- The New Cosmological Argument: O’Connor on Ultimate Explanation.Tyron Craig Goldschmidt - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):267-288.details
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VI—Panpsychism and Free Will: A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism.Philip Goff - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (2):123-144.details
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VI—Panpsychism and Free Will: A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism.Philip Goff - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (2):123-144.details
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Conscious Thought and the Cognitive Fine-Tuning Problem.Philip Goff - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):98-122.details
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Did the universe design itself?Philip Goff - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (1):99-122.details
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Mental Causation.Sophie Gibb - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):327-338.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Alexander Gebharter, Maria Sekatskaya & Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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Reasons explanations (of actions) as structural explanations.Megan Fritts - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12683-12704.details
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Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer Interfaces and Disembodied Agency.Steffen Steinert, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf Jox & Orsolya Friedrich - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):457-482.details
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The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.details
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The assimilation argument and the rollback argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):395-416.details
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Powers, Necessity, and Determinism.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):225-229.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Everyone thinks that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will and moral responsibility.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.details
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Event-causal libertarianism, functional reduction, and the disappearing agent argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):413-432.details
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Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.details
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Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.details
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Reasons explanations and pure agency.Richard H. Feldman & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.details
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Pursuing Natural Piety: Understanding Ontological Emergence and Distinguishing it from Physicalism.Peter Fazekas - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):97-119.details
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Psychological Causes in Plato’s Phaedo.Matthew L. Evans - 2022 - Ancient Philosophy Today 4 (2):196-216.details
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Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):335–347.details
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What Makes Free Will Free: The Impossibility of Predicting Genuine Creativity.Nikos Erinakis - 2020 - Conatus 5 (1):55.details
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Variantism about responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.details
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Financial Returns of Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Moral Freedom and Responsibility of Business Leaders.Peter Demacarty - 2009 - Business and Society Review 114 (3):393-433.details
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Cross-world luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists as well.Mirja Pérez de Calleja - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):112-125.details
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Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.details
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The Robustness Requirement on Alternative Possibilities.Taylor W. Cyr - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (3):481-499.details
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Two Arguments for Impossiblism and Why It isn’t Impossible to Refute them.Joseph Corabi - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):569-584.details
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Molinists (still) cannot endorse the consequence argument.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246.details
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Freedom and the open future.Yishai Cohen - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):228-255.details
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Deliberating in the presence of manipulation.Yishai Cohen - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):85-105.details
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How (not) to attack the luck argument.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.details
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Molinism: Explaining our Freedom Away.Nevin Climenhaga & Daniel Rubio - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):459-485.details
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On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.details
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Free Will, Agent Causation, and “Disappearing Agents”.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - Noûs:76-96.details
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Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):893-904.details
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Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency.Randolph Clarke - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):747-764.details
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Agent causation and the problem of luck.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.details
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Reasons Explanation and Agent Control.John Ross Churchill - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):241-253.details
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The Possibility of Emergent Conscious Causal Powers.Lok-Chi Chan & Andrew J. Latham - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):195-201.details
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Free Will, Self-Governance and Neuroscience: An Overview.Alisa Carse, Hilary Bok & Debra J. H. Mathews - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (3):237-244.details
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Causality, determination and necessitation in free human action.Vanessa Carr - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-28.details
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Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance.Gregg D. Caruso & Stephen G. Morris - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):837-855.details
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Freedom with Causation.Justin A. Capes - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):327-338.details
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Frankfurt cases: the fine-grained response revisited.Justin A. Capes & Philip Swenson - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):967-981.details
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The Prejudice of Freedom: an Application of Kripke’s Notion of a Prejudice to our Understanding of Free Will.James Cain - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):323-339.details
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Frankfurt Style Examples.James Cain - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):221-229.details
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Foreknowledge, accidental necessity, and uncausability.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):137-154.details
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Agential capacities: a capacity to guide.Denis Buehler - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):21-47.details
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