J Harvey; Stereotypes and Group-claims: epistemological and moral issues, and their implications for multi-culturalism in education, Journal of Philosophy of Ed.

J Harvey; Stereotypes and Group-claims: epistemological and moral issues, and their implications for multi-culturalism in education, Journal of Philosophy of Ed.

The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion synthesizes leading studies of public opinion from the late 1980s in a top-down model of opinion formation and change. The core feature of this synthesis, the Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model, remains sound, but the book overstates the importance of the form of public opinion that it explains—elite-induced survey statements of issue positions—and understates the force of opinions that elites cannot easily shape and that citizens may not be able to articulate in response to survey (...) prompts. Moreover, there are major problems in the book's Parable of Purple Land. What, then, becomes of the top-down view of elite-mass interaction outlined in Nature and Origins? To answer this question, I begin by characterizing the kinds of opinions Nature and Origins leaves out: Converse's “group interest” voters, “nature of the times” voters, and issue publics. I then add a model of political parties as policy-motivated organizers of Converse's voter types. The upshot is an account of elite/mass interactions that is still largely top-down and that has roles for both the elite-led attitudes that the RAS model explains and the less conventional and harder-to-shape attitudes that it overlooks. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A review of two of the strands of cultural studies that Mark Fenster contends are superior to Murray Edelman’s analysis of mass public opinion—Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, and Bourdieu’s sociology—and a more general look at work in the field of cultural studies suggests that all of these alternatives suffer from severe theoretical and methodological limitations. Future studies of culture and politics need to pose questions similar to the ones that preoccupied Edelman, but they must move beyond the political and (...) interpretive biases that have dominated cultural studies (some of which Edelman shared), as well as the questionable view of “ideology” as a matter of elite domination of the masses, rather than as a mediating, constitutive force in the process of individual opinion formation. (shrink)

In the ongoing debate about the impact that studies of public ignorance should have on the study of culture, Mark Fenster and Bret Chandler assume that wider political participation must be our goal, because, to them, political ignorance is a culturally imposed, and therefore removable, obstacle—as if, without the baleful influence of culture, political participants would be well informed. Culture is indeed a primary influence on people's political opinions, so political scientists should indeed study the role it plays in the (...) formation of political beliefs. But such studies should begin with ignorance as people's default position, and should refrain from assuming that the source of ignorance is cultural domination or manipulation. (shrink)

Base rates have no necessary relation to judgments that are not themselves probabilities. There is no logical imperative, for instance, that behavioral base rates must affect causal attributions or that base rate information should affect judgments of legal liability. Decision theorists should be cautious in arguing that base rates place normative constraints on judgments of anything other than posterior probabilities.

Using Dewey's critics' own arguments that purport to show Dewey intentionally, or naively, disregarded the role of power in the relations of communities, Westbrook brings examples to reinforce the contrary view.

According to the principles derived from his theory of discourse ethics, Habermas's model of deliberative democracy is justified only if the public is capable of making political decisions that advance the common good. Recent public‐opinion research demonstrates that the public's overwhelming ignorance of politics precludes it from having such capabilities, even if radical measures were taken to thoroughly educate the public about politics or to increase the salience of politics in their lives.

Abstract(1) The miscitations of seminal experiments in the base rate literature adds to the existing database of systematic miscitations of wellknown psychological experiments. These miscitations may be caused by a process of reconstructive remembering. (2) Representative design should be the methodological core of Koehler's call for ecologically valid research. This approach can benefit both basic and applied research.

Koehler's summary and critique of research on the base rate fallacy is cogent and persuasive. However, he may have overstated the case, and his suggestions for future research may be too restrictive. We agree that methodological approaches to this topic should be broadened, but we argue that experimental laboratory research and the Bayesian normative standard are useful and should not be abandoned.

