Switch to: References

Citations of:

Directed Duties

Philosophy Compass 10 (8):523-532 (2015)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Corrective Duties/Corrective Justice.Giulio Fornaroli - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (3):e12968.
    In this paper, I assess critically the recent debate on corrective duties across moral and legal philosophy. Two prominent positions have emerged: the Kantian rights-based view (holding that what triggers corrections is a failure to respect others' right to freedom) and the so-called continuity view (correcting means attempting to do what one was supposed to do before). Neither position, I try to show, offers a satisfactory explanation of the ground (why correct?) and content (how to correct?) of corrective duties. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Against the Entitlement Model of Obligation.Mario Attie-Picker - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):138-155.
    The purpose of this paper is to reject what I call the entitlement model of directed obligation: the view that we can conclude from X is obligated to Y that therefore Y has an entitlement against X. I argue that rejecting the model clears up many otherwise puzzling aspects of ordinary moral interaction. The main goal is not to offer a new theory of obligation and entitlement. It is rather to show that, contrary to what most philosophers have assumed, directed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Putting Wronging First.Daniel Webber - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly.
    I argue that an act can be wrong _because_ it wrongs a particular person. I then show how this thesis serves as a constraint on moral theories, using Kantian ethics as a case study.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Neglecting Others and Making It Up to Them: The Idea of a Corrective Duty.Giulio Fornaroli - 2023 - Legal Theory 29 (4):289-313.
    I aspire to answer two questions regarding the concept of a corrective duty. The first concerns what it means to wrong others, thus triggering a demand for corrections (the ground question). The second relates to the proper content of corrective duties. I first illustrate how three prominent accounts of corrective duties—the Aristotelian model of correlativity, the Kantian idea that wronging corresponds to the violation of others’ right to freedom, and the more recent continuity view—have failed to answer the two questions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Relational nonhuman personhood.Nicolas Delon - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):569-587.
    This article defends a relational account of personhood. I argue that the structure of personhood consists of dyadic relations between persons who can wrong or be wronged by one another, even if some of them lack moral competence. I draw on recent work on directed duties to outline the structure of moral communities of persons. The upshot is that we can construct an inclusive theory of personhood that can accommodate nonhuman persons based on shared community membership. I argue that, once (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The trustworthiness of AI: Comments on Simion and Kelp’s account.Dong-Yong Choi - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-9.
    Simion and Kelp explain the trustworthiness of an AI based on that AI’s disposition to meet its obligations. Roughly speaking, according to Simion and Kelp, an AI is trustworthy regarding its task if and only if that AI is obliged to complete the task and its disposition to complete the task is strong enough. Furthermore, an AI is obliged to complete a task in the case where the task is the AI’s etiological function or design function. This account has a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Obligatory Gifts: An Essay on Forgiveness.Mario Attie-Picker - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (18).
    The paper attempts to bridge a gap between two prevalent conceptions of forgiveness that are widely thought to be in opposition. On one side of things, forgiveness is often characterized as a gift. The image is an ever-present one, enduring in popular culture no less than in the sober prose of analytic philosophy. But we also talk of forgiveness as a moral imperative, an important, even vital aspect of our moral life. I argue that, contrary to what may at first (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Second‐Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation.Janis David Schaab - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (3):1 - 11.
    According to second‐personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second‐personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second‐personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second‐personal relations, which has consequences for the nature of the obligations that they purport to explain. This article aims to distinguish these groups from each other, highlight their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Acting on Behalf of Another.Alexander Edlich & Jonas Vandieken - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):540-555.
    This paper provides an analysis of the phrase ‘acting on behalf of another.’ To do this, acting on behalf is first distinguished from ‘acting for the sake of another,’ the latter being a matter of other-directed motivation, the former of what we call ‘normative other-directedness’—i.e., acting on the claims and duties of the other. Second, we provide a distinction between two kinds of acting on behalf of another: representation as other-directedness plus normative replacement, and normative support as other-directedness without normative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Robot rights in joint action.Guido Löhr - 2022 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2021. Berlin: Springer.
    The claim I want to explore in this paper is simple. In social ontology, Margaret Gilbert, Abe Roth, Michael Bratman, Antonie Meijers, Facundo Alonso and others talk about rights or entitlements against other participants in joint action. I employ several intuition pumps to argue that we have reason to assume that such entitlements or rights can be ascribed even to non-sentient robots that we collaborate with. Importantly, such entitlements are primarily identified in terms of our normative discourse. Justified criticism, for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Contractualism and the question of direction.Aaron Salomon - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1298-1316.
