- Conditionals in causal decision theory.John Cantwell - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):661-679.details
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Non-Ideal Accessibility.Holly Lawford-Smith - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):653-669.details
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Learning Conditional Information.Igor Douven - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):239-263.details
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Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):643-651.details
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Options and the subjective ought.Brian Hedden - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):343-360.details
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Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
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Toward a Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa & Carlo Buttasi - 2009 - In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. pp. 73--93.details
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Weight for Stephen Finlay.Daan Evers - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):737-749.details
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Regret and instability in causal decision theory.James M. Joyce - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):123-145.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Focused Correlation, Confirmation, and the Jigsaw Puzzle of Variable Evidence.Maximilian Schlosshauer & Gregory Wheeler - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (3):376-92.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor.Luca Ferrero - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10:1-23.details
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Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly.Ralph Wedgwood - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 201--229.details
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Conditional Excluded Middle without the Limit Assumption.Eric Swanson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):301-321.details
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Supposition and desire in a non-classical setting.J. Robert G. Williams - unknowndetails
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A unified Bayesian decision theory.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (3):233-263,.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Causation, Coherence and Concepts : a Collection of Essays.Wolfgang Spohn - unknowndetails
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Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation.Wolfgang Spohn - unknowndetails
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The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006).Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.) - 2010 - Springer.details
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Tenable conditionals.J. Robert G. Williams - manuscriptdetails
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Is the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?Jonah N. Schupbach - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):13-27.details
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Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.details
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Practical reasoning as figuring out what is best: Against constructivism.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):139-152.details
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The paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.details
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Putting the irrelevance back into the problem of irrelevant conjunction.Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (4):611-622.details
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The kinematics of belief and desire.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):513-535.details
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The Chances of Choices.Reuben Stern - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Analytic Functionalism.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A companion to David Lewis. Chichester, West Sussex ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 504–518.details
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In defense of causal eliminativism.Alice van’T. Hoff - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-22.details
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The rational dimension of understanding.Miloud Belkoniene - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-16.details
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A plan-based causal decision theory.Gerard J. Rothfus - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):264-272.details
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Attitudes, deliberation and decisions.Richard Bradley - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.details
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Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency.Wiebe van der Hoek - 2006 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Nuel Belnap on Indeterminism and Free Action.Thomas Müller (ed.) - 2014 - Wien, Austria: Springer.details
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Preference Change: Approaches From Philosophy, Economics and Psychology.Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson - 2009 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Dynamic Formal Epistemology.Patrick Girard, Olivier Roy & Mathieu Marion (eds.) - 2010 - Berlin, Germany: Springer.details
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Bradley Conditionals and Dynamic Choice.Simon M. Huttegger & Gerard J. Rothfus - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6585-6599.details
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In Defence of Revealed Preference Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (2):163-187.details
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The fine-grainedness of poetry: A new argument against the received view.Daniela Glavaničová & Miloš Kosterec - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):224-231.details
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The Logic of Partial Supposition.Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - Analysis (2):215-224.details
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Interpreting plural predication: homogeneity and non-maximality.Manuel Križ & Benjamin Spector - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (5):1131-1178.details
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Policymaking under scientific uncertainty.Joe Roussos - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Objects of Choice.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2021 - Mind 111.details
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Exploiting Cyclic Preference.Arif Ahmed - 2016 - Mind:fzv218.details
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Structural Decision Theory.Tung-Ying Wu - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):951-960.details
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Conditional desirability: comments on Richard Bradley’s decision theory with a human face.James M. Joyce - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8413-8431.details
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