- Modality, expected utility, and hypothesis testing.WooJin Chung & Salvador Mascarenhas - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-40.details
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Predictivism and model selection.Alireza Fatollahi - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-28.details
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(1 other version)A New Condition for Transitivity of Probabilistic Support.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):253-265.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis: A Hybrid Approach.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Sussexdetails
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A probabilistic analysis of cross‐examination using Bayesian networks.Marcello Di Bello - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):41-65.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Consensus versus Unanimity: Which Carries More Weight?Finnur Dellsén - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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The problem of model selection and scientific realism.Stanislav Larski - unknowndetails
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Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):241-294.details
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Fine‐tuning, weird sorts of atheism and evidential favouring.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy (3):1-12.details
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(1 other version)A New Condition for Transitivity of Probabilistic Support.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2021 - Erkenntnis (1):1-13.details
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Fragmentation and Old Evidence.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):542-567.details
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Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to Best Explanation.Barry Ward - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):360-377.details
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Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Why is Bayesian confirmation theory rarely practiced.Robert W. P. Luk - 2019 - Science and Philosophy 7 (1):3-20.details
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Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.details
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Plenty of room left for the Dogmatist.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Analysis 80 (1):66-76.details
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Inference to the Best Explanation, Cleaned Up and Made Respectable.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2017 - In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 39-61.details
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Approaching Truth in Conceptual Spaces.Gustavo Cevolani - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1485-1500.details
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Truth-Seeking by Abduction.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2018 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.details
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(1 other version)Evidential Reasoning.Marcello Di Bello & Bart Verheij - 2011 - In G. Bongiovanni, Don Postema, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor, C. Valentini & D. Walton (eds.), Handbook in Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 447-493.details
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Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence.Anna-Maria A. Eder & Peter Brössel - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-83.details
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Information and Inaccuracy.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):577-604.details
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Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fit.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1263-1290.details
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Nagelian Reduction and Coherence.Philippe van Basshuysen - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (1):63-94.details
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Confirmation, Increase in Probability, and the Likelihood Ratio Measure: a Reply to Glass and McCartney.William Roche - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (4):491-513.details
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Bayesians sometimes cannot ignore even very implausible theories (even ones that have not yet been thought of).Branden Fitelson & Neil Thomason - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Logic 6:25-36.details
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On Popper’s strong inductivism.José A. Díez - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):105-116.details
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Is there a place in Bayesian confirmation theory for the Reverse Matthew Effect?William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1631-1648.details
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Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):139--159.details
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Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):371-398.details
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Hempel’s logic of confirmation.Franz Huber - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):181-189.details
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Confirmation and Reduction: a Bayesian Account.Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Roman Frigg & Stephan Hartmann - 2011 - Synthese 179 (2):321-338.details
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Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):473-489.details
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Assessing theories, Bayes style.Franz Huber - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):89-118.details
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Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.details
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How Do Reasons Accrue?Shyam Nair - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 56–73.details
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A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.Jan Sprenger - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (3):383-401.details
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Evidential Support, Transitivity, and Screening-Off.William Roche - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):785-806.details
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Montague Reduction, Confirmation, and the Syntax-Semantics Relation.Stephan Hartmann & Kristina Liefke - manuscriptdetails
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Why Explanatoriness Is Evidentially Relevant.Kevin McCain & Ted Poston - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):145-153.details
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Independent Tests and the Log‐Likelihood‐Ratio Measure of Confirmation.Alexander R. Pruss - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):124-135.details
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Explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant, or inference to the best explanation meets Bayesian confirmation theory.W. Roche & E. Sober - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):659-668.details
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The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.details
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Confirmation.Franz Huber - 2011 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.details
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Inductive Logic.Franz Huber - 2008 - In J. Lachs R. Talisse (ed.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. Routledge.details
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Revamping Hypothetico-Deductivism: A Dialectic Account of Confirmation. [REVIEW]Gregor Betz - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):991-1009.details
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The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.details
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A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):643-651.details
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An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence.Jacob Stegenga - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2391-2411.details
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