- What Is It To Have A Language?David Balcarras - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (4):837-866.details
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Radical Misinterpretation.Edward Elliott - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (3):646-684.details
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Private Investigators and Public Speakers.Alexander Sandgren - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):95-113.details
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Why Defend Humean Supervenience?Siegfried Jaag & Christian Loew - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (7):387-406.details
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Indeterminacy and Normativity.Giulia Pravato - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2119-2141.details
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Lewis on Materialism and Experience.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A companion to David Lewis. Chichester, West Sussex ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 519–532.details
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Incoherentism and the Sorites Paradox.Matti Eklund - 2019 - In Sergi Oms & Elia Zardini (eds.), The Sorites Paradox. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
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Color and a priori knowledge.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):293-315.details
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Carnap's Second Aufbau and David Lewis's Aufbau.David J. Chalmers - 2020 - In Denis Fisette, Guillaume Fréchette & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook Volume 24.details
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Descriptivism Without Quotation.Dirk Franken - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):367-379.details
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Colouring for and Colour Relationalism.Derek H. Brown - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):433-449.details
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Cruel Intensions: An Essay on Intentional Identity and Intentional Attitudes.Alexander Sandgren - 2016 - Dissertation, The Australian National Universitydetails
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Turning up the volume on the property view of sound.Pendaran Roberts - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):337-357.details
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Against Harmony.Ian Rumfitt - 1995 - In B. Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell.details
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The Metaphysics of Grounding.Michael John Clark - unknowndetails
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Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy.Matti Eklund - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (2):165-179.details
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Against Magnetism.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):17-36.details
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Concepts, analysis, generics and the canberra plan.Mark Johnston & Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):113-171.details
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Two-dimensional semantics.Laura Schroeter - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Metaontology.Matti Eklund - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):317-334.details
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Color: A vision scientist's perspective.Davida Y. Teller - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):48-49.details
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Surreptitious substitution.Barbara Saunders - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):47-48.details
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Color nominalism, pluralistic realism, and color science.Mohan Matthen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):39-40.details
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Clarifying the problem of color realism.Barry Maund - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):40-41.details
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(1 other version)Perceptual objects may have nonphysical properties.Aaron Ben-Ze’ev - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23.details
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Ecological considerations support color physicalism.James J. Clark - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):24-25.details
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Color.Barry Maund - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What are Thick Concepts?Matti Eklund - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49.details
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Fiction, indifference, and ontology.Matti Eklund - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557–579.details
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Fitting color into the physical world.Peter W. Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):575-599.details
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(1 other version)The Internal and the External in Linguistic Explanation.Brian Epstein - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (22):77-111.details
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Color realism redux.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):52-59.details
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(1 other version)Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?1.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.details
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Colour irrealism and the formation of colour concepts.Jonathan Ellis - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):53-73.details
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Color and similarity.Alex Byrne - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):641-65.details
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Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.details
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Color properties and color ascriptions: A relationalist manifesto.Jonathan Cohen - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):451-506.details
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On the structural properties of the colours.Jonathan Cohen - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):78-95.details
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True colours.Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):335-340.details
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(1 other version)Locke-ing onto content.Frank Jackson - 2001 - In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 127-143.details
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Two Physicalist Arguments for Microphysical Manyism.Simon Thunder - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Modal dispositionalism and necessary perfect masks.Barbara Vetter & Ralf Busse - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):84-94.details
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Kripke Was Right Even If He Was Wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the Unicorns.Harold Noonan - 2021 - Disputatio 13 (60):51-69.details
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Troubles with the Canberra Plan.Panu Raatikainen - 2020 - Synthese 1 (1-2).details
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Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms.Jussi Haukioja, Mons Nyquist & Jussi Jylkkä - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (3):377-403.details
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Objectivity and Perspectival Content.Max Kölbel - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):137-159.details
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What is Special about De Se Attitudes?Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2021 - In Heimir Geirsson & Stephen Biggs (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. New York: Routledge. pp. 464-481.details
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Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation.Michelle Liu - 2019 - In Dena Shottenkirk, Manuel Curado & Steven S. Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 227-251.details
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Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.details
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