- Good Enough? The Minimally Good Life Account of the Basic Minimum.Nicole Hassoun - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):330-341.details
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Making good choices: toward a theory of well-being in medicine.Alicia Hall - 2016 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 37 (5):383-400.details
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Requiring and justifying: Two dimensions of normative strength. [REVIEW]Joshua Gert - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (1):5 - 36.details
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Breaking the law of desire.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (3):295-319.details
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The attractions and delights of goodness.By Jyl Gentzler - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):353–367.details
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Structuring Wellbeing.Christopher Frugé - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):564-580.details
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Artifactual Normativity.Christopher Frugé - 2022 - Synthese 200 (126):1-19.details
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Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.details
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A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being.Guy Fletcher - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (2):206-220.details
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Against Contextualism about Prudential Discourse.Guy Fletcher - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):699-720.details
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Two Visions of Welfare.Fred Feldman - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):99-118.details
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On Sense and Preference.James Fanciullo - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (3):280-302.details
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Alienation, Engagement, and Welfare.James Fanciullo - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason?David Enoch - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):319-339.details
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Ideal Conceivers, the Nature of Modality and the Response-Dependent Account of Modal Concepts.Alexandru Dragomir - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (2):659-674.details
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Why should Welfare ‘Fit’?Dale Dorsey - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):685-24.details
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The Hedonist's Dilemma.Dale Dorsey - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):173-196.details
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Subjectivism without Desire.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.details
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Preferences, welfare, and the status-quo bias.Dale Dorsey - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):535-554.details
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Persons, situations, and virtue ethics.John M. Doris - 1998 - Noûs 32 (4):504-530.details
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Preferences and Prudential Reasons.Dale Dorsey - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):157-178.details
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Intrinsic value and the supervenience principle.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):267-285.details
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Desire-satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):151-171.details
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Ethical Pragmatism.Raff Donelson - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (4):383-403.details
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Affective Consciousness and Moral Status.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.details
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The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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A defence of the desire theory of well-being.Atus Mariqueo-Russell - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Southamptondetails
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Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory.Stephen Finlay & David Plunkett - 2018 - In John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, vol. 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-86.details
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AI Wellbeing.Simon Goldstein & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini - manuscriptdetails
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Attributivism.Casey Sean Elliott - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Objectivity/Subjectivity of Values.Jason R. Raibley - 2014 - In Alex C. Michalos (ed.), Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. Springer. pp. 4438-4443.details
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Moral motivation.Connie S. Rosati - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral psychology: Empirical approaches.John Doris & Stephen Stich - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Desire Satisfaction Theories and the Problem of Depression.Andrew Spaid - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska, Lincolndetails
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Subjective Moral Biases & Fallacies: Developing Scientifically & Practically Adequate Moral Analogues of Cognitive Heuristics & Biases.Mark H. Herman - 2019 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State Universitydetails
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Subjective Theories of Well-Being.Chris Heathwood - 2014 - In Ben Eggleston & Dale Miller (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 199-219.details
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How to study well-being: A proposal for the integration of philosophy with science.Michael Prinzing - 2021 - Review of General Psychology 25 (2):152-162.details
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Virtue Ethics and the Interests of Others.Mark Lebar - 1999 - Dissertation, The University of Arizonadetails
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An Opinionated Guide to “What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best”.Chris Heathwood - 2020 - In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. Routledge. pp. 94-113.details
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Ethics, intentions and judgement-dependence.Callum Hood - unknowndetails
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Eternal Recurrence and Nihilism: Adding Weight to the Unbearable Lightness of Action.Nadeem J. Z. Hussain - manuscriptdetails
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The buck passing account of value: assessing the negative thesis.Philip Stratton-Lake - unknowndetails
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The Role of Pleasure in Well-Being.Ben Bramble - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge.details
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Norms for values in scientific belief acceptance.Heather Douglas - unknowndetails
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As a matter of fact : Empirical perspectives on ethics.John M. Doris & Stephen P. Stich - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.details
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Utilitarianism, Welfare, Children.Anthony Skelton - 2014 - In Alexander Bagattini & Colin Macleod (eds.), The Nature of Children's Well-Being: Theory and Practice. Springer. pp. 85-103.details
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Desire-Fulfillment Theory.Chris Heathwood - 2016 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 135-147.details
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Can program explanation confer ontological rights for the Cornell realist variety of moral realism?Andrew Field - unknowndetails
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The being and value of health.Sander Werkhoven - unknowndetails
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