    Directed duties are those duties whose violation would wrong someone in particular. Under what conditions, and in virtue of what, is a duty directed to someone? This is the Question of Direction. In this article, I explore the possibility of providing a Contractualist answer to the Question of Direction—one where the directedness of a directed duty is explained by the way in which that duty is derived in Contractualist moral reasoning. After presenting and rejecting three attempts at such an answer, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem.Cristina Ballarini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2475-2505.
    The New Evil Demon Problem presents a serious challenge to externalist theories of epistemic justification. In recent years, externalists have developed a number of strategies for responding to the problem. A popular line of response involves distinguishing between a belief’s being epistemically justified and a subject’s being epistemically blameless for holding it. The apparently problematic intuitions the New Evil Demon Problem elicits, proponents of this response claim, track the fact that the deceived subject is epistemically blameless for believing as she (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Commitment engineering: conceptual engineering without representations.Guido Löhr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13035-13052.
    It is largely assumed that conceptual engineering is essentially about revising, introducing, or eliminating representational devices, in particular the intension and extension of words and concepts. However, tying conceptual engineering too closely to representations is risky. Not everyone endorses the notion of representation as theoretically helpful or even real. Not everyone thinks that concepts or meanings should be understood in terms of the notion of representation. Does this mean that conceptual engineering is not interesting or relevant for these skeptics? In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Why Strict Compliance?Simon Căbulea May - 2021 - In David Sobel, Steven Wall & Peter Vallentyne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 227-264.
    I present an interpretation of ideal theory that is grounded in the idea of society as a fair scheme of cooperation, which Rawls describes as the most fundamental idea of justice as fairness. A key element of the Rawlsian idea of cooperation, I claim, is that the individual participants of a genuinely cooperative scheme—whatever its scale—are morally accountable to each other for complying with the scheme’s rules. This means that each participant has the moral standing to demand of the others (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Directed Duty, Practical Intimacy, and Legal Wronging.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2021 - In Teresa Marques & Chiara Valentini (eds.), Collective Action, Philosophy and Law. London: Routledge. pp. 152-174.
    What is it for a duty or obligation to be directed? Thinking about paradigmatic cases such as the obligations generated by promises will take us only so far in answering this question. This paper starts by surveying several approaches for understanding directed duties, as well as the challenges they face. It turns out that shared agency features something similar to the directedness of duties. This suggests an account of directedness in terms of shared agency – specifically, in terms of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (1 other version)Paternalism and Duties to Self.Michael Cholbi - 2018 - In Kalle Grill & Jason Hanna (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism. New York: Routledge. pp. 108-118.
    Here I pursue two main aims: (1) to articulate and defend a Kantian conception of duties to self, and (2) to explore the ramifications of such duties for the moral justification of paternalism. I conclude that there is a distinctive reason to resent paternalistic intercessions aimed at assisting others in fulfilling their duties to self (or the self-regarding virtues necessary thereunto), based on the fact that the goods realized via their fulfillment are historical, i.e., their value depends on an individual's (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the Supposed Incoherence of Obligations to Oneself.Janis David Schaab - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):175-189.
    ABSTRACT An influential argument against the possibility of obligations to oneself states that the very notion of such obligations is incoherent: If there were such obligations, we could release ourselves from them; yet releasing oneself from an obligation is impossible. I challenge this argument by arguing against the premise that it is impossible to release oneself from an obligation. I point out that this premise assumes that if it were possible to release oneself from an obligation, it would be impossible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Sweatshops, Structural Injustice, and the Wrong of Exploitation: Why Multinational Corporations Have Positive Duties to the Global Poor.Brian Berkey - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 169 (1):43-56.
