- Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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The Material Conditional is Sufficient to Model Deliberation.Giacomo Bonanno - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):325-349.details
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Coordinated Rational Choice.Luca Tummolini & Wynn C. Stirling - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):317-327.details
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Replies to: Commentators.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):343-352.details
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Heart of DARCness.Yang Liu & Huw Price - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):136-150.details
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Non-Naturalist Moral Realism and the Limits of Rational Reflection.Max Khan Hayward - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):724-737.details
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The Logic of Consistency and the Logic of Truth.Isaac Levi - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):461-482.details
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Making Ranking Theory Useful for Psychology of Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Konstanzdetails
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Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
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Representation theorems and the foundations of decision theory.Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.details
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Some counterexamples to causal decision theory.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):93-114.details
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Rationality and the Unit of Action.Christopher Woodard - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):261-277.details
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Demons, Deceivers And Liars: Newcomb’s Malin Génie. [REVIEW]Peter Slezak - 2006 - Theory and Decision 61 (3):277-303.details
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The elements of rationality and chance in the choice of human action.Ernest Krausz - 2004 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (4):353–374.details
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Personal and sub‐personal; A difference without a distinction.José Luis Bermúdez - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63-82.details
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Reconciling Evidential and Causal Decision Theory.Simon Huttegger & Simon M. Huttegger - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23.details
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Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account.Eleonora Cresto - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3737-3753.details
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Varieties of Epistemic Freedom.Alison Fernandes - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):736-751.details
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Safeguards of a Disunified Mind.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):356-383.details
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Preference Aggregation After Harsanyi.Matthias Hild, Mathias Risse & Richard Jeffrey - 1998 - In Marc Fleurbaey, Maurice Salles & John A. Weymark (eds.), Justice, political liberalism, and utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198-219.details
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Belief and contextual acceptance.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):41-66.details
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Satisficing revisited.Michael A. Goodrich, Wynn C. Stirling & Erwin R. Boer - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (1):79-109.details
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Causal concepts and temporal ordering.Reuben Stern - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6505-6527.details
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A New Puzzle about Believed Fallibility.Yitzhak Benbaji - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):679-696.details
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The logic of consistency and the logic of truth.Isaac Levi - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):461–482.details
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Deliberators Must Be Imperfect.Derek Baker - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):321-347.details
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Levi's account of preference reversals.Erik Angner - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):287-302.details
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The No Probabilities For Acts-Principle.Marion Ledwig - 2005 - Synthese 144 (2):171-180.details
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The better toolbox: experimental methodology in economics and psychology.Daniela Di Cagno, Werner Güth & Giacomo Sillari - 2023 - Mind and Society 22 (1):53-66.details
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Disagreeing with Myself: Doxastic Commitments and Intrapersonal Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):1-14.details
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Truth-conditional pragmatics: an overview.Francois Recanati - 2008 - In Paolo Bouquet, Luciano Serafini & Richmond H. Thomason (eds.), Perspectives on Contexts. Center for the Study of Language and Inf. pp. 171-188.details
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Realizing Newcomb’s Problem.Peter Slezak - unknowndetails
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How can we be moral when we are so irrational?Nils-Eric Sahlin & Johan Brännmark - unknowndetails
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¿Cuándo preguntar "¿por qué?"?: Observaciones sobre la dinámica de las preguntas y respuestas en una investigación científica.Eleonora Cresto - 2007 - Análisis Filosófico 27 (2):101-117.details
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