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Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method

Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press (2007)

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  1. How to Be a Minimalist About Sets.Luca Incurvati - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):69-87.
    According to the iterative conception of set, sets can be arranged in a cumulative hierarchy divided into levels. But why should we think this to be the case? The standard answer in the philosophical literature is that sets are somehow constituted by their members. In the first part of the paper, I present a number of problems for this answer, paying special attention to the view that sets are metaphysically dependent upon their members. In the second part of the paper, (...)
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  • Neo-Carnapian Metaphysics.Jack Ritchie - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (3):392-407.
    Any movement worth its salt has a creation myth. Analytic metaphysics is no exception. According to legend, it was born from the clash of two titans. On the one side, was the anti-metaphysical Logi...
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  • Naturalism, Experience, and Hume’s ‘Science of Human Nature’.Benedict Smith - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):310-323.
    A standard interpretation of Hume’s naturalism is that it paved the way for a scientistic and ‘disenchanted’ conception of the world. My aim in this paper is to show that this is a restrictive reading of Hume, and it obscures a different and profitable interpretation of what Humean naturalism amounts to. The standard interpretation implies that Hume’s ‘science of human nature’ was a reductive investigation into our psychology. But, as Hume explains, the subject matter of this science is not restricted (...)
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  • Defending the Indispensability Argument: Atoms, Infinity and the Continuum.Eduardo Castro - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):41-61.
    This paper defends the Quine-Putnam mathematical indispensability argument against two objections raised by Penelope Maddy. The objections concern scientific practices regarding the development of the atomic theory and the role of applied mathematics in the continuum and infinity. I present two alternative accounts by Stephen Brush and Alan Chalmers on the atomic theory. I argue that these two theories are consistent with Quine’s theory of scientific confirmation. I advance some novel versions of the indispensability argument. I argue that these new (...)
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  • Structures and Logics: A Case for (a) Relativism.Stewart Shapiro - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S2):309-329.
    In this paper, I use the cases of intuitionistic arithmetic with Church’s thesis, intuitionistic analysis, and smooth infinitesimal analysis to argue for a sort of pluralism or relativism about logic. The thesis is that logic is relative to a structure. There are classical structures, intuitionistic structures, and (possibly) paraconsistent structures. Each such structure is a legitimate branch of mathematics, and there does not seem to be an interesting logic that is common to all of them. One main theme of my (...)
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  • Depth and ClarityFelix Mühlhölzer. Braucht Die Mathematik Eine Grundlegung? Eine Kommentar des Teils III von Wittgensteins Bemerkungen Über Die Grundlagen der Mathematik [Does Mathematics Need a Foundation? A Commentary on Part III of Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics]. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2010. ISBN: 978-3-465-03667-8. Pp. Xiv + 602. [REVIEW]Juliet Floyd - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (2):255-276.
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  • Labyrinth of Continua.Patrick Reeder - 2018 - Philosophia Mathematica 26 (1):1-39.
    This is a survey of the concept of continuity. Efforts to explicate continuity have produced a plurality of philosophical conceptions of continuity that have provably distinct expressions within contemporary mathematics. I claim that there is a divide between the conceptions that treat the whole continuum as prior to its parts, and those conceptions that treat the parts of the continuum as prior to the whole. Along this divide, a tension emerges between those conceptions that favor philosophical idealizations of continuity and (...)
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  • Three Conceptions of Explaining How Possibly—and One Reductive Account.Johannes Persson - 2009 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.
    Philosophers of science have often favoured reductive approaches to how-possibly explanation. This article identifies three alternative conceptions making how-possibly explanation an interesting phenomenon in its own right. The first variety approaches “how possibly X?” by showing that X is not epistemically impossible. This can sometimes be achieved by removing misunderstandings concerning the implications of one’s current belief system but involves characteristically a modification of this belief system so that acceptance of X does not result in contradiction. The second variety offers (...)
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  • Maddy and Mathematics: Naturalism or Not.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):423-450.
