- On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
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The Function of Normative Process-Requirements.Julian Fink - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):115-136.details
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Instrumental reasons.Niko Kolodny - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Aesthetic Reasons.McGonigal Andrew - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 908–935.details
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Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):921-946.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.details
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Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
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Making space for the normativity of coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):393-415.details
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Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.details
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Intention and Predicition in Means-End Reasoning.Stephen J. White - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):251-266.details
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The symmetry of rational requirements.Jonathan Way - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):227-239.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068.details
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Explaining the Instrumental Principle.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.details
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Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.details
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Cornerstones: You’d better believe them.Giorgio Volpe - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):1-23.details
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On the Normativity of Intentions.Bruno Verbeek - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):87-101.details
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Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):943-955.details
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How to derive a narrow-scope requirement from wide-scope requirements.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):535-542.details
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Reasons and Entailment.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):353-374.details
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Inferential and non-inferential reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.details
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Introspection and Necessity.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):389-410.details
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One Ought Too Many.Justin Snedegar Stephen Finlay - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):102-124.details
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The Conditionality of Hypothetical Imperatives.Jamsheed Siyar - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (3):439-460.details
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Moral and Rational Commitment.Sam Shpall - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):146-172.details
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Wide and narrow scope.Sam Shpall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.details
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A problem for the unity of normativity.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):404-411.details
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Weighting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):110–132.details
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The hypothetical imperative?Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):357 – 372.details
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Scope for rational autonomy.Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):297-310.details
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Reasons and Agent-neutrality.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):279-306.details
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Ought, Agents, and Actions.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):1-41.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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Instrumental mythology.Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2):1-13.details
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Boulesic-Doxastic Logic.Daniel Rönnedal - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (3):83-132.details
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Unifying the requirements of rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Rational requirements and reasoning.Herlinde Pauer-Studer - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):513-528.details
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Emotions and Process Rationality.Oded Na’Aman - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):531-546.details
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Instrumental normativity and the practicable good: A Murdochian constitutivist account.Evgenia Mylonaki - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):349-388.details
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¿Estamos racionalmente obligados a ser eficientes?Julen Ibarrondo Murguialday - 2018 - Análisis Filosófico 38 (2):157-181.details
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Against triggering accounts of robust reason-giving.Ezequiel H. Monti - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3731-3753.details
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The Scope of Instrumental Morality.Michael Moehler - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):431-451.details
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A reason to be rational.Carl David Https://Orcidorg191X Mildenberger - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):1008-1032.details
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Rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1277-1304.details
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Understanding Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):767-797.details
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Conjuring Ethics from Words.Jonathan McKeown-Green, Glen Pettigrove & Aness Webster - 2012 - Noûs 49 (1):71-93.details
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What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.details
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What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do.Errol Lord - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1109-1154.details
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The real symmetry problem(s) for wide-scope accounts of rationality.Errol Lord - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-22.details
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