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How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist.Brian T. Miller - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):766-780.details
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On the Interpretation of Decision Theory.Samir Okasha - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (3):409-433.details
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Rational choice and action omnipotence.John L. Pollock - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):1-23.details
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Rational Choice and Action Omnipotence.John L. Pollock - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):1.details
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Waging War on Pascal’s Wager.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.details
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Waging War on Pascal's Wager.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.details
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Why bayesian psychology is incomplete.Frank Döring - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):389.details
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Why Bayesian Psychology Is Incomplete.Frank Döring - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (S1):S379 - S389.details
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Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?Sinan Dogramaci - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):61-96.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.details
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Making climate decisions.Richard Bradley & Katie Steele - unknowndetails
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Thoughts on Jun Otsuka’s Thinking about Statistics – the Philosphical Foundations.Elliott Sober - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-11.details
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Altruism, Inclusive Fitness, and “The Logic of Decision”.Brian Skyrms - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S104-S111.details
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Radical Probabilism Revisited.Lyle Zynda - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):969-980.details
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Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.details
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* Psicologia Popular, Teoria da Decisão e Comportamento Humano Comum.António Zilhão - 2001 - Disputatio (10):1-21.details
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Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences.Jiji Zhang, Teddy Seidenfeld & Hailin Liu - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6571-6597.details
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Vagueness and Thought, by Andrew Bacon.Elia Zardini - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1375-1386.details
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Ramsey, truth, and probability.S. L. Zabell - 1991 - Theoria 57 (3):211-238.details
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Bayesian Confirmation or Ordinary Confirmation?Yongfeng Yuan - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (3):425-449.details
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Austrian Economics and Compatibilist Freedom.Igor Wysocki & Łukasz Dominiak - 2024 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 55 (1):113-136.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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Representational Scepticism: The Bubble Puzzle.J. Robert G. Williams - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):419-442.details
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Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate Survival.J. Robert G. Williams - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (4):379-428.details
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Knowledge as evidence.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):1-25.details
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Conditionalizing on knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):89-121.details
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Bayesian conditionalisation and the principle of minimum information.P. M. Williams - 1980 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (2):131-144.details
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Entrepreneurial Beliefs and Agency under Knightian Uncertainty.Randall E. Westgren & Travis L. Holmes - 2021 - Philosophy of Management 21 (2):199-217.details
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Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem.Ian Wells - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):429-457.details
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Objectivism without objective probabilities.Ruth Weintraub - 1990 - Theoria 56 (1-2):23-41.details
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Hierarchical maximization of two kinds of expected utility.Paul Weirich - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):560-582.details
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Fallibilism and rational belief.Ruth Weintraub - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):251-261.details
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Decisions in Dynamic Settings.Paul Weirich - 1986 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986 (1):438-449.details
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Conditional probabilities and probabilities given knowledge of a condition.Paul Weirich - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (1):82-95.details
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Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
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Endogenous epistemic factionalization.James Owen Weatherall & Cailin O’Connor - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6179-6200.details
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Local Explanations via Necessity and Sufficiency: Unifying Theory and Practice.David S. Watson, Limor Gultchin, Ankur Taly & Luciano Floridi - 2022 - Minds and Machines 32 (1):185-218.details
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Projecting Chances: A Humean Vindication and Justification of the Principal Principle.Barry Ward - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (1):241-261.details
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Postscript to Richard Jeffrey’s “Conditioning, Kinematics, and Exchangeability”.Carl G. Wagner - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):631-643.details
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Probability kinematics and commutativity.Carl G. Wagner - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):266-278.details
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Old evidence and new explanation.Carl G. Wagner - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):677-691.details
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Old evidence and new explanation II.Carl G. Wagner - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (2):283-288.details
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Logic, probability, and coherence.John M. Vickers - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (1):95-110.details
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Sometimes It Is Better to Do Nothing: A New Argument for Causal Decision Theory.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Justifying the Norms of Inductive Inference.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (1):135-160.details
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Why Those Biscuits Are Relevant and on the Sideboard.Robert van Rooij & Katrin Schulz - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):704-712.details
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The Geometry of Opinion: Jeffrey Shifts and Linear Operators.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (2):163-175.details
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A problem for relative information minimizers in probability kinematics.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):375-379.details
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