Esta enciclopédia abrange, de uma forma introdutória mas desejavelmente rigorosa, uma diversidade de conceitos, temas, problemas, argumentos e teorias localizados numa área relativamente recente de estudos, os quais tem sido habitual qualificar como «estudos lógico-filosóficos». De uma forma apropriadamente genérica, e apesar de o território teórico abrangido ser extenso e de contornos por vezes difusos, podemos dizer que na área se investiga um conjunto de questões fundamentais acerca da natureza da linguagem, da mente, da cognição e do raciocínio humanos, bem (...) como questões acerca das conexões destes com a realidade não mental e extralinguística. A razão daquela qualificação é a seguinte: por um lado, a investigação em questão é qualificada como filosófica em virtude do elevado grau de generalidade e abstracção das questões examinadas (entre outras coisas); por outro, a investigação é qualificada como lógica em virtude de ser uma investigação logicamente disciplinada, no sentido de nela se fazer um uso intenso de conceitos, técnicas e métodos provenientes da disciplina de lógica. O agregado de tópicos que constitui a área de estudos lógico-filosóficos é já visível, pelo menos em parte, no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Ludwig Wittgenstein, uma obra publicada em 1921. E uma boa maneira de ter uma ideia sinóptica do território disciplinar abrangido por esta enciclopédia, ou pelo menos de uma porção substancial dele, é extrair do Tractatus uma lista dos tópicos mais salientes aí discutidos; a lista incluirá certamente tópicos do seguinte género, muitos dos quais se podem encontrar ao longo desta enciclopédia: factos e estados de coisas; objectos; representação; crenças e estados mentais; pensamentos; a proposição; nomes próprios; valores de verdade e bivalência; quantificação; funções de verdade; verdade lógica; identidade; tautologia; o raciocínio matemático; a natureza da inferência; o cepticismo e o solipsismo; a indução; as constantes lógicas; a negação; a forma lógica; as leis da ciência; o número. (shrink)

Traces the development of recursive functions from their origins in the late nineteenth century to the mid-1930s, with particular emphasis on the work and influence of Kurt Gödel.

Let b and c be r.e. Turing degrees such that b>c. We show that there is an r.e. degree a such that b>a>c and all lattices containing a critical triple, including the lattice M5, cannot be embedded into the interval [c, a].

Calhoun, W.C., Incomparable prime ideals of recursively enumerable degrees, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 63 39–56. We show that there is a countably infinite antichain of prime ideals of recursively enumerable degrees. This solves a generalized form of Post's problem.

Computability theory concerns information with a causal–typically algorithmic–structure. As such, it provides a schematic analysis of many naturally occurring situations. Emil Post was the first to focus on the close relationship between information, coded as real numbers, and its algorithmic infrastructure. Having characterised the close connection between the quantifier type of a real and the Turing jump operation, he looked for more subtle ways in which information entails a particular causal context. Specifically, he wanted to find simple relations on reals (...) which produced richness of local computability-theoretic structure. To this extent, he was not just interested in causal structure as an abstraction, but in the way in which this structure emerges in natural contexts. Post’s programme was the genesis of a more far reaching research project. In this article we will firstly review the history of Post’s programme, and look at two interesting developments of Post’s approach. The first of these developments concerns the extension of the core programme, initially restricted to the Turing structure of the computably enumerable sets of natural numbers, to the Ershov hierarchy of sets. The second looks at how new types of information coming from the recent growth of research into randomness, and the revealing of unexpected new computability-theoretic infrastructure. We will conclude by viewing Post’s programme from a more general perspective. We will look at how algorithmic structure does not just emerge mathematically from information, but how that emergent structure can model the emergence of very basic aspects of the real world. (shrink)

For over a decade, the hypercomputation movement has produced computational models that in theory solve the algorithmically unsolvable, but they are not physically realizable according to currently accepted physical theories. While opponents to the hypercomputation movement provide arguments against the physical realizability of specific models in order to demonstrate this, these arguments lack the generality to be a satisfactory justification against the construction of any information-processing machine that computes beyond the universal Turing machine. To this end, I present a more (...) mathematically concrete challenge to hypercomputability, and will show that one is immediately led into physical impossibilities, thereby demonstrating the infeasibility of hypercomputers more generally. This gives impetus to propose and justify a more plausible starting point for an extension to the classical paradigm that is physically possible, at least in principle. Instead of attempting to rely on infinities such as idealized limits of infinite time or numerical precision, or some other physically unattainable source, one should focus on extending the classical paradigm to better encapsulate modern computational problems that are not well-expressed/modeled by the closed-system paradigm of the Turing machine. I present the first steps toward this goal by considering contemporary computational problems dealing with intractability and issues surrounding cyber-physical systems, and argue that a reasonable extension to the classical paradigm should focus on these issues in order to be practically viable. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to address the question: Can an artificial neural network (ANN) model be used as a possible characterization of the power of the human mind? We will discuss what might be the relationship between such a model and its natural counterpart. A possible characterization of the different power capabilities of the mind is suggested in terms of the information contained (in its computational complexity) or achievable by it. Such characterization takes advantage of recent results based (...) on natural neural networks (NNN) and the computational power of arbitrary artificial neural networks (ANN). The possible acceptance of neural networks as the model of the human mind's operation makes the aforementioned quite relevant. (shrink)