    Penelope Maddy advances a purportedly naturalistic account of mathematical methodology which might be taken to answer the question 'What justifies axioms of set theory?' I argue that her account fails both to adequately answer this question and to be naturalistic. Further, the way in which it fails to answer the question deprives it of an analog to one of the chief attractions of naturalism. Naturalism is attractive to naturalists and nonnaturalists alike because it explains the reliability of scientific practice. Maddy's (...)
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  • Realismo/Anti-Realismo.Eduardo Castro - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    State of the art paper on the topic realism/anti-realism. The first part of the paper elucidates the notions of existence and independence of the metaphysical characterization of the realism/anti-realism dispute. The second part of the paper presents a critical taxonomy of the most important positions and doctrines in the contemporary literature on the domains of science and mathematics: scientific realism, scientific anti-realism, constructive empiricism, structural realism, mathematical Platonism, mathematical indispensability, mathematical empiricism, intuitionism, mathematical fictionalism and second philosophy.
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  • Strawsons Descriptive Metaphysics-Its Scope and Limits.Fredrik Stjernberg - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (4):529-541.
    This paper examines some aspects of Strawson’s conception of descriptive metaphysics, as it is developed in Individuals. Descriptive metaphysics sets out to describe ”the actual structure of our thought about the world”. Three specific problems for this project are discussed. First, isn’t the description of our actual thought about the world mainly an empirical task? Second, how determinate and consistent is the stuff we find, how determinate and consistent is our conceptual scheme? Third, who are “we” here? Answers to these (...)
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  • On Naturalizing the Epistemology of Mathematics.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):63-97.
    In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e. that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.
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  • The Anti-Mechanist Argument Based on Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Indescribability of the Concept of Natural Number and Deviant Encodings.Paula Quinon - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):243-266.
    This paper reassesses the criticism of the Lucas-Penrose anti-mechanist argument, based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, as formulated by Krajewski : this argument only works with the additional extra-formal assumption that “the human mind is consistent”. Krajewski argues that this assumption cannot be formalized, and therefore that the anti-mechanist argument – which requires the formalization of the whole reasoning process – fails to establish that the human mind is not mechanistic. A similar situation occurs with a corollary to the argument, that (...)
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  • Naturalising Badiou: Mathematical Ontology and Structural Realism.Fabio Gironi - unknown
    This thesis offers a naturalist revision of Alain Badiou’s philosophy. This goal is pursued through an encounter of Badiou’s mathematical ontology and theory of truth with contemporary trends in philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. I take issue with Badiou’s inability to elucidate the link between the empirical and the ontological, and his residual reliance on a Heideggerian project of fundamental ontology, which undermines his own immanentist principles. I will argue for both a bottom-up naturalisation of Badiou’s philosophical approach (...)
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  • Why Naturalize Consciousness?Wayne Wright - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):583-607.
    This paper examines the relevance of philosophical work on consciousness to its scientific study. Of particular concern is the debate over whether consciousness can be naturalized, which is typically taken to have consequences for the prospects for its scientific investigation. It is not at all clear that philosophers of consciousness have properly identified and evaluated the assumptions about scientific activity made by both naturalization and anti- naturalization projects. I argue that there is good reason to think that some of the (...)
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  • Was Spinoza a Naturalist?Alexander Douglas - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):77-99.
    In this article I dispute the claim, made by several contemporary scholars, that Spinoza was a naturalist. ‘Naturalism’ here refers to two distinct but related positions in contemporary philosophy. The first, ontological naturalism, is the view that everything that exists possesses a certain character permitting it to be defined as natural and prohibiting it from being defined as supernatural. I argue that the only definition of ontological naturalism that could be legitimately applied to Spinoza's philosophy is so unrestrictive as to (...)
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  • Deflating Existence Away? A Critique of Azzouni's Nominalism.Yvonne Raley - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (1):73-83.
