- Illusions of Affection: A Hyper-Illusory Account of Normative Valence.Mihailis Diamantis - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (5-6):6-29.details
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Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Mind/Brain Identity Theory.Jjc Smart - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Consciousness and intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane & Craig French - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Consciousness: Individuated Information in Action.Jakub Jonkisz - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:149261.details
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Introspective training apprehensively defended: Reflections on Titchener's lab manual.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):11--7.details
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Vicissitudes of Consciousness, Varieties of Correlates.Austen Clark & Manchester Hall - unknowndetails
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on 'Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness?'.Bernard Baars - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):29-86.details
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Perception and representation.William Alston - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.details
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Conscious awareness and representation.Joseph Levine - 2006 - In Kenneth Williford & Uriah Kriegel (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 173--198.details
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Pain, qualia, and the explanatory gap.Donald F. Gustafson - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.details
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Pain, qualia, and the explanatory gap.Don Gustafson - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.details
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Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.details
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Consciousness and nonconceptual content. [REVIEW]Alex Byrne - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):261-274.details
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Finkelstein on the difference between conscious and unconscious belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.details
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Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.details
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Is experiencing just representing? [REVIEW]Ned Block - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663-670.details
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Stalnaker on zombies. [REVIEW]William G. Lycan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):473-479.details
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Mary Mary, quite contrary.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.details
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Is conceptual analysis needed for the reduction of qualitative states?Janet Levin - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):571-591.details
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Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap".Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-174.details
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Nagel's case against physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2002 - SATS 3 (2):91-108.details
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Concepts of consciousness, kinds of consciousness, meanings of 'consciousness'.Michael V. Antony - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (1):1-16.details
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Centered worlds and the content of perception: Short version.Berit Brogaard - 1972 - In David Sosa (ed.), Philosophical Books (Analytic Philosophy). Wiley-Blackwell.details
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El problema de la consciencia en la filosofía contemporánea.Nicolás Alarcón Zambrano - 2018 - Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 28 (2):429-442.details
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The Ability Hypothesis: An Empirically Based Defense.Mahdi Zakeri & Majid Ghasemi - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):23-38.details
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Perceiving Smellscapes.Benjamin D. Young - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):203-223.details
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Degrees of Consciousness.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):553-575.details
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The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood.Kenneth Williford, Daniel Bennequin, Karl Friston & David Rudrauf - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective.Assaf Weksler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):91-103.details
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Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
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Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.details
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The zombie's cogito: Meditations on type-Q materialism.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585-605.details
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Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience.Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):375-394.details
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Sensory modalities and novel features of perceptual experiences.Douglas C. Wadle - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9841-9872.details
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Colour hallucination: In defence of externalist representationalism.Elisabeth Lucia Waczek & Wolfgang Barz - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):3-7.details
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Sensations and the language of thought.Adam Vinueza - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392.details
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The Social Epistemology of Introspection.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):925-942.details
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Shoemaker on phenomenal content.Brad Thompson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):307--334.details
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Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.details
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Representationalism and the argument from hallucination.Brad Thompson - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.details
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Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.details
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A Metacognitive Account of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1081-1101.details
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Inverting intentional content.R. Takenaga - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):133-143.details
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Review of David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness. [REVIEW]Pär Sundström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (1):80-86.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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