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Authority, Law and Morality

The Monist 68 (3):295-324 (1985)

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  1. (1 other version)Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis.Brian Leiter - 1998 - Legal Theory 4 (4):533-547.
    The American Legal Realists, as I read them, are tacit legal positivists: they presuppose views about the criteria of legality that have affinities with positivist accounts of law in the sense that they employ primarily pedigree tests of legal validity. Ever since Ronald Dworkin's well-known critique of H.L.A. Hart's positivism a generation ago, however, it has been hotly contested whether there is anything about positivism as a legal theory that requires that tests of legal validity be pedigree tests. So-called Soft (...)
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  • The Anarchist Official: A Problem for Legal Positivism.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2011 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 36:89-112.
    I examine the impact of the presence of anarchists among key legal officials upon the legal positivist theories of H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz. For purposes of this paper, an anarchist is one who believes that the law cannot successfully obligate or create reasons for action beyond prudential reasons, such as avoiding sanction. I show that both versions of positivism require key legal officials to endorse the law in some way, and that if a legal system can continue to exist (...)
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  • The mad, the bad, and the psychopath.Heidi L. Maibom - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):167-184.
    It is common for philosophers to argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible because they lack some of the essential capacities for morality. In legal terms, they are criminally insane. Typically, however, the insanity defense is not available to psychopaths. The primary reason is that they appear to have the knowledge and understanding required under the M’Naghten Rules. However, it has been argued that what is required for moral and legal responsibility is ‘deep’ moral understanding, something that psychopaths do not (...)
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  • An argument against the social fact thesis (and some additional preliminary steps towards a new conception of legal positivism).Kevin Toh - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (5):445 - 504.
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  • Three separation theses.James Morauta - 2004 - Law and Philosophy 23 (2):111-135.
    Legal positivism's ``separation thesis'' is usually taken in one of two ways: as an analytic claim about the nature of law – roughly, as some version of the Social Thesis; or as a substantive claim about the moral value of law – roughly, as some version of the Value Thesis. In this paper I argue that we should recognize a third kind of positivist separation thesis, one which complements, but is distinct from, positivism's analytic and moral claims. The Neutrality Thesis (...)
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  • Natural law theories.John Finnis - unknown - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • LA COHERENCIA EN LA ARGUMENTACIÓN JURÍDICA.Amalia Amaya - manuscript
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  • Law, Coercion and Folk Intuitions.Lucas Miotto, Guilherme F. C. F. Almeida & Noel Struchiner - 2023 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 43 (1):97-123.
    In discussing whether legal systems are necessarily coercive, legal philosophers usually appeal to thought experiments involving angels or other morally driven beings who need no coercion to organise their social lives. Such appeals have invited criticism. Critics have not only challenged the relevance of such thought experiments to our understanding of legal systems; they have also argued that, contrary to the intuitions of most legal philosophers, the ‘man on the Clapham Omnibus’ would not hold that there is law in a (...)
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  • The Effectiveness of Embedded Values Analysis Modules in Computer Science Education: An Empirical Study.Matthew Kopec, Meica Magnani, Vance Ricks, Roben Torosyan, John Basl, Nicholas Miklaucic, Felix Muzny, Ronald Sandler, Christo Wilson, Adam Wisniewski-Jensen, Cora Lundgren, Kevin Mills & Mark Wells - 2023 - Big Data and Society 10 (1).
    Embedding ethics modules within computer science courses has become a popular response to the growing recognition that CS programs need to better equip their students to navigate the ethical dimensions of computing technologies like AI, machine learning, and big data analytics. However, the popularity of this approach has outpaced the evidence of its positive outcomes. To help close that gap, this empirical study reports positive results from Northeastern’s program that embeds values analysis modules into CS courses. The resulting data suggest (...)
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  • Techno-optimism: an Analysis, an Evaluation and a Modest Defence.John Danaher - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (2):1-29.
    What is techno-optimism and how can it be defended? Although techno-optimist views are widely espoused and critiqued, there have been few attempts to systematically analyse what it means to be a techno-optimist and how one might defend this view. This paper attempts to address this oversight by providing a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of techno-optimism. It is argued that techno-optimism is a pluralistic stance that comes in weak and strong forms. These vary along a number of key dimensions but each (...)