    Yet, he also says that it is philosophically indeterminate which criterion for what exists is correct. Nominalism is the view that certain objects ( i.e ., abstract objects) do not exist, and not the view that it is philosophically indeterminate whether or not they do. I resolve the dilemma that Azzouni's claims pose: Azzouni is a non-factualist about what exists, but he is a factualist about which criterion for what exists our community of speakers has adopted. It is in the (...)
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  • Basic Reasons and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of Reasons.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
    This paper develops and defends a coherentist account of reasons. I develop three core ideas for this defense: a distinction between basic reasons and noninferential justification, the plausibility of the neglected argument against first philosophy, and an emergent account of reasons. These three ideas form the backbone for a credible coherentist view of reasons. I work toward this account by formulating and explaining the basic reasons dilemma. This dilemma reveals a wavering attitude that coherentists have had toward basic reasons. More (...)
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  • Thought Experiments Considered Harmful.Paul Thagard - 2014 - Perspectives on Science 22 (2):122-139.
    Thought experiments have been influential in philosophy at least since Plato, and they have contributed to science at least since Galileo. Some of this influence is appropriate, because thought experiments can have legitimate roles in generating and clarifying hypotheses, as well as in identifying problems in competing hypotheses. I will argue, however, that philosophers have often overestimated the significance of thought experiments by supposing that they can provide evidence that supports the acceptance of beliefs. Accepting hypotheses merely on the basis (...)
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  • Philosophy Without Borders, Naturally: An Interview with Harold Kincaid.Harold Kincaid - 2017 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 10 (1):83-100.
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  • From Numerical Concepts to Concepts of Number.Lance J. Rips, Amber Bloomfield & Jennifer Asmuth - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):623-642.
    Many experiments with infants suggest that they possess quantitative abilities, and many experimentalists believe that these abilities set the stage for later mathematics: natural numbers and arithmetic. However, the connection between these early and later skills is far from obvious. We evaluate two possible routes to mathematics and argue that neither is sufficient: (1) We first sketch what we think is the most likely model for infant abilities in this domain, and we examine proposals for extrapolating the natural number concept (...)
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  • Between Deflationism and Inflationism: A Moderate View on Truth and Reference.Graham Seth Moore - 2021 - The Philosophical Quarterly (N/A):1-22.
    This essay argues for a two-part thesis concerning the deflationist theories of truth and reference. First, I identify two points of contrast between the deflationist theories and their traditional inflationary opponents: (1) they each employ different orders of explanation for the variety of semantic phenomena, and (2) the inflationist is typically taken to be beholden to a reductive explanation of reference, whereas the deflationist is doubtful of this project. Secondly, I argue that these two points of contrast need not come (...)
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  • Filip Tvrdý o naturalizaci filosofie.Tomas Hribek - 2017 - Filosofie Dnes 9 (1):71-79.
    [Filip Tvrdý on Naturalizing Philosophy] The paper distinguishes several versions of contemporary naturalism: revisionary, constructive, and non-representational. Revisionary naturalism pleads substituting the traditional philosophical inquiry into the nature of things by a genetic inquiry into the origin of our – often faulty – beliefs about the nature of things. Constructive naturalism accepts the program of traditional philosophy, yet hoping that its questions could be answered by broadly scientific methods. Non-representational naturalism is an extension of metaethical expressivism, claiming that philosophical claims (...)
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  • Matematický Realismus a Naturalismus Penelope Maddy1.Vít Punčochář - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19:199-226.
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  • Must Naturalism Lead to a Deflationary Meta-Ontology?Matthew Haug - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (2):347-367.
    Huw Price has argued that naturalistic philosophy inevitably leads to a deflationary approach to ontological questions. In this paper, I rebut these arguments. A more substantive, less language-focused approach to metaphysics remains open to naturalists. However, rebutting one of Price’s main arguments requires rejecting Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. So, even though Price’s argument is unsound, it reveals that naturalists cannot rest content with broadly Quinean, “mainstream metaphysics,” which, I suggest, naturalists also have independent reasons to reject.