    It is widely thought that firms that employ workers in “sweatshop” conditions wrongfully exploit those workers. This claim has been challenged by those who argue that because companies are not obligated to hire their workers in the first place, employing them cannot be wrong so long as they voluntarily accept their jobs and genuinely benefit from them. In this article, I argue that we can maintain that at least many sweatshop employees are wrongfully exploited, while accepting the plausible claim at (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Rights and Virtues: the groundwork of a virtue-based theory of rights.Ondřej Micka - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    The dissertation investigates whether virtue ethics can provide the normative ground for the justification of rights. Most justificatory accounts of rights consist in different explanations of the function of rights. On the view I will defend, rights have a plurality of functions and one of the main functions of rights is to make the right-holder more virtuous. The idea that the possession of rights leads to the development of virtues, called the function of virtue acquisition, is the core of a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Relational Structure of Human Dignity.Ariel Zylberman - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):738-752.
    ABSTRACTThis article argues that received accounts of the concept of human dignity face more difficulties than has been appreciated, when explaining the connection between human dignity and the duty of respect that dignity is supposed to generate. It also argues that a novel, relational, account has the adequate structure to explain such connection.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Why it is Disrespectful to Violate Rights: Contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theory.Janis David Schaab - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):97-116.
    The most prominent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, notoriously fail to accommodate all and only rights-attributions that make sense to ordinary speakers. The Kind-Desire Theory, Leif Wenar’s recent contribution to the field, appears to fare better in this respect than any of its predecessors. The theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based desire that a certain enforceable duty be fulfilled. A kind-based desire is a reason to want (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Contractualism, Person-Affecting Wrongness and the Non-identity Problem.Corey Katz - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):103-119.
    A number of theorists have argued that Scanlon's contractualist theory both "gets around" and "solves" the non-identity problem. They argue that it gets around the problem because hypothetical deliberation on general moral principles excludes the considerations that lead to the problem. They argue that it solves the problem because violating a contractualist moral principle in one's treatment of another wrongs that particular other, grounding a person-affecting moral claim. In this paper, I agree with the first claim but note that all (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Intergenerational Rights and the Problem of Cross-Temporal Relations.Aaron M. Griffith - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):693-710.
    This paper considers the prospects for a theory of intergenerational rights in light of certain ontologies of time. It is argued that the attempt to attribute rights to future persons or obligations to present persons towards future persons, faces serious difficulties if the existence of the future is denied. The difficulty of attributing rights to non-existent future persons is diagnosed as a particularly intractable version of the ‘problem of cross-temporal relations’ that plagues No-Futurist views like presentism. I develop a version (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Two Second‐Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons.Ariel Zylberman - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):921-943.
    In spite of the burgeoning philosophical literature on human dignity, Stephen Darwall's second-personal account of the dignity of persons has not received the attention it deserves. This article investigates Darwall's account and argues that it faces a dilemma, for it succumbs either to a problem of antecedence or to the wrong kind of reasons problem. But this need not mean one should reject a second-personal account. Instead, I argue that an alternative second-personal conception, one I will call relational, promises to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Human Dignity.Ariel Zylberman - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):201-210.
    This article focuses on human dignity as a moral idea and, in particular, on a single but fundamental question: what conception of human dignity, if any, can generate an egalitarian duty to respect all persons? After surveying two mainstream and two alternative conceptions, the article suggests that explaining how human dignity generates an egalitarian duty of respect may be more difficult than has been appreciated.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Civic Trust.Ryan Preston-Roedder - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
    It is a commonplace that there are limits to the ways we can permissibly treat people, even in the service of good ends. For example, we may not steal someone’s wallet, even if we plan to donate the contents to famine relief, or break a promise to help a colleague move, even if we encounter someone else on the way whose need is somewhat more urgent. In other words, we should observe certain constraints against mistreating people, where a constraint is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Rethinking moral claim rights.Laura Valentini - 2023 - Journal of Political Philosophy 31 (4):433-451.
    Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Recent Experimental Philosophy on Joint Action: Do We Need a New Normativism About Collective Action?Guido Löhr - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):754-762.
    There are two general views that social ontologists currently defend concerning the nature of joint intentional action. According to ‘non-normativists’, for a joint action to be established, we need to align certain psychological states in certain ways. ‘Normativists’ argue that joint action essentially involves normative relations that cannot be reduced to the intentional states of individuals. In two ground-breaking publications, Javier Gomez-Lavin and Matthew Rachar empirically investigate the relation between normativity and joint action in several survey studies. They argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Indivisibility of Human Rights.Ariel Zylberman - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (4):389-418.