Chomsky’s highly influential Syntactic Structures ( SS ) has been much praised its originality, explicitness, and relevance for subsequent cognitive science. Such claims are greatly overstated. SS contains no proof that English is beyond the power of finite state description (it is not clear that Chomsky ever gave a sound mathematical argument for that claim). The approach advocated by SS springs directly out of the work of the mathematical logician Emil Post on formalizing proof, but few linguists are aware of (...) this, because Post’s papers are not cited. Chomsky’s extensions to Post’s systems are not clearly defined, and the arguments for their necessity are weak. Linguists have also overlooked Post’s proofs of the first two theorems about effects of rule format restrictions on generative capacity, published more than ten years before SS was published. (shrink)

Taking Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures as a starting point, this paper explores the use of recursive techniques in contemporary linguistic theory. Specifically, it is shown that there were profound ambiguities surrounding the notion of recursion in the 1950s, and that this was partly due to the fact that influential texts such as Syntactic Structures neglected to define what exactly constituted a recursive device. As a result, uncertainties concerning the role of recursion in linguistic theory have prevailed until the present day, and (...) some of the most common misunderstandings that have appeared in recent discussions are examined at some length. This article shows that debates about such topics are frequently undermined by fundamental misunderstandings concerning core terminology, and the full extent of the prevailing haziness is revealed. An attempt is made, for instance, to distinguish between such things as iterative constructional devices and self-similar syntactic embedding, despite the fact that these are usually both unhelpfully classified as examples of recursion. Consequently, this article effectively constitutes a plea for much greater accuracy and clarity when such important issues are addressed from a linguistic perspective. (shrink)

In the last five years there have been a number of results about the computable content of the prime, saturated, or homogeneous models of a complete decidable theory T in the spirit of Vaught's "Denumerable models of complete theories" combined with computability methods for degrees d ≤ 0′. First we recast older results by Goncharov, Peretyat'kin, and Millar in a more modern framework which we then apply. Then we survey recent results by Lange, "The degree spectra of homogeneous models," which (...) generalize the older results and which include positive results on when a certain homogeneous model of T has an isomorphic copy of a given Turing degree. We then survey Lange's "A characterization of the 0-basis homogeneous bounding degrees" for negative results about when does not have such copies, generalizing negative results by Goncharov, Peretyat'kin, and Millar. Finally, we explain recent results by Csima, Harizanov, Hirschfeldt, and Soare, "Bounding homogeneous models," about degrees d that are homogeneous bounding and explain their relation to the PA degrees. (shrink)

An incomplete degree is cuppable if it can be joined by an incomplete degree to a complete degree. For sets fulfilling some type of simplicity property one can now ask whether these sets are cuppable with respect to a certain type of reducibilities. Several such results are known. In this paper we settle all the remaining cases for the standard notions of simplicity and all the main strong reducibilities.

Ranging from Alan Turing’s seminal 1936 paper to the latest work on Kolmogorov complexity and linear logic, this comprehensive new work clarifies the relationship between computability on the one hand and constructivity on the other. The authors argue that even though constructivists have largely shed Brouwer’s solipsistic attitude to logic, there remain points of disagreement to this day. Focusing on the growing pains computability experienced as it was forced to address the demands of rapidly expanding applications, the content maps the (...) developments following Turing’s ground-breaking linkage of computation and the machine, the resulting birth of complexity theory, the innovations of Kolmogorov complexity and resolving the dissonances between proof theoretical semantics and canonical proof feasibility. Finally, it explores one of the most fundamental questions concerning the interface between constructivity and computability: whether the theory of recursive functions is needed for a rigorous development of constructive mathematics. This volume contributes to the unity of science by overcoming disunities rather than offering an overarching framework. It posits that computability’s adoption of a classical, ontological point of view kept these imperatives separated. In studying the relationship between the two, it is a vital step forward in overcoming the disagreements and misunderstandings which stand in the way of a unifying view of logic. (shrink)

I develop a theory of counterfactuals about relative computability, i.e. counterfactuals such as 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then the halting problem would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is true, and 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then arithmetical truth would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is false. These counterfactuals are counterpossibles, i.e. they have metaphysically impossible antecedents. They thus pose a challenge to the orthodoxy about counterfactuals, which would treat them as uniformly true. What’s more, I (...) argue that these counterpossibles don’t just appear in the periphery of relative computability theory but instead they play an ineliminable role in the development of the theory. Finally, I present and discuss a model theory for these counterfactuals that is a straightforward extension of the familiar comparative similarity models. (shrink)

We investigate dependence of recursively enumerable graphs on the equality relation given by a specific r.e. equivalence relation on ω. In particular we compare r.e. equivalence relations in terms of graphs they permit to represent. This defines partially ordered sets that depend on classes of graphs under consideration. We investigate some algebraic properties of these partially ordered sets. For instance, we show that some of these partial ordered sets possess atoms, minimal and maximal elements. We also fully describe the isomorphism (...) types of some of these partial orders. (shrink)

Let be an infinite computable structure, and let R be an additional computable relation on its domain A. The syntactic notion of formal hypersimplicity of R on , first introduced and studied by Hird, is analogous to the computability-theoretic notion of hypersimplicity of R on A, given the definability of certain effective sequences of relations on A. Assuming that R is formally hypersimple on , we give general sufficient conditions for the existence of a computable isomorphic copy of on whose (...) domain the image of R is hypersimple and of arbitrary nonzero computably enumerable Turing degree. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the following contributions to recursion theory made by John Myhill: two sets are recursively isomorphic iff they are one-one equivalent; two sets are recursively isomorphic iff they are recursively equivalent and their complements are also recursively equivalent; every two creative sets are recursively isomorphic; the recursive analogue of the Cantor–Bernstein theorem; the notion of a combinatorial function and its use in the theory of recursive equivalence types.

In this paper, we first prove that there exist computably enumerable (c.e.) degrees a and b such that ${\bf a\not\leq b}$ , and for any c.e. degree u, if ${\bf u\leq a}$ and u is cappable, then ${\bf u\leq b}$ , so refuting a conjecture of Lempp (in Slaman [1996]); secondly, we prove that: (A. Li and D. Wang) there is no uniform construction to build nonzero cappable degree below a nonzero c.e. degree, that is, there is no computable function (...) $f$ such that for all $e\in\omega,$ (i) $W_{f(e)}\leq_{\rm T}W_e$ , (ii) $W_{f(e)}$ has a cappable degree, and (iii) $W_{f(e)}\not\leq_{\rm T}\emptyset$ unless $W_e\leq_{\rm T}\emptyset.$. (shrink)

This paper concerns Alan Turing’s ideas about machines, mathematical methods of proof, and intelligence. By the late 1930s, Kurt Gödel and other logicians, including Turing himself, had shown that no finite set of rules could be used to generate all true mathematical statements. Yet according to Turing, there was no upper bound to the number of mathematical truths provable by intelligent human beings, for they could invent new rules and methods of proof. So, the output of a human mathematician, for (...) Turing, was not a computable sequence (i.e., one that could be generated by a Turing machine). Since computers only contained a finite number of instructions (or programs), one might argue, they could not reproduce human intelligence. Turing called this the “mathematical
objection” to his view that machines can think. Logico-mathematical reasons, stemming from his own work, helped to convince Turing that it should be possible to reproduce human intelligence, and eventually compete with it, by developing the appropriate kind of digital computer. He felt it
should be possible to program a computer so that it could learn or discover new rules, overcoming the limitations imposed by the incompleteness and undecidability results in the same way that human
mathematicians presumably do. (shrink)

In The Uses of Argument, Stephen Toulmin proposed a model for the layout of arguments: claim, data, warrant, qualifier, rebuttal, backing. Since then, Toulmin’s model has been appropriated, adapted and extended by researchers in speech communications, philosophy and artificial intelligence. This book assembles the best contemporary reflection in these fields, extending or challenging Toulmin’s ideas in ways that make fresh contributions to the theory of analysing and evaluating arguments.