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  • Tragic Choices and the Virtue of Techno-Responsibility Gaps.John Danaher - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (2):1-26.
    There is a concern that the widespread deployment of autonomous machines will open up a number of ‘responsibility gaps’ throughout society. Various articulations of such techno-responsibility gaps have been proposed over the years, along with several potential solutions. Most of these solutions focus on ‘plugging’ or ‘dissolving’ the gaps. This paper offers an alternative perspective. It argues that techno-responsibility gaps are, sometimes, to be welcomed and that one of the advantages of autonomous machines is that they enable us to embrace (...)
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  • Trump's Inducement of America's Banality of Evil.Norman K. Swazo - manuscript
    When political philosopher Hannah Arendt introduced the concept of ‘banality of evil’ she did so in reference to the actions of Germans who appropriated the doctrines of National Socialism “thoughtlessly” and without obvious intentions to do evil. But, Arendt’s description of this phenomenon entails that such banality can be found even in a democracy such as the USA. The relation of law and morality must therefore be unambiguous to defend the rule of law against the rule of men. However, a (...)
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  • Authoritative Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502.
    This paper investigates ‘authoritative knowledge’, a neglected species of practical knowledge gained on the basis of exercising practical authority. I argue that, like perceptual knowledge, authoritative knowledge is non-inferential. I then present a broadly reliabilist account of the process by which authority yields knowledge, and use this account to address certain objections.
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  • Standing Tall Hommages a Csaba Varga.Bjarne Melkevik (ed.) - 2012 - Budapest: Pazmany Press.
    Thirty-five papers by outstanding specialists of philosophy of law and comparative law from Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, as well as from Northern America and Japan, dedicated to the Hungarian philosopher of law and comparatist Csaba Varga.
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  • The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.
    According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that (...)
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  • (1 other version)Hart's Methodological Positivism.Stephen R. Perry - 1998 - Legal Theory 4 (4):427-467.
    To understand H.L.A. Hart's general theory of law, it is helpful to distinguish betweensubstantiveandmethodologicallegal positivism. Substantive legal positivism is the view that there is no necessary connection between morality and the content of law. Methodological legal positivism is the view that legal theory can and should offer a normatively neutral description of a particular social phenomenon, namely law. Methodological positivism holds, we might say, not that there is no necessary connection between morality and law, but rather that there is no (...)
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  • Law and Authority Under the Guise of the Good, by Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco.Ori J. Herstein - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1213-1222.
    Law and Authority Under the Guise of the Good, by Rodriguez-BlancoVeronica. Oxford : Hart Publishing, 2014. Pp. 215.
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  • Reasons of Law: Dworkin on the Legal Decision.Anthony R. Reeves - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (2):210-230.
    Ronald Dworkin once identified the basic question of jurisprudence as: ‘What, in general, is a good reason for a decision by a court of law?’ I argue that, over the course of his career, Dworkin gave an essentially sound answer to this question. In fact, he gave a correct answer to a broader question: ‘What is a good reason for a legal decision, generally?’ For judges, officials of executive and administrative agencies, lawyers, non-governmental organizations, and ordinary subjects acting in the (...)
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  • The Unilateralist’s Curse and the Case for a Principle of Conformity.Nick Bostrom, Thomas Douglas & Anders Sandberg - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (4):350-371.
    In some situations a number of agents each have the ability to undertake an initiative that would have significant effects on the others. Suppose that each of these agents is purely motivated by an altruistic concern for the common good. We show that if each agent acts on her own personal judgment as to whether the initiative should be undertaken, then the initiative will be undertaken more often than is optimal. We suggest that this phenomenon, which we call the unilateralist’s (...)
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  • Statelessness and Bernhard Waldenfels' Phenomenology of the Alien.William Conklin - 2007 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 38 (3):280-296.
