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Franco Montagna’s Work on Provability Logic and Many-valued Logic.Lev Beklemishev & Tommaso Flaminio - 2016 - Studia Logica 104 (1):1-46.details
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Scotching Dutch Books?Alan Hájek - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):139-151.details
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Probability and Inductive Logic.Antony Eagle - manuscriptdetails
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Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-21.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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Ontology of Divinity.Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.) - 2024 - De Gruyter.details
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Regular probability comparisons imply the Banach–Tarski Paradox.Alexander R. Pruss - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3525-3540.details
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Avoiding Dutch Books despite inconsistent credences.Alexander R. Pruss - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11265-11289.details
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Probability, Regularity, and Cardinality.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):231-240.details
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Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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Dutch Books and nonclassical probability spaces.Leszek Wroński & Michał Tomasz Godziszewski - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (2):267-284.details
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Hidden Assumptions in the Dutch Book Argument.C. Waidacher - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (3):293-312.details
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Some remarks on coherence and subjective probability.John M. Vickers - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (1):32-38.details
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Higher order probabilities and coherence.Soshichi Uchii - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (3):373-381.details
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Coordinated Rational Choice.Luca Tummolini & Wynn C. Stirling - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):317-327.details
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Regularity reformulated.Weng Hong Tang - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):329-343.details
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What conceptual spaces can do for Carnap's late inductive logic.Marta Sznajder - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:62-71.details
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Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective.Wynn C. Stirling & Teppo Felin - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):279-308.details
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Probability and conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.details
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Strict coherence, sigma coherence and the metaphysics of quantity.Brian Skyrms - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):39-55.details
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Updating, supposing, and maxent.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (3):225-246.details
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Nagel's translation of teleological statements: A critique.Vivien B. Shelanski - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):397-401.details
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The main two arguments for probabilism are flawed.Luigi Secchi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):287-295.details
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Belief Update across Fission.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):659-682.details
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The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2007 - Studia Logica 87 (1):65-71.details
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A dutch book theorem and converse dutch book theorem for Kolmogorov conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):705-735.details
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A Dutch Book Theorem and Converse Dutch Book Theorem for Kolmogorov Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - unknowndetails
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Null probability, dominance and rotation.A. R. Pruss - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):682-685.details
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On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Noûs (1):23-38.details
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Comparative Expectations.Arthur Paul Pedersen - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):811-848.details
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Weintraub’s response to Williamson’s coin flip argument.Matthew W. Parker - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-21.details
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Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):8.details
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A model of belief.J. B. Paris & A. Vencovská - 1993 - Artificial Intelligence 64 (2):197-241.details
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Feminist Philosophy of Science.Lynn Hankinson Nelson - 2002 - In Peter Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312–331.details
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Coherence of de Finetti coherence.Daniele Mundici - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4055-4063.details
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On projecting grue.John Moreland - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (3):363-377.details
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Dutch book arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Frank Ramsey.Fraser MacBride, Mathieu Marion, Maria Jose Frapolli, Dorothy Edgington, Edward J. R. Elliott, Sebastian Lutz & Jeffrey Paris - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A New Way to Block a Dutch Book Argument, or The Stubborn Non-probabilist.Leszek Wronski - manuscriptdetails
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Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.details
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Philosophy as conceptual engineering: Inductive logic in Rudolf Carnap's scientific philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbiadetails
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Assessing Theories. The Problem of a Quantitative Theory of Confirmation.Franz Huber - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Erfurtdetails
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Bayesian Epistemology.Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2010 - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. London: Routledge. pp. 609-620.details
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More trouble for regular probabilitites.Matthew W. Parker - 2012details
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Infinitesimal Probabilities.Sylvia Wenmackers - 2016 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 199-265.details
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Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), MIT Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press.details
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Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPaper Foundation. pp. 1-55.details
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