The main topic of the present work is the relation that a set X is strongly hyperimmune-free relative to Y . Here X is strongly hyperimmune-free relative to Y if and only if for every partial X -recursive function p there is a partial Y -recursive function q such that every a in the domain of p is also in the domain of q and satisfies p (...) Y , one also says that X is pmaj-reducible to Y . It is shown that between degrees not above the Halting problem the pmaj-reducibility coincides with the Turing reducibility and that therefore only recursive sets have a strongly hyperimmune-free Turing degree while those sets Turing above the Halting problem bound uncountably many sets with respect to the pmaj-relation. So pmaj-reduction is identical with Turing reduction on a class of sets of measure 1. Moreover, every pmaj-degree coincides with the corresponding Turing degree. The pmaj-degree of the Halting problem is definable with the pmaj-relation. (shrink)

The Major Sub-degree Problem of A. H. Lachlan (first posed in 1967) has become a long-standing open question concerning the structure of the computably enumerable (c.e.) degrees. Its solution has important implications for Turing definability and for the ongoing programme of fully characterising the theory of the c.e. Turing degrees. A c.e. degree a is a major subdegree of a c.e. degree b > a if for any c.e. degree x, ${{\bf 0' = b \lor x}}$ if and only if (...) ${{\bf 0' = a \lor x}}$ . In this paper, we show that every c.e. degree b ≠ 0 or 0′ has a major sub-degree, answering Lachlan’s question affirmatively. (shrink)

The biinterpretability conjecture for the r.e. degrees asks whether, for each sufficiently large k, the [Formula: see text] relations on the r.e. degrees are uniformly definable from parameters. We solve a weaker version: for each k ≥ 7, the [Formula: see text] relations bounded from below by a nonzero degree are uniformly definable. As applications, we show that Low 1 is parameter definable, and we provide methods that lead to a new example of a ∅-definable ideal. Moreover, we prove that (...) automorphisms restricted to intervals [d, 1], d ≠ 0, are [Formula: see text]. We also show that, for each c ≠ 0, can be interpreted in [0, c] without parameters. (shrink)

In our former works, for a given concept of reduction, we study the following hypothesis: “For a random oracle A, with probability one, the degree of the one-query tautologies with respect to A is strictly higher than the degree of A.” In our former works (Suzuki in Kobe J. Math. 15, 91–102, 1998; in Inf. Comput. 176, 66–87, 2002; in Arch. Math. Logic 44, 751–762), the following three results are shown: The hypothesis for p-T (polynomial-time Turing) reduction is equivalent to (...) the assertion that the probabilistic complexity class R is not equal to NP; The hypothesis for p-tt (polynomial-time truth-table) reduction implies that P is not NP; The hypothesis holds for each of the following: disjunctive reduction, conjunctive reduction, and p-btt (polynomial-time bounded-truth-table) reduction. In this paper, we show the following three results: (1) Let c be a positive real number. We consider a concept of truth-table reduction whose norm is at most c times size of input, where for a relativized propositional formula F, the size of F denotes the total number of occurrences of propositional variables, constants and propositional connectives. Then, our main result is that the hypothesis holds for such tt-reduction, provided that c is small enough. How small c can we take so that the above holds? It depends on our syntactic convention on one-query tautologies. In our setting, the statement holds for all c < 1. (2) The hypothesis holds for monotone truth-table reduction (also called positive reduction). (3) Dowd (in Inf. Comput. 96, 65–76, 1992) shows a polynomial upper bound for the minimum sizes of forcing conditions associated with a random oracle. We apply the above result (1), and get a linear lower bound for the sizes. (shrink)

We describe the important role that the conjectures and questions posed at the end of the two editions of Gerald Sacks's Degrees of Unsolvability have had in the development of recursion theory over the past thirty years.

We show: for every noncomputable c.e. incomplete c-degree, there exists a nonspeedable c-degree incomparable with it; The c-degree of a hypersimple set includes an infinite collection of \-degrees linearly ordered under \ with order type of the integers and consisting entirely of hypersimple sets; there exist two c.e. sets having no c.e. least upper bound in the \-reducibility ordering; the c.e. \-degrees are not dense.

We give a proof of a theorem of Harrington that there is no orbit of the lattice of recursively enumerable sets containing elements of each nonzero recursively enumerable degree. We also establish some degree theoretical extensions.

We present an overview of the topics in the title and of some of the key results pertaining to them. These have historically been topics of interest in computability theory and continue to be a rich source of problems and ideas. In particular, we draw attention to the links and connections between these topics and explore their significance to modern research in the field.

Let μ be a universal lower enumerable semi-measure . Any computable upper bound for μ can be effectively separated from zero with a constant . Computable positive lower bounds for μ can be nontrivial and allow one to construct natural examples of hypersimple sets.