Switch to: References

Citations of:

Practical inference

Analysis 26 (3):65 (1966)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Deontic Logic.Paul McNamara - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • Acquiring Practical Knowledge: A Justification for Physical Education.Sheryle Bergmann Drewe - 1999 - Paideusis: Journal of the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society 12 (2):33-44.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Practical Reasoning and Normative Relevance: A Reply to McKeever and Ridge.Alan Thomas - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):77-84.
    A putative problem for the moral particularist is that he or she fails to capture the normative relevance of certain considerations that they carry on their face, or the intuitive irrelevance of other considerations. It is argued in response that mastery of certain topic-specific truisms about a subject matter is what it is for a reasonable interlocutor to be engaged in a moral discussion, but the relevance of these truisms has nothing to do with the particularist/generalist dispute. Given that practical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Structure of Instrumental Practical Reasoning.Christian Miller - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):1–40.
    The view to be defended in this paper is intended to be a novel and compelling model of instrumental practical reasoning, reasoning aimed at determining how to act in order to achieve a given end in a certain set of circumstances. On standard views of instrumental reasoning, the end in question is the object of a particular desire that the agent has, a desire which, when combined with the agent’s beliefs about what means are available to him or her in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Dynamic Semantics, Imperative Logic and Propositional Attitudes.Berislav Žarnić - 2002 - Uppsala Universitet.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Practical Steps and Reasons for Action.Philip Clark - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):17 - 45.
    There is an idea, going back to Aristotle, that reasons for action can be understood on a parallel with reasons for belief. Not surprisingly, the idea has almost always led to some form of inferentialism about reasons for action. In this paper I argue that reasons for action can be understood on a parallel with reasons for belief, but that this requires abandoning inferentialism about reasons for action. This result will be thought paradoxical. It is generally assumed that if there (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Presuming and Presumption in Everyday Argumentation: A Response to Godden and Walton.Fred J. Kauffeld - unknown
    In response to critique by Godden and Walton, this essay delineates the role of moral motivation in the commitment structure of ordinary presumptive inferences. It defends the capacity of ordinary presumptions to support discursive structures within which everyday argumentation can address defeasible claims and enable alignments and realignments in probative obligations, i.e., burdens of proof.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Imperatives as Semantic Primitives.Rosja Mastop - 2011 - Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (4):305-340.
    This paper concerns the formal semantic analysis of imperative sentences. It is argued that such an analysis cannot be deferred to the semantics of propositions, under any of the three commonly adopted strategies: the performative analysis, the sentence radical approach to propositions, and the (nondeclarative) mood-as-operator approach. Whereas the first two are conceptually problematic, the third faces empirical problems: various complex imperatives should be analysed in terms of semantic operators over simple imperatives. One particularly striking case is the Dutch pluperfect (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Practical Reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 244-251.
    To be able to say what practical reasoning is, we first need to say what reasoning is and what the conclusion of a process of reasoning is. I shall do this in sections 1 and 2. We can then make a distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. There are three main ways to do this, which I shall survey in sections 3 to 5. I shall end by suggesting that there are different kinds of practical reasoning.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Rationalization and the Ross Paradox.Benj Hellie - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press. pp. 283--323.
    'Post this letter!' does not entail 'Post this letter or drink up my wine!' (the Ross Paradox) because one can be in a state with the content of the former without being in a state with the content of the latter; in turn, because the latter can rationalize drinking up my wine but the former cannot; in turn, because practical rationalization flows toward one's present situation, in contrast with the flow of theoretical rationalization from one's present situation. Formally, this is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Instrumental Reasons.Instrumental Reasons - unknown
    As Kant claimed in the Groundwork, and as the idea has been developed by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whether reasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle of instrumental transmission and the principle that reasons for ends are provided by desires. Instead, they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Instrumental Reasons.Niko Kolodny - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    Often our reason for doing something is an "instrumental reason": that doing that is a means to doing something else that we have reason to do. What principles govern this "instrumental transmission" of reasons from ends to means? Negatively, I argue against principles often invoked in the literature, which focus on necessary or sufficient means. Positively, I propose a principle, "General Transmission," which answers to two intuitive desiderata: that reason transmits to means that are "probabilizing" and "nonsuperfluous" with respect to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Theory and Practice: Some Analogous Concepts and Their Disanalogies.David Carr - 1982 - Metaphilosophy 13 (3-4):228-239.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Imperative Statics and Dynamics.Nate Charlow - manuscript
    Imperatives are linguistic devices used by an authority (speaker) to express wishes, requests, commands, orders, instructions, and suggestions to a subject (addressee). This essay's goal is to tentatively address some of the following questions about the imperative. -/- METASEMANTIC. What is the menu of options for understanding fundamental semantic notions like satisfaction, truth-conditions, validity, and entailment in the context of imperatives? Are there good imperative arguments, and, if so, how are they to be characterized? What are the options for understanding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.