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  • The Applicability of Mathematics and the Indispensability Arguments.Michele Ginammi - 2016 - Lato Sensu, Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 3 (1).
    In this paper I will take into examination the relevance of the main indispensability arguments for the comprehension of the applicability of mathematics. I will conclude not only that none of these indispensability arguments are of any help for understanding mathematical applicability, but also that these arguments rather require a preliminary analysis of the problems raised by the applicability of mathematics in order to avoid some tricky difficulties in their formulations. As a consequence, we cannot any longer consider the applicability (...)
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  • Malebranche and Descartes on Method: Psychologism, Free Will, and Doubt.David Scott - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):581-604.
    The subject of this paper is Malebranche’s relation to Descartes on the question of method. Using recent commentary as a springboard, it examines whether Malebranche advances a nonpsychologistic account of method, in contrast to the psychologism typically thought to characterize the Cartesian view. I explore this question with respect to two issues of central importance to method generally: doubt and free will. My argument is that, despite superficial differences of emphasis, Descartes and Malebranche adopt positions on doubt and free will (...)
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  • Why Cognitive Science Needs Philosophy and Vice Versa.Paul Thagard - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):237-254.
    Contrary to common views that philosophy is extraneous to cognitive science, this paper argues that philosophy has a crucial role to play in cognitive science with respect to generality and normativity. General questions include the nature of theories and explanations, the role of computer simulation in cognitive theorizing, and the relations among the different fields of cognitive science. Normative questions include whether human thinking should be Bayesian, whether decision making should maximize expected utility, and how norms should be established. These (...)
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  • Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Math Water: Why Discounting the Developmental Foundations of Early Numeracy is Premature and Unnecessary.Kevin Muldoon, Charlie Lewis & Norman Freeman - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):663-664.
    We see no grounds for insisting that, because the concept natural number is abstract, its foundations must be innate. It is possible to specify domain general learning processes that feed into more abstract concepts of numerical infinity. By neglecting the messiness of children's slow acquisition of arithmetical concepts, Rips et al. present an idealized, unnecessarily insular, view of number development.
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  • The Last Mathematician From Hilbert's Göttingen: Saunders Mac Lane as Philosopher of Mathematics.Colin McLarty - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1):77-112.
    While Saunders Mac Lane studied for his D.Phil in Göttingen, he heard David Hilbert's weekly lectures on philosophy, talked philosophy with Hermann Weyl, and studied it with Moritz Geiger. Their philosophies and Emmy Noether's algebra all influenced his conception of category theory, which has become the working structure theory of mathematics. His practice has constantly affirmed that a proper large-scale organization for mathematics is the most efficient path to valuable specific results—while he sees that the question of which results are (...)
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  • The View From the Armchair: A Defense of Traditional Philosophy.Anthony Alan Bryson - 2009 - Dissertation, The University of Iowa
    Traditional philosophy has been under attack from several quarters in recent years. The traditional philosopher views philosophy as an armchair discipline relying, for the most part, on reason and reflection. Some philosophers doubt the legitimacy of this type of inquiry. Their arguments usually occur along two dimensions. Some argue that the primary data source for the armchair philosopher--intuition--does not provide evidence for philosophical theories. Others argue that conceptual analysis, which is the preferred method of inquiry for armchair philosophers, can't yield (...)
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  • Naturalism and the Surreptitious Embrace of Necessity.Kurt Mosser - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):17-32.
    Abstract: In this article, two philosophical positions that structure distinct approaches in the history of metaphysics and epistemology are briefly characterized and contrasted. While one view, “naturalism,” rejects an a priori commitment to necessity, the other view, “transcendentalism,” insists on that commitment. It is shown that at the level of the fundamentals of thought, judgment, and reason, the dispute dissolves, and the naturalists' employment of “necessity for all practical purposes” is at best only nominally distinct from the transcendentalists' use of (...)
