.details
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Epistemic akrasia and the fallibility of critical reasoning.Cristina Borgoni & Yannig Luthra - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):877-886.details
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Overintellectualizing the Mind 1.Susan L. Hurley - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):423-431.details
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