    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Deliberative Rhetoric: Arguing About Doing.Christian Kock (ed.) - 2017 - Windsor: University of Windsor.
    Christian Kock’s essays show the essential interconnectedness of practical reasoning, rhetoric and deliberative democracy. They constitute a unique contribution to argumentation theory that draws on – and criticizes – the work of philosophers, rhetoricians, political scientists and other argumentation theorists. It puts rhetoric in the service of modern democracies by drawing attention to the obligations of politicians to articulate arguments and objections that citizens can weigh against each other in their deliberations about possible courses of action.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • New Foundations for Imperative Logic I: Logical Connectives, Consistency, and Quantifiers.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):529-572.
    Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.
    According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Positive Economics and the Normativistic Fallacy: Bridging the Two Sides of CSR.Philipp Schreck, Dominik van Aaken & Thomas Donaldson - 2013 - Business Ethics Quarterly 23 (2):297-329.
    In response to criticism of empirical or “positive” approaches to corporate social responsibility, we defend the importance of these approaches for any CSR theory that seeks to have practical impact. Although we acknowledge limitations to positive approaches, we unpack the neglected but crucial relationships between positive knowledge on the one hand and normative knowledge on the other in the implementation of CSR principles. Using the structure of a practical syllogism, we construct a model that displays the key role of empirical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • On Practical Abduction.Risto Hilpinen - 2007 - Theoria 73 (3):207-220.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Knowing-How and Knowing-That.Jeremy Fantl - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
    You know that George W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you know how to ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According to intellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge. Anti-intellectualists deny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that something is the case requires a prior (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Some Questions About “Practical Reasoning”.Max Black - 1978 - Dialectica 32 (2):101-114.
    SummaryDo we need to recognize distinctive forms of reasoning about what should be done that are not reducible to deductive or inductive forms? A canonical form for such deliberative reasoning is proposed, in which the conclusion is a “praxigenic dictum” . It is argued that a deliberative argument has a kernel that can be viewed as the proposed solution to a specified problem or task. In evaluating such a solution no distinctively “practical” principles seem to be needed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Against Triggering Accounts of Robust Reason-Giving.Ezequiel H. Monti - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3731-3753.
    By promising, requesting and commanding we can give ourselves and each other reasons for acting as promised, requested, and commanded. Call this our capacity to give reasons robustly. According to the triggering account, we give reasons robustly simply by manipulating the factual circumstances in a way that triggers pre-existing reasons. Here I claim that we ought to reject the triggering account. By focusing on David Enoch’s sophisticated articulation of it, I argue that it is overinclusive; it cannot adequately distinguish between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How to Do Things with Logical Expressions: Creating Collective Value Through Co-Ordinated Reasoning.Denis Hilton, Gaelle Villejoubert & Jean-Francois Bonnefon - 2005 - Interaction Studies 6 (1):103-117.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Practical Language: Its Meaning and Use.Nathan A. Charlow - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    I demonstrate that a "speech act" theory of meaning for imperatives is—contra a dominant position in philosophy and linguistics—theoretically desirable. A speech act-theoretic account of the meaning of an imperative !φ is characterized, broadly, by the following claims. -/- LINGUISTIC MEANING AS USE !φ’s meaning is a matter of the speech act an utterance of it conventionally functions to express—what a speaker conventionally uses it to do (its conventional discourse function, CDF). -/- IMPERATIVE USE AS PRACTICAL !φ's CDF is to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Reasons and Ideals.Kimberley Brownlee - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):433-444.