I present a theory of alienation that accounts for the cognitive processes involved with moral thinking and political behavior in modern societies. On my account, alienation can be understood as a particular kind of atrophy of moral concepts and moral thinking that affect the ways individuals cognize and legitimate the social world and their place within it. Central to my argument is the thesis that modern forms of social integration—shaped by highly institutionalized, rationalized and hierarchical forms of social life—serve to (...) constrain the moral- cognitive powers of subjects leading to a condition of alienation as moral atrophy. This state results from the withering of the subject's internal powers of moral reflection and an overriding predisposition to rely on external value schemas to make sense of moral and political problems. I then present an analysis of alienated moral consciousness and its implications for modern social theory. (shrink)

Since the early 20th century, advocates of public relations professionalism have mandated that practitioners serve the public interest making it an ethical standard for evaluating the morality of public relations practice. However, the field has devoted little research to determining just what it means for practitioners to serve the public interest. Most research suggests practice-oriented solutions. This article focuses what practitioners must do to serve the public interest. It reviews theories of the social contract and the public interest to identify (...) an approach to serving the public interest that will help practitioners reconcile moral obligations to themselves, their client organizations, and the public. It concludes that combining superior individual interests with John Dewey's public philosophy will contribute to the moral development and improvement of practitioners and the public. (shrink)

Objectivity is discussed as the underlying ethic of news reporting with an exploration of its origins. A content analysis of the general news reports in six selected U.S. daily newspapers found that objectivity was not widely practiced in 1865?1874, was common in 1905?1914, and normative by 1925?1984. Incidence of objective reporting was evidently not influenced by the introduction of the telegraph and wire services, and there is also no apparent difference between news reports of New York City newspapers and those (...) of other cities. (shrink)

This commentary presents a self-assessment inventory that will allow readers to determine their own attitude toward the base rate fallacy and its literature. The inventory is scientifically valid but not Medicare/Medicaid reimbursable.

When base rates are learned and used in an experiential manner subjects show better base rate use, perhaps because the implicit learning system is engaged. A causal framework in which base rates are relevant might also be necessary. Humans might thus perform better on more ecologically valid tasks, which are likely to contain those three components.

Abstract If voters do not understand the programs of rival candidates or their likely consequences, they cannot rationally exercise control over government. An ignorant electorate cannot achieve true democratic control over public policy. The immense size and scope of modern government makes it virtually impossible for voters to acquire sufficient knowledge to exercise such control. The problem is exacerbated by voters? strong incentive to be ?rationally ignorant? of politics. This danger to democracy cannot readily be circumvented through ?shortcut? methods of (...) economizing on voter knowledge costs. A truly democratic government must, therefore, be strictly limited in scope. (shrink)

Abstract Democratic control of public policy is nearly impossible in the presence of extreme voter ignorance, and this ignorance is in part caused by the vast size and scope of modern government. Only a government limited in its scope can be meaningfully democratic. David Ciepley's response to my article does not seriously challenge this conclusion, and his attempts to show that limited government is inherently undemocratic fail. Ciepley's alternative vision of a ?democracy? that does not require informed voters turns out (...) to be not a defense of democracy at all, but a rationalization for any form of government that achieves a high level of leadership skill and bureaucratic efficiency. (shrink)

Examination of visual images in evening network television stories about 5 environmental catastrophes indicates that news producers usually ignored their own network's policies about identifying news footage from advocacy groups and almost always ignored their own network's policies about labeling file hotage. In some unlabeled footage was used in symbolic ways that would not substantially mislead viewers. In other cases, unlabeled video suggested the persistence of a catastrophic reality that had not existed for as long as 4 years.

Ethicists in and out of the profession have argued that a journalist's precept to report only the truth is deduced, say, from utilitarianism's appeal to social utility or Rawls' appeal to justice as fairness. The mistake in this is indicated by an argument that the physician owes his or her professional ethic to the human need for health and the lawyer's to the human need for justice. The journalist, therefore, may well owe his or her professional regard for truthful reporting (...) to everyone's need for news?a critical element in a democratic society. So, instead of basing journalistic ethics in the fashionable moral philosophies of the modern era, it is better to argue that it grows out of the special nature of the craft, as imbedded in a more venerable notion of self fulfilling social responsibility. (shrink)

Political debate in an election season is artificially constrained by the media's focus on electability as the primary determinant of news coverage. What gets lost under this criterion is the wealth of ideas that lesser known candidates can bring to the debate. This article argues that political coverage by the mainstream media should be more responsible in its efforts to cultivate public discourse by redefining the standards for who gets covered and challenging the prevailing notions of electability. It also argues (...) for a view of campaign news that is less driven by events and that gives voters more information about candidates' ideas on key issues of the day. (shrink)

The Rhetorical Presidency places great importance on the transformative power of political ideas. For Tulis, Progressive ideas informed the rhetorical practices of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson—practices that reconstituted the American presidency. They did so, in part, by trading on the ambiguous nature of the concept of “publicity”—which at once evoked liberal ideals of public deliberation and transparency, and modern practices of manipulative communication. In turn, the new practices of publicity revolutionized not only the American presidency, but American politics as (...) a whole. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

The partisan and ideological polarization of American politics since the 1970s appears to have affected pubic opinion in striking ways. The American public has become increasingly partisan and ideological along liberal-conservative lines on a wide range of issues, including even foreign policy. This has raised questions about how rational the public is, in the broad sense of the public's responsiveness to objective conditions. Widespread partisan disagreements over what those conditions arei.e., disagreements about the factssuggest that large proportions of the public (...) may be perceiving the facts incorrectly. The facts in question are important enough that these partisan disagreements may translate into sub-optimal policy preferences and electoral decisions. (shrink)

In early work, I argued that Barack Obama, the 44th president of the United States, often represented, in his political speeches and writings, a form of philosophical pragmatism with special relations to the University of Chicago and its reform tradition. That form of pragmatism, especially evident in the work of such early figures as John Dewey and Jane Addams, and such later figures as Saul Alinsky, Abner Mikva, David Greenstone, Richard Rorty, Danielle Allen, and Cass Sunstein, contributed greatly to the (...) intellectual atmosphere that Obama breathed during his many years in Chicago as a community organizer, senior lecturer in the University of Chicago Law School, and emerging figure in Illinois politics. And that form of pragmatism has, from Dewey to Obama, been keenly concerned to appropriate for its purposes the legacy of Abraham Lincoln. My purpose in this essay is to set out these filiations in ways more accessible to a global audience, and to carry the story forward through the opening moves of the Obama presidency. Key Words: Obama • pragmatism • optimism • pessimism • community • rhetoric • political philosophy. (shrink)

Psychologists investigating dreams in non-Western cultures have generally not considered the meanings of dreams within the unique meaning-structure of the person in his or her societal context. The study was concerned with explicating the indigenous system of dream interpretation of the Xhosa-speaking people, as revealed by acknowledged dream experts, and elaborating upon the life-world of the participants. Fifty dreams and their interpretations were collected from participants, who were traditional healers and their clients. A phenomenological methodology was adopted in explicating the (...) data. Themes explicated included : the physiognomy of the dreamer's life-world as revealed by significant dreams, the interpretation of significant dreams as revealed through action, and human bodiliness as revealed in dream interpretations. The participants' approach to dreams is not based upon an explicit theory, but upon an immediate and pathic understanding of the dream phenomenon. The understanding is based upon the interpreter's concrete understanding of the life-world, which includes the possibility of cosmic integration and continuity between personal and trans-personal realms of being. (shrink)

Objective journalism is blamed frequently for all sorts of journalistic failures and weaknesses, but the critiques typically are flawed because their authors fail to understand objectivity or to define it precisely. This defense of objective journalism defines objectivity and suggests that it is indispensable in a free society, summarizes major critiques of and alternatives to objectivity, and proposes that critics and defenders might serve journalism best by seeking common ground.

Base rates are vital in predicting violent criminal recidivism. However, both lay people given simulated prediction tasks and professionals milking real life predictions appear insensitive to variations in the base rate of violent recidivism. Although there are techniques to help decision makers attend to base rates, increased decision accuracy is better sought in improved actuarial models as opposed to improved clinicians.

Deliberative democracy is unrealistic, but so are rational-choice models of democracy. The elements of reality that rationalistic theories of democracy leave out are the very elements that deliberative democrats would need to subtract if their theory were to be applied to reality. The key problem is not, however, the altruistic orientation that deliberative democrats require; opinion researchers know that voters are already sociotropic, not self-interested. Rather, as Schumpeter saw, the problems lie in understanding politics, government, and economics under modern—and postmodern—conditions. (...) Modernity entails levels of complexity that stymie voters' attempts to be well informed about which political promises will actually solve social problems. Postmodernity adds to complexity an overabundance of fragmented information experienced impatiently and fleetingly by citizens who confuse entertainment with knowledge, and whose political demands are as unrealistic as their personal desire for a unique identity. These factors can be added, one by one, to the minimalist rational-choice model of politics, with each step leading us farther away from deliberative democracy. (shrink)

Drawing from midcentury and contemporary theoretical work on propaganda, this study provides an analysis of the propagandistic properties of the "Shared Values" initiative developed by Charlotte Beers, former chief of public diplomacy under U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. The campaign was broadcast in several Muslim countries before it was abandoned in 2003. The campaign's utilization of truth, its treatment of Muslim audiences as means to serve broader policy objectives rather than as a population to be engaged on its own (...) terms, and its use of palaver all suggest the "Shared Values" videos, as an example of mass communication, had serious ethical shortcomings. (shrink)

This paper explores the marginalized practice of sportswriting to demonstrate the limited ways in which the question "who is a journalist?" has been answered within the profession. Following John Dewey and Raymond Williams, we offer an alternative view of democratic culture that values narrative as well as information. We also discuss how "New Journalists" (and other writers since), in their quest for fresh, sophisticated storytelling strategies, turned to sports as a cultural activity worthy of serious examination. Our goal is to (...) demonstrate that sportswriting fundamentally resembles other forms of reporting and that journalism should not use sports as an ethical straw man against which to defend the virtue of its serious work. This suspension of our usual ethical judgments would deepen our sense of the moral significance of sportswriting and allow us to rethink journalism's relation to democratic culture in productive new ways. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Laurel Gleason contends that deliberative polling constrains the autonomy of participants and substitutes the ideas and agendas of ?experts? for those of the deliberators. However, the format and informational constraints faced by participants in deliberative forums are no worse, and are in many ways better, than those faced by ordinary citizens. The real problem with deliberative polls is that if they were to become popular, it would be tempting for interest groups and partisan elites to create polls in which (...) the constraints and briefing materials subtly tilted the participants in a desired direction. Public criticism of biased deliberative polls would, in turn, invite biased criticism of unbiased polls. In short, ?policing? the quality of deliberative polls could recreate the very pathologies of real-world democratic discourse that the polls are designed to rectify. However, this problem is not insurmountable, because the participants themselves can police the proceedings by questioning the veracity and balance of the briefing materials. (shrink)

Do people tend to disagree over political issues because of conflicting values? Or do they disagree about which policies will most effectively promote shared values? In a previous article, I argued that the issues most people think are most important tend to fall into the latter category. On the issues of greatest importance to the mass public, most citizens agree about the ends that are desirable, but disagree about which policy means would best effectuate those ends. Consequently, disputes about facts—disputes (...) about the actual effects of proposed public policies—lie at the heart of the most important divisions in contemporary American public opinion. However, people do not necessarily interpret their political disagreements this way. If they fail to recognize that facts that they see as self-evident are disputed by their opponents, they may see their opponents as having different values, since there could be few other explanations for their opponents' disagreement with them. However, evidence that disagreements about facts are really driving public opinion can be found by using conditional surveys, which ask respondents if they would support a given policy if they believed that it would cause specific negative consequences. (shrink)

