- Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):342-359.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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Ought, Can, and Presupposition: An Experimental Study.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Methode 4 (6):232-243.details
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Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy.Michael Hannon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4147-4168.details
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Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):110-138.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Experimental philosophy and the method of cases.Joachim Horvath & Steffen Koch - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12716.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes).Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1461-1481.details
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Reflective Reasoning & Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11):e12786.details
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Lingering stereotypes: Salience bias in philosophical argument.Eugen Fischer & Paul E. Engelhardt - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (4):415-439.details
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Why Variation Matters to Philosophy.Edouard Machery - 2023 - Res Philosophica 100 (1):1-22.details
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Philosophical expertise beyond intuitions.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):253-277.details
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Experimental Philosophy of Language.Nathaniel Hansen - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.details
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Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):115-141.details
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Saving the armchair by experiment: what works in economics doesn’t work in philosophy.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2483-2508.details
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Inappropriate stereotypical inferences? An adversarial collaboration in experimental ordinary language philosophy.Eugen Fischer, Paul E. Engelhardt & Justin Sytsma - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10127-10168.details
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Risky‐choice framing and rational decision‐making.Sarah A. Fisher & David R. Mandel - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12763.details
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Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity.Pendaran Roberts, James Andow & Kelly Ann Schmitdtke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3267-3287.details
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Intuitions.James Andow - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):232-246.details
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Intuitions as evidence : an introduction.Marc A. Moffett - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Framing how we think about disagreement.Joshua Alexander, Diana Betz, Chad Gonnerman & John Philip Waterman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2539-2566.details
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Trope analysis and folk intuitions.Stephanie Rennick - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5025-5043.details
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The Methodological Necessity of Experimental Philosophy.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2015 - Discipline Filosofiche 25 (1):23-42.details
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Famine, affluence, and philosophers’ biases.Peter Seipel - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2907-2926.details
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Are Philosophers Good Intuition Predictors?Shen-yi Liao - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1004-1014.details
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(1 other version)Further Insights on Fake-Barn Cases and Intuition Variation.Carsten Bergenholtz, Jacob Busch & Sara Kier Praëm - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):163-180.details
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(1 other version)Further Insights on Fake-Barn Cases and Intuition Variation.Carsten Bergenholtz, Jacob Busch & Sara Kier Praëm - 2021 - Episteme:1-18.details
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The Future of Moral Responsibility and Desert.Jay Spitzley - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4):977-997.details
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Thought Experiments and Experimental Ethics.Thomas Pölzler & Norbert Paulo - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Philosophical Expertise and Philosophical Methodology.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):110-129.details
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Philosophical Expertise.Sven Ove Hansson - 2020 - Theoria 86 (2):139-144.details
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Neo-Confucianism, experimental philosophy and the trouble with intuitive methods.Hagop Sarkissian - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):812-828.details
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Are thought experiments “disturbing”? The case of armchair physics.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2671-2695.details
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Justifying the evidential use of linguistic intuitions.Karen Brøcker - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8167-8189.details
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Knowledge, Noise, and Curve-Fitting: A methodological argument for JTB?Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2017 - In Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Philosophers' linguistic expertise: A psycholinguistic approach to the expertise objection against experimental philosophy.Eugen Fischer, Paul E. Engelhardt & Aurélie Herbelot - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-33.details
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No Harm Done? An Experimental Approach to the Nonidentity Problem.Matthew Kopec & Justin Bruner - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):169-189.details
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Expressive Responding, Experimental Philosophy, and Philosophical Expertise.Shane Nicholas Glackin - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (3):909-931.details
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Experimental philosophy and moral responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 494–516.details
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Intuition in Gettier.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Hetherington Stephen (ed.), Classic Philosophical Arguments: The Gettier Problem. Cambridge University Presss.details
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The Fourfold Route to Empirical Enlightenment: Experimental Philosophy’s Adolescence and the Changing Body of Work.Robert Barnard, Joseph Ulatowski & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (2):77-113.details
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(1 other version)Moral Education Through the Fostering of Reasoning Skills.Kirsten Meyer - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (1):41-55.details
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A (moderate) skill-based defense of the expertise defense.M. Hosein M. A. Khalaj - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Judgements, Expertise, and Counterfactuals.Sören Häggqvist - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):741-754.details
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Modest meta‐philosophical skepticism.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):93-103.details
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The Challenges Involved with Going Negative.Joshua Alexander - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):465-479.details
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Peer Idealization and Internal Examples in the Epistemology of Disagreement.Tim Kenyon - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (1):69-79.details
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Philosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl.Konrad Werner - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1725-1751.details
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Reason Trumps All: Rationality of Minority Views in Relevant Expert Consensus (2021).David Klier - manuscriptdetails
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