    This Paper addresses the problem of statelessness, a problem which remains despite treaties and judicial decisions elaborating distinct rules to protect stateless persons. I explain why this has been so. Drawing from the work of Bernhard Waldenfels, I argue that international and domestic courts have presupposed a territorial sense of space, a territorial knowledge and the founding date for the territorial structure of a state-centric international legal community. I then focus upon the idea that an impartial third party can resolve (...)
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  • Form and Agency in Raz’s Legal Positivism.Kristen Rundle - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (6):767-791.
    As two parts of one overarching legal positivist project, it is likely assumed that the constitutive elements of Joseph Raz’s analysis of the rule of law are compatible with his thinking on the nature of legal authority. The aim of this article is to call this assumption into question by reading Raz in light of the core, if under-recognised, preoccupation of the jurisprudence of Lon Fuller: namely, the latter’s concern to illuminate the relationship between the distinctive form of law and (...)
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  • Shen Dao’s Own Voice in the Shenzi Fragments.Soon-ja Yang - 2011 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 10 (2):187-207.
    Feizi 韓非子 in terms of the concept of shi 勢 (circumstantial advantage, power, or authority). This argument is based on the A Critique of Circumstantial Advantage (Nanshi 難勢) chapter of the Hanfeizi, where Han Feizi advances his own idea of shi after criticizing both Shen Dao and an anonymous Confucian. However, there are other primary sources to contain Shen Dao’s thought, namely, seven incomplete Shenzi 慎子 chapters of the Essentials on Government from the Assemblage of Books (Qunshu zhi yao 群書治要) (...)
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  • Judicial Practical Reason: Judges in Morally Imperfect Legal Orders.Anthony R. Reeves - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (3):319-352.
    I here address the question of how judges should decide questions before a court in morally imperfect legal systems. I characterize how moral considerations ought inform judicial reasoning given that the law may demand what it has no right to. Much of the large body of work on legal interpretation, with its focus on legal semantics and epistemology, does not adequately countenance the limited legitimacy of actual legal institutions to serve as a foundation for an ethics of adjudication. I offer (...)
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  • Was inclusive legal positivism founded on a mistake?Scott J. Shapiro - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (3):326-338.
    In this paper, I present a new argument against inclusive legal positivism. As I show, any theory which permits morality to be a condition on legality cannot account for a core feature of legal activity, namely, that it is an activity of social planning. If the aim of a legal institution is to guide the conduct of the community through plans, it would be self-defeating if the existence of these plans could only be determined through deliberation on the merits. I (...)
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  • Legal reasoning and legal theory revisited.Fernando Atria - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (5):537-577.
    This article deals with the relation between a theory of law and a theory of legal reasoning. Starting from a close reading of Chapter VII of H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law, it claims that a theory of law like Hart's requires a particular theory of legal reasoning, or at least a theory of legal reasoning with some particular characteristics. It then goes on to say that any theory of legal reasoning that satisfies those requirements is highly implausible, (...)
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  • Naturalism in legal philosophy.Brian Leiter - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The “naturalistic turn” that has swept so many areas of philosophy over the past three decades has also had an impact in the last decade in legal philosophy. Methodological naturalists (M-naturalists) view philosophy as continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences. Some M-naturalists want to replace conceptual and justificatory theories with empirical and descriptive theories; they take their inspiration from more-or-less Quinean arguments against conceptual analysis and foundationalist programs. Other M-naturalists retain the normative and regulative ambitions of traditional philosophy, but (...)
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  • On relevance and justification of legal decisions.J. J. Moreso - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (1):73 - 100.
    The author discusses a question related to a certain aspect of justification of legal decisions, often so-called internal justification-a legal decision is internally justified if and only if it can be deduced from the norm(s) applicable to the case, and from the statement(s) describing the facts of the case. According to this notion, infinite irrelevant logical consequences are justified. To avoid this counterintuitive conclusion, the author analyzes three notions of relevance: Sperber-Wilson's notion, Anderson-Belnap's notion, and Schurz's notion. The author presents (...)
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  • Waluchow’s constitutional morality and the artificial reason of the Common Law.Kevin Bouchard - forthcoming - Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoria Del Derecho:e18773.
    This article proposes to elucidate Wilfrid Waluchow’s notion of constitutional morality by explaining how it relates to the classical common law idea of artificial reason. It examines how Waluchow’s effort to reconcile insights from the thought of H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin through the idea of constitutional morality is both reminiscent of the artificial reason of the common law and distinct from it. It shows that constitutional morality evokes the subtle union of custom and reason found in artificial reason, but (...)
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  • Rescuing Inclusive Legal Positivism from the Charge of Inconsistency.Cindy L. Phillips - unknown
    Scott Shapiro, an exclusive legal positivist, argues that inclusive legal positivism is inconsistent with the view that legal norms must conceptually provide reasons for agents of a legal system to act in specified ways. I defend inclusive legal positivism from Shapiro's charge of inconsistency.
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  • Against the Managerial State: Preventive Policing as Non-Legal Governance.John Lawless - 2020 - Law and Philosophy (6):657-689.
    Since at least the 1980s, police departments in the United States have embraced a set of practices that aim, not to enable the prosecution of past criminal activity, but to discourage people from breaking the law in the first place. It is not clear that these practices effectively lower the crime rate. However, whatever its effect on the crime rate, I argue that preventive policing is essentially distinct from legal governance, and that excessive reliance on preventive policing undermines legal governance. (...)
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  • Reasoning by Precedent—Between Rules and Analogies.Katharina Stevens - 2018 - Legal Theory 24 (3):216-254.
    This paper investigates the process of reasoning through which a judge determines whether a precedent-case gives her a binding reason to follow in her present-case. I review the objections that have been raised against the two main accounts of reasoning by precedent: the rule-account and the analogy-account. I argue that both accounts can be made viable by amending them to meet the objections. Nonetheless, I believe that there is an argument for preferring accounts that integrate analogical reasoning: any account of (...)
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  • My Conscience May Be My Guide, but You May not Need to Honor It.Hugh Lafollette - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (1):44-58.
    A number of health care professionals assert a right to be exempt from performing some actions currently designated as part of their standard professional responsibilities. Most advocates claim that they should be excused from these duties simply by averring that they are conscientiously opposed to performing them. They believe that they need not explain or justify their decisions to anyone; nor should they suffer any undesirable consequences of such refusal. Those who claim this right err by blurring or conflating three (...)
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  • Authorities and Persons.Andrei Marmor - 1995 - Legal Theory 1 (3):337-359.
    In this article I want to support a certain conception of legal authority. The question I want to address is this: Is it possible to attribute legal authority to a given norm if its authority does not derive from the authority of someone who has issued that norm? Basically, I will try to defend here a negative answer to this question, espousing a personal conception of authority.
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  • On the Normativity of Intentions.Bruno Verbeek - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):87-101.
    Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended (...)
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  • The Ties that Bind: An Analysis of the Concept of Obligation.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2013 - Ratio Juris 26 (1):16-46.
    Legal positivism lacks a comprehensive theory of legal obligation. Hart's account of legal obligation, if successful, would explain only how the rule of recognition obligates officials. There is nothing in Hart's account of social obligation and social norms that would explain how the legal norms that govern citizen behavior give rise to legal obligations. However, we cannot give a theoretical explanation of the concept of legal obligation without a theoretical explanation of the concept of obligation. If legal, social and moral (...)
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  • The instantiation thesis and Raz's critique of inclusive positivism.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2001 - Law and Philosophy 20 (1):61 - 79.
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  • Was Hart an Inclusive Positivist?João Costa-Neto & Henrique Porto de Castro - 2024 - Ratio Juris 37 (2):130-147.
    After the publication of Hart's Concept of Law, Dworkin published his article “The Model of Rules,” dividing positivism into two varieties: inclusive and exclusive. Many theorists involved in this debate have characterized Hart's position as inclusivist, which we reject in this article. We argue that Hart, in the postscript to The Concept of Law, conceded a point to Dworkin in accepting that inclusive positivism would imply the existence of objective moral standing, adopting a more “neutral” position—compatible with inclusive and exclusive (...)
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  • The Questionable Presupposition Underlying Hartian Accounts of Legal Facts.Stefan Sciaraffa - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (2):81-90.
    