- Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1213-1223.details
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The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.details
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Epistemic Peer Disagreement.Filippo Ferrari & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge.details
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One standard to rule them all?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):12-21.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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The Nature and Rationality of Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - In Kevin Vallier & Joshua Rasmussen (eds.), A New Theist Response to the New Atheists. New York: Routledge. pp. 77-92.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The imprecise impermissivist’s dilemma.Clinton Castro & Casey Hart - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1623-1640.details
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Epistemic Uniqueness and the Practical Relevance of Epistemic Practices.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1721-1733.details
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When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
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Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.details
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Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
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Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Diachronic and Interpersonal Coherence.Kenny Easwaran & Reuben Stern - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & A. K. Flowerree (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Resolutions Against Uniqueness.Kenji Lota & Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1013–1033.details
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The Surprising Truth About Disagreement.Neil Levy - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):137-157.details
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Suspension of Judgment, Rationality's Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic.Errol Lord - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 126-145.details
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A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.details
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Cross-disciplinary research as a platform for philosophical research.Stephen J. Crowley, Chad Gonnerman & Michael O'rourke - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):344-363.details
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Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - 2021 - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), The Handbook of Rationality. London: MIT Press.details
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Concepts of Existential Catastrophe.Hilary Greaves - 2024 - The Monist 107 (2):109-129.details
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Time-Slice Epistemology for Bayesians.Lisa Cassell - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Elgin’s community-oriented steadfastness.Klaas J. Kraay - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):4985-5008.details
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One’s own reasoning.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):208-232.details
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Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism.Michael Vollmer - 2023 - Episteme:1-16.details
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Permissivism and self-fulfilling propositions.Anantharaman Muralidharan - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):217-226.details
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Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
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The trouble with standards of proof.Zoë A. Johnson King - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):141-159.details
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Is Epistemic Permissivism Intuitive?Nathan Ballantyne - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):365-378.details
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Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.details
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Judgement aggregation in scientific collaborations: The case for waiving expertise.Alexandru Marcoci & James Nguyen - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 84:66-74.details
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The Tripartite Role of Belief: Evidence, Truth, and Action.Kenny Easwaran - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):1-18.details
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A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):625-640.details
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Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement.Mark Walker - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):285-309.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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Expressivism and Crossed Disagreements.Javier Osorio & Neftali Villanueva - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:111-132.details
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