    This paper contributes to the debate on whether we can have reason to do what we are unable to do. I take as my starting point two papers recently published in Philosophical Studies , by Bart Streumer and Ulrike Heuer, which defend the two dominant opposing positions on this issue. Briefly, whereas Streumer argues that we cannot have reason to do what we are unable to do, Heuer argues that we can have reason to do what we are unable to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A Logic of Practical Reasoning.Georg Spielthenner - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (2):139-153.
    In this paper my primary aim is to present a logical system of practical reasoning that can be used to assess the validity of practical arguments, that is, arguments with a practical judgment as conclusion. I begin with a critical evaluation of other approaches to this issue and argue that they are inadequate. On the basis of these considerations, I explain in Sect. 2 the informal conception of practical validity and introduce in Sect. 3 the logical system P , which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Consciousness, Context, and Know-How.Charles Wallis - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):123 - 153.
    In this paper I criticize the most significant recent examples of the practical knowledge analysis of knowledge-how in the philosophical literature: David Carr [1979, Mind, 88, 394–409; 1981a, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, 53–61; 1981b, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 15(1), 87–96] and Stanley & Williamson [2001, Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411–444]. I stress the importance of know-how in our contemporary understanding of the mind, and offer the beginnings of a treatment of know-how capable of providing insight in to the use (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Logic and Semantics for Imperatives.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.
    In this paper I will develop a view about the semantics of imperatives, which I term Modal Noncognitivism, on which imperatives might be said to have truth conditions (dispositionally, anyway), but on which it does not make sense to see them as expressing propositions (hence does not make sense to ascribe to them truth or falsity). This view stands against “Cognitivist” accounts of the semantics of imperatives, on which imperatives are claimed to express propositions, which are then enlisted in explanations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • Silogismo Prático, Prohairesis e Deliberação em Aristóteles.Luis Deodato Ricardo Machado - 2012 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Pelotas, Brazil
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Richard Mervyn Hare.Anthony W. Price - unknown
    A long encyclopedia entry, sketching his life, analysing his work.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Dialectical Tier Argumentation as Structured by Proposing and Advising.Fred J. Kauffeld - unknown
    This paper discusses the parameters of an arguer's duties on the "dialectical tier of argument appraisal." Argumentative burdens incurred in making proposals will be compared with probative obligations which may be taken on in advising. The burdens t ypically incurred in these two kinds of illocutionary acts are strikingly different; accordingly, the arguer's obligation to response to objections would be circumscribed differently depending on which speech acts initiates the dialogue. This claim has i mplications for how we delimit a "good (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Instrumental Reasoning Reconsidered.Georg Spielthenner - 2008 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):59-76.
    Since Aristotle it has been common among philosophers to distinguish between two fundamental types of reasoning, theoretical and practical. We do not only want to work out what is the case but also what we ought to do. This article offers a logical analysis of instrumental reasoning, which is the paradigm of practical reasoning. In the first section I discuss the major types of instrumental reasoning and show why the accounts of most authors are defective. On the basis of this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Imperatives, Logic Of.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 2575-2585.
    Suppose that a sign at the entrance of a hotel reads: “Don’t enter these premises unless you are accompanied by a registered guest”. You see someone who is about to enter, and you tell her: “Don’t enter these premises if you are an unaccompanied registered guest”. She asks why, and you reply: “It follows from what the sign says”. It seems that you made a valid inference from an imperative premise to an imperative conclusion. But it also seems that imperatives (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Projectives and Their Logic.D. S. Clarke - 1979 - Philosophia 8 (4):599-614.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Putting Ifs to Work: Goal-Based Relevance in Conditional Directives.Denis J. Hilton, Markus Kemmelmeier & Jean-François Bonnefon - 2005 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 134 (3):388-405.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Compliance and Command I—Categorical Imperatives.Kit Fine - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):609-633.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations