- Arguing about Free Will: Lewis and the Consequence Argument.Danilo Šuster - 2021 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 21 (63):375-403.details
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The Truth of Scepticism: on the varieties of epistemological doubt.Guido Tana - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism.Guido Tana - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-30.details
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Closure, Underdetermination, and the Peculiarity of Sceptical Scenarios.Guido Tana - 2022 - Theoria 89 (1):73-97.details
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Epistemological disjunctivism: Neo-Wittgensteinian and moderate neo-Moorean.Joshua Stuchlik - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):438-457.details
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Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement.Paul Simard Smith & Michael Patrick Lynch - 2020 - Topoi 40 (5):971-982.details
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Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology.Mona Ioana Simion, Johanna Schnurr & Emma C. Gordon - 2021 - Synthese 198 (15):3553-3564.details
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Hinges, Disagreements, and Arguments: (Rationally) Believing Hinge Propositions and Arguing across Deep Disagreements.Harvey Siegel - 2019 - Topoi 40 (5):1107-1116.details
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The bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge: a new solution to the basis problem for epistemological disjunctivism.Kegan J. Shaw - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2871-2884.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Internalist Challenge.Kegan Shaw - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):385-396.details
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A Plea for the Theist in the Street.Kegan J. Shaw - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (1):102-128.details
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A Better Disjunctivist Response to the 'New Evil Genius' Challenge.Kegan J. Shaw - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):101-125.details
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A Kantian virtue epistemology: rational capacities and transcendental arguments.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3113-3136.details
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Judgment and Practice in Reid and Wittgenstein.Patrick Rysiew - 2017 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (2).details
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What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.details
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Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):257-273.details
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Moral hinges and steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability.Chris Ranalli - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):183-205.details
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Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Synthese:1-33.details
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Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12887.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.details
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Collective ignorance: an information theoretic account.Christopher Ranalli & René van Woudenberg - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4731-4750.details
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Introduction: Groundless Grounds and Hinges. Wittgenstein's On Certainty within the Philosophical Tradition.Begoña Ramón Cámara & Jesús Vega Encabo - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):931-937.details
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Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125.details
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Venturinha and Epistemic Vertigo.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1699-1704.details
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Varieties of Epistemic Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):9-23.details
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Understanding Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):301-317.details
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Scepticism and Commonsense.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):716-725.details
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Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.details
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Hinge commitments and common knowledge.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-16.details
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Epistemically useful false beliefs.Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):4-20.details
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Contextualism and radical scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4733-4750.details
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Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3065-3077.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and pragmatic encroachment.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):715-729.details
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Can Hinge Epistemology Close the Door on Epistemic Relativism?Oscar A. Piedrahita - 2021 - Synthese (1-2):1-27.details
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Entitlement, generosity, relativism, and structure‐internal goods.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (4):486-511.details
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Epistemic presentism.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):458-478.details
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Epistemic austerity: limits to entitlement.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13771-13787.details
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Is There a Problem of Demarcation for Hinges?Jakob Ohlhorst - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (4):317-330.details
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Curiosity, Checking, and Knowing: a Virtue-Theoretical Perspective.Nenad Miscevic - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):53-67.details
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The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.details
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Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1869-1893.details
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Rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1277-1304.details
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Hegel and Wittgenstein on Difficulties of Beginning at the Beginning.Jakub Mácha - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):939-953.details
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On Certainty, Change, and “Mathematical Hinges”.James V. Martin - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):987-1002.details
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The Epistemic Benefits of Worldview Disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (1):85-98.details
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Why warrant transmits across epistemological disjunctivist Moorean-style arguments.Thomas Lockhart - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):287-319.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Random Demon Hypothesis.Thomas Lockhart - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):1-30.details
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