    This article defends a novel, normative conception of the indivisibility of human rights. Human rights are indivisible because normative commitment to one mutually entails normative commitment to another. The normative conception enables us to defend three important theoretical and practical corollaries. First, as a conceptual thesis normative indivisibility lets us see how human rights constitute a unified system not liable to the typical counter-examples to indivisibility as mutual indispensability. Second, as a dialectical thesis, normative indivisibility can support linkage arguments in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Cancelling fiduciary excuses.Robert E. Goodin - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.
    In trust relationships, one person has a ‘beneficial interest’ in another’s performance. The former not only would but should benefit from the latter’s action, and the latter has a ‘fiduciary duty’ toward the former to so act. But where that act would otherwise be wrong, the first person’s beneficial interest would be providing a pro tanto reason for the second person to do something that is pro tanto wrong. That reason can – and should – be removed by the former (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rights and the Good.Ariel Zylberman - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    What is the connection between moral rights and the good? While familiar normative theories give justificatory precedence to one notion over the other, this paper explores a neglected alternative: when properly specified, the notion of moral rights and of the good conceptually depend on each other.1.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Bipolar Obligations, Recognition Respect, and Second-Personal Morality.Jonas Vandieken - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):291-315.
    Any complete theory of “what we owe to each other” must be able to adequately accommodate directed or bipolar obligations, that is, those obligations that are owed to a particular individual and in virtue of which another individual stands to be wronged. Bipolar obligations receive their moral importance from their intimate connection to a particular form of recognition respect that we owe to each other: respect of another as a source of valid claims to whom in particular we owe certain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Towards a More Particularist View of Rights’ Stringency.Benedict Rumbold - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (2):211-233.
    For all their various disagreements, one point upon which rights theorists often agree is that it is simply part of the nature of rights that they tend to override, outweigh or exclude competing considerations in moral reasoning, that they have ‘peremptory force’, making ‘powerful demands’ that can only be overridden in ‘exceptional circumstances’, Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 240). In this article I challenge this thought. My aim here is not to prove that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Moral rights without balancing.Ariel Zylberman - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):549-569.
    How should we think about apparent conflicts of moral rights? I defend a non-balancing and holistic specification model: non-balancing because moral rights have absolute deontic stringency regardless of any balance of independent values; holistic because the content of moral rights is limited only by that of other moral rights. Holistic Specification, as I call the model, offers a principled, non-consequentialist explanation of exceptions to moral rights. Moreover, Holistic Specification explains why moral rights matter to practical thought while rendering remedial duties (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Fundamental Legal Concepts: The Hohfeldian Framework.Luís Duarte D'Almeida - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (10):554-569.
    Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's account of legal rights is now 100 years old. It has been much discussed, and remains very influential with philosophers and lawyers alike. Yet it is still sometimes misunderstood in crucial respects. This article offers a rigorous exposition of Hohfeld's framework; discusses its claims to comprehensiveness and fundamentality, reviewing recent work on the topic; and highlights the argumentative uses of Hohfeld's most important distinction.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Rights.Leif Wenar - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Rights dominate most modern understandings of what actions are proper and which institutions are just. Rights structure the forms of our governments, the contents of our laws, and the shape of morality as we perceive it. To accept a set of rights is to approve a distribution of freedom and authority, and so to endorse a certain view of what may, must, and must not be done.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • The Duty to Let Others Do Their Duty.Robert E. Goodin - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):1-10.
    We have no general duty to help others do their duty. But arguably we do, for a combination of agency-based and outcome-based reasons, have a general duty to let others do their duty. Our duty is derived from the other’s duty, but it is none the worse for being so. It is best seen as a duty, rather than as the upshot of some right or power of the other that would preclude us from insisting that the others do their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Relational Primitivism.Ariel Zylberman - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):401-422.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Reconsidering the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income.Andrew Lister - 2020 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (3):209-228.
    This article reconsiders the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income based on the idea that reciprocity is not only a duty but a limiting condition on other duties. If the objection wer...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Contractualist justification and the direction of a duty.Julian Jonker - 2019 - Legal Theory 25 (3):200-224.
    ABSTRACTTo whom is a duty owed? Contractualism answers with an interest theory of direction. As such, it faces three challenges. The Conceptual Challenge requires acknowledgment that a duty is conceptually distinct from an interest. The Extensional Challenge requires an account of cases in which one who is owed a duty does not take an interest in the duty, or does not take as much of an interest as someone who is not owed the duty. The Positivist Challenge requires explanation of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations