- Is color-dispositionalism nasty and unecological?Nenad Miscevic - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):203 - 231.details
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A light theory of color.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & David Sparrow - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):267-284.details
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Color properties and color ascriptions: A relationalist manifesto.Jonathan Cohen - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):451-506.details
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Colour irrealism and the formation of colour concepts.Jonathan Ellis - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):53-73.details
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Colors without circles?Kathrin Glüer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):107--131.details
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Color and similarity.Alex Byrne - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):641-65.details
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Barry Stroud, the Quest for reality: Subjectivism and the metaphysics of colour.Jonathan Cohen - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):537-554.details
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Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.details
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Should we trust our intuitions? Deflationary accounts of the analytic data.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):299-323.details
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The ontology of concepts: Abstract objects or mental representations?Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):561-593.details
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The normativity of the mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.details
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Scott Soames' two-dimensionalism.David J. Chalmers - 2006details
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(1 other version)The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 55-140.details
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(1 other version)Two-dimensional semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Descriptivism, rigidified and anchored.Philip Pettit - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):323-338.details
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(1 other version)Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):299-322.details
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Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.details
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Masters of our meanings.David Braddon-Mitchell - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):133-52.details
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Bad intensions.Alex Byrne & James Pryor - 2006 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 38--54.details
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Propositional clothing and belief.Neil Sinclair - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342-362.details
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Physical Constituents of Qualia.István Aranyosi - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (2):103-131.details
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(1 other version)Acquaintance and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 2012 - In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 16-43.details
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Consciousness constrained: Commentary on Metzinger.Josh Weisberg - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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The property dualism argument against physicalism.Andrew Botterell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.details
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Coulda, woulda, shoulda.Stephen Yablo - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 441-492.details
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The evidential status of philosophical intuition.Janet Levin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.details
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(2 other versions)Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap".Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-174.details
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(1 other version)Explanation and the hard problem.Wayne Wright - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301-330.details
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A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204.details
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Thinking about Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness.Robert Kirk - 2002 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind [December 4 (1).details
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Meaning and Metaphysical Necessity.Tristan Grotvedt Haze - 2022 - New York: Routledge.details
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Consciousness, Neuroscience, and Physicalism: Pessimism About Optimistic Induction.Giacomo Zanotti - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (2):283-297.details
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Philosophy is a Great Success, and We are Fooled into Thinking Otherwise.T. Parent - forthcoming - In Green Mitchell & Michel Jan (eds.), William Lycan on Mind, Meaning, and Method. Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Material People in Logical Space.Clas Weber - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):517-530.details
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(1 other version)A Theory of Conceptual Advance: Explaining Conceptual Change in Evolutionary, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental Biology.Ingo Brigandt - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburghdetails
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Counterfactuals versus conceivability as a guide to modal knowledge.Daniel Dohrn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3637-3659.details
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Précis of Unbelievable Errors.Bart Streumer - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6):687-696.details
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Super-Humeanism and free will.Michael Esfeld - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6245-6258.details
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Knowledge, infallibility, and skepticism.Gregory Douglas Stoutenburg - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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Rational learners and metaethics: Universalism, relativism, and evidence from consensus.Alisabeth Ayars & Shaun Nichols - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (1):67-89.details
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The Mackiean Supervenience Challenge.Victor Moberger - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):219-236.details
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Naming without necessity.Nigel Sabbarton-Leary - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Conceptual engineering, truth, and efficacy.Jennifer Nado - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1507-1527.details
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Virtuous vs. utilitarian artificial moral agents.William A. Bauer - 2020 - AI and Society (1):263-271.details
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Interventionism and Mental Surgery.Alex Kaiserman - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):919-935.details
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Epistemología Craiguiana y El Rol de Las Intuiciones En El Teorizar Epistemológico.Leandro De Brasi - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):533-552.details
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Introduction: New Perspectives on Philosophical Thought Experiments.Adriano Angelucci & Margherita Arcangeli - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):763-768.details
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Grounding entails supervenience.Samuele Chilovi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (S6):1317-1334.details
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Representing ethical reality: a guide for worldly non-naturalists.William J. FitzPatrick - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):548-568.details
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