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  • Scientific Realism: What It is, the Contemporary Debate, and New Directions.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):451-484.
    First, I answer the controversial question ’What is scientific realism?’ with extensive reference to the varied accounts of the position in the literature. Second, I provide an overview of the key developments in the debate concerning scientific realism over the past decade. Third, I provide a summary of the other contributions to this special issue.
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  • Scepticism and the Senses.Barry Stroud - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):559-570.
    Abstract: This paper is an attempt to identify and to suggest reasons to reject those assumptions about the nature and scope of perceptual knowledge that appear to make an unacceptable scepticism the only strictly defensible answer to the philosophical problem of knowledge of the world in general. The suggestion is that our knowing things about the world around us by perception can be satisfactorily explained only if we can be understood to sometimes perceive that such-and-such is so, where what we (...)
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  • In Carnap’s Defense: A Survey on the Concept of a Linguistic Framework in Carnap’s Philosophy.Parzhad Torfehnezhad - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1):03-30.
    The main task in this paper is to detail and investigate Carnap’s conception of a “linguistic framework”. On this basis, we will see whether Carnap’s dichotomies, such as the analytic-synthetic distinction, are to be construed as absolute/fundamental dichotomies or merely as relative dichotomies. I argue for a novel interpretation of Carnap’s conception of a LF and, on that basis, will show that, according to Carnap, all the dichotomies to be discussed are relative dichotomies; they depend on conventional decisions concerning the (...)
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  • The Impossibility of Skepticism.Daniel Greco - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):317-358.
    Epistemologists and philosophers of mind both ask questions about belief. Epistemologists ask normative questions about belief—which beliefs ought we to have? Philosophers of mind ask metaphysical questions about belief—what are beliefs, and what does it take to have them? While these issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict: the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. This essay argues (...)
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  • How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):645-668.
    In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well-defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework-internal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our first-order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an ‘external’ question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not (...)
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  • Wigner’s Puzzle for Mathematical Naturalism.Sorin Bangu - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):245-263.
    I argue that a recent version of the doctrine of mathematical naturalism faces difficulties arising in connection with Wigner's old puzzle about the applicability of mathematics to natural science. I discuss the strategies to solve the puzzle and I show that they may not be available to the naturalist.
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  • Naturalising Mathematics: A Critical Look at the Quine-Maddy Debate.Marianna Antonutti Marfori - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (32):323-342.
    This paper considers Maddy’s strategy for naturalising mathematics in the context of Quine’s scientific naturalism. The aim of this proposal is to account for the acceptability of mathematics on scientific grounds without committing to revisionism about mathematical practice entailed by the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. It has been argued that Maddy’s mathematical naturalism makes inconsistent assumptions on the role of mathematics in scientific explanations to the effect that it cannot distinguish mathematics from pseudo-science. I shall clarify Maddy’s arguments and show that (...)
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  • B. Jack Copeland, Carl J. Posy, and Oron Shagrir, Eds, Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2013. ISBN 978-0-262-01899-9. Pp. X + 362. [REVIEW]Roy T. Cook - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):412-413.
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  • Sorin Bangu. The Applicability of Mathematics in Science: Indispensability and Ontology. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. ISBN 978-0-230-28520-0 (Hbk). Pp. Xiii + 252. [REVIEW]Christopher Pincock - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):401-412.
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  • Sorin Bangu. The Applicability of Mathematics in Science: Indispensability and Ontology. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. ISBN 978-0-230-28520-0 . Pp. Xiii + 252. [REVIEW]Christopher Pincock - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):401-412.
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  • The Mystery of Applied Mathematics?: A Case Study in Mathematical Development Involving the Fractional Derivative†: Articles.Sheldon R. Smith - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (1):35-69.
    I discuss the applicability of mathematics via a detailed case study involving a family of mathematical concepts known as ‘fractional derivatives.’ Certain formulations of the mystery of applied mathematics would lead one to believe that there ought to be a mystery about the applicability of fractional derivatives. I argue, however, that there is no clear mystery about their applicability. Thus, via this case study, I think that one can come to see more clearly why certain formulations of the mystery of (...)