Aunque el uso no problematizado en el lenguaje ordinario de los términos "consenso" y "consentimiento" sugiere que debe haber alguna comprensión compartida de su significado, no hay un acuerdo generalizado sobre el uso de estos conceptos entre los filósofos políticos. De hecho, el significado filosófico de estos conceptos sigue siendo elusivo y controvertido; tal vez precisamente a causa de su amplitud y centralidad. Teniendo en cuenta los numerosos intentos de explicar satisfactoriamente consenso y consentimiento -que con el tiempo se han (...) vuelto más sofisticados-, este artículo recoge algunos usos filosóficos fundamentales de estos dos multifacéticos conceptos y sugiere una estrategia para bosquejar un mapa que parece un rompecabezas cuyas piezas están moldeadas de tal forma que se necesita un enfoque multidisciplinario para poder identificar adecuadamente sus significados e implicaciones. Although the unproblematic use of the terms "consensus" and "consent" in ordinary language suggests that there must be some shared understanding of their meaning, there is no widespread assent on the use of these concepts among political philosophers. In fact, the philosophical meaning of these concepts remains elusive and controversial, perhaps exactly because of their extension and centrality. Taking note of the numerous attempts to provide a satisfactory account of "consensus" and "consent" - that have become increasingly sophisticated in time - this article recollects some fundamental philosophical uses of the two many-faceted concepts, and suggests a strategy for delineating a map that looks like a puzzle, whose pieces are shaped in such a way that we need a multidisciplinary approach in order to adequately identify their meanings and implications. (shrink)

Using the recommendations of the Commission on Freedom of the Press, we ask today's media consumers how they rate the performance of modern American journalism. We employ original survey data collected from journalism students at a major Midwest university, framing our findings in the context of the commission's 1947 recommendations. The result is presentation of contemporary opinions about the performance of American media in the context of journalism ideals articulated more than 60 years ago.

Consistent with Koehler's position, we propose a generalization of the base rate fallacy and earlier conservatism literatures. In studies using both traditional tasks and new tasks based on ecologically valid base rates, our subjects typically underweight individuating information at least as much as they underweight base rates. The implications of cue consistency for averaging heuristics are discussed.

Koehler is right that base rate information is used, to various degrees, both in laboratory tasks and in everyday life. However, it is not time to turn our backs on laboratory tasks and focus solely on ecologically valid decision making. Tightly controlled experimental data are still needed to understandhowbase rate information is used, and how this varies among groups.

Any instance (i.e., event, behavior, trait) belongs to infinitely many reference classes, hence there are infinitely many base rates from which to choose. People clearly do not entertain all possible reference classes, however, so something must be limiting the search space. We suggest some possible mechanisms that determine which reference class is evoked for the purpose of judgment and decision.

The fallacy beneath the base rate fallacy is that we know what a base rate is. We talk as if base rates and individuating information were two different kinds of information. From a Bayesian perspective, however, the only difference between base rate and individuating information is – which comes first.

This article looks at how various political cultures and imaginaries occlude the public’s deeply democratic political role, especially the currently reigning anti-political culture of neo-liberalism. Even in an era when millions of people the world over take to the streets in protest, dominant political imaginaries position most of the world’s people as largely powerless. What is needed is a radical political imaginary along the lines that Cornelius Castoriadis suggests. This imaginary foregrounds the ways in which all social and political formations (...) are already constituted by human beings’ ability to create new formations in the absence of foundations. But ignorant of this power, people are trapped in imaginaries where it seems that power resides elsewhere, only in halls of state or corporate boardrooms. This article offers an account that identifies where power originates and how it can be reclaimed through a more radical democratic political imaginary. The article proceeds as follows: the first two sec... (shrink)

Koehler is right to argue for more nuanced interpretation of base rate anomalies. These anomalies are best understood in relation to a broader class of cognitive anomalies, which are important for theory and practice. Recognizing a need for more nuanced analysis should not be taken as a license for treating the effects as “explained away.”.