- The Inward Turn.Charles Travis - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 65:313-349.details
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(1 other version)Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume’s argument about induction.Louis E. Loeb - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):321-338.details
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“Hallucination, Mental Representation, and the Presentational Character”.Costas Pagondiotis - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 361.details
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Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.details
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Knowledge entails dispositional belief.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.details
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"What Is Knowledge?".Linda Zagzebski - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 92-116.details
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Internalism and epistemically responsible belief.John Greco - 1990 - Synthese 85 (2):245 - 277.details
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(1 other version)Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume’s argument about induction.Louis E. Loeb - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):321 - 338.details
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Perceiving temporal properties.Ian Phillips - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):176-202.details
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Internalism, externalism, and epistemic source circularity.Ian David MacMillan - unknowndetails
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Celebrity Politics and Democratic Elitism.Alfred Archer & Amanda Cawston - 2021 - Topoi 41 (1):33-43.details
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What We All Know: Community in Moore's "A Defence of Common Sense".Wim Vanrie - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (4):629-651.details
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(1 other version)Enough is Enough: Austin on Knowing.Guy Longworth - 2017 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 186–205.details
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The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (Open Access).Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Self-knowledge and the KK principle.Conor McHugh - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):231-257.details
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Experience of and in Time.Ian Phillips - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):131-144.details
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Content and the stream of consciousness.Matthew Soteriou - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):543–568.details
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Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience.Julian Kiverstein - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:155-181.details
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Mentalism is not epistemic ur-internalism.Evan Butts - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):233 - 249.details
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Error and doubt.Douglas Odegard - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (3-4):341-359.details
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XII—The Distinction in Kind between Knowledge and Belief.Maria Rosa Antognazza - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (3):277-308.details
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On the need for a metaphysics of justification.D. E. Bradshaw - 1992 - Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):90-106.details
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(1 other version)Internalist vs. externalist conceptions of epistemic justification.George Pappas - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The constraints of Hume’s naturalism.Barry Stroud - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):339 - 351.details
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Epistemic Deflationism.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):103-134.details
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(1 other version)Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification.George S. Pappas - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Knowing that there is no demon.Douglas Odegard - 1994 - Theoria 60 (2):81-98.details
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