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  • Ontology and the Word 'Exist': Uneasy Relations.Jody Azzouni - 2010 - Philosophia Mathematica 18 (1):74-101.
    An extensive exploration of the special properties of ‘exist’ is here undertaken. Two of several results are: Denying that `exist’ has associated with it a set of necessary and sufficient conditions has seemed to a number of philosophers to imply metaphysical nihilism . This is because it has seemed that without such conditions the target domain of `existence’ is arbitrarily open. I show this is wrong. Second, my analysis sheds light on the puzzling question of what we are asking when (...)
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  • Marcus Giaquinto. Visual Thinking in Mathematics: An Epistemological Study. [REVIEW]Jeremy Avigad - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (1):95-108.
    Published in 1891, Edmund Husserl's first book, Philosophie der Arithmetik, aimed to ‘prepare the scientific foundations for a future construction of that discipline’. His goals should seem reasonable to contemporary philosophers of mathematics: "…through patient investigation of details, to seek foundations, and to test noteworthy theories through painstaking criticism, separating the correct from the erroneous, in order, thus informed, to set in their place new ones which are, if possible, more adequately secured. 1"But the ensuing strategy for grounding mathematical knowledge (...)
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  • Naturalism and Abstract Entities.Feng Ye - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):129-146.
    I argue that the most popular versions of naturalism imply nominalism in philosophy of mathematics. In particular, there is a conflict in Quine's philosophy between naturalism and realism in mathematics. The argument starts from a consequence of naturalism on the nature of human cognitive subjects, physicalism about cognitive subjects, and concludes that this implies a version of nominalism, which I will carefully characterize. The indispensability of classical mathematics for the sciences and semantic/confirmation holism does not affect the argument. The disquotational (...)
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  • Three Roles of Empirical Information in Philosophy: Intuitions on Mathematics Do Not Come for Free.Deniz Sarikaya, José Antonio Pérez-Escobar & Deborah Kant - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):247-278.
    This work gives a new argument for ‘Empirical Philosophy of Mathematical Practice’. It analyses different modalities on how empirical information can influence philosophical endeavours. We evoke the classical dichotomy between “armchair” philosophy and empirical/experimental philosophy, and claim that the latter should in turn be subdivided in three distinct styles: Apostate speculator, Informed analyst, and Freeway explorer. This is a shift of focus from the source of the information towards its use by philosophers. We present several examples from philosophy of mind/science (...)
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  • On G.E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’.James Owen Weatherall - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
    A new reading of G.E. Moore's ‘Proof of an External World’ is offered, on which the Proof is understood as a unique and essential part of an anti-sceptical strategy that Moore worked out early in his career and developed in various forms, from 1909 until his death in 1958. I begin by ignoring the Proof and by developing a reading of Moore's broader response to scepticism. The bulk of the article is then devoted to understanding what role the Proof plays (...)
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  • “The Brain in Vat” at the Intersection. [REVIEW]Danilo Šuster - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):205-217.
    Goldberg 2016 is a collection of papers dedicated to Putnam’s (1981) brain in a vat (‘BIV’) scenario. The collection divides into three parts, though the issues are inter-connected. Putnam uses conceptual tools from philosophy of language in order to establish theses in epistemology and metaphysics. Putnam’s BIV is considered a contemporary version of Descartes’s skeptical argument of the Evil Genius, but I argue that deception (the possibility of having massively false belief) is not essential, externalism does all the anti-skeptical work. (...)
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  • An Overview of Lexical Semantics.Kent Johnson - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):119-134.
    This article reviews some linguistic and philosophical work in lexical semantics. In Section 1, the general methods of lexical semantics are explored, with particular attention to how semantic features of verbs are associated with grammatical patterns. In Section 2, philosophical consequences and issues arising from this sort of research is reviewed.
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