- (1 other version)Explication, Description and Enlightenment.Severin Schroeder & John Preston - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):106-120.details
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“The Ravens Paradox” is a misnomer.Roger Clarke - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):427-440.details
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A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.Susanna Rinard - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):81-100.details
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Revamping Hypothetico-Deductivism: A Dialectic Account of Confirmation. [REVIEW]Gregor Betz - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):991-1009.details
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(1 other version)Contemporary debates in philosophy of science.Christopher Hitchcock (ed.) - 2004 - Malden, MA: Blackwell.details
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Confirmation and Induction.Franz Huber - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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(1 other version)How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006). Springer. pp. 247--275.details
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The paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.details
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Language and its commonsense: Where formal semantics went wrong, and where it can (and should) go.Walid Saba - 2020 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 1 (1):40-62.details
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(1 other version)Explication, description and enlightenment.Severin Schroeder & John Preston - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22:106-120.details
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Studies in the logic of K -onfirmation.Clayton Peterson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):437-471.details
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Semantic Information Measure with Two Types of Probability for Falsification and Confirmation.Lu Chenguang - manuscriptdetails
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Hempel's Paradox, Law‐likeness and Causal Relations.Severin Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (3):244-263.details
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Bayesian Confirmation Theory and The Likelihood Principle.Daniel Steel - 2007 - Synthese 156 (1):53-77.details
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On the equivalence of Goodman’s and Hempel’s paradoxes.Kenneth Boyce - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:32-42.details
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(1 other version)The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006).Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.) - 2010 - Springer.details
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Qualitative confirmation and the ravens paradox.Patrick Maher - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):89-108.details
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A bayesian way to make stopping rules matter.Daniel Steel - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):213--227.details
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The plurality of bayesian measures of confirmation and the problem of measure sensitivity.Branden Fitelson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.details
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Logical Semantics and Commonsense Knowledge: Where Did we Go Wrong, and How to Go Forward, Again.Walid Saba - manuscriptdetails
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Bayes' theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Conciliatory Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens.William Peden - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):45-64.details
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The Raven Paradox Revisited in Terms of Random Variables.Bruno Carbonaro & Federica Vitale - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):763-795.details
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Probability captures the logic of scientific confirmation.Patrick Maher - 2004 - In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of science. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 69--93.details
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All Ravens can be Black, After All.Ruurik Holm - 2021 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 30 (4):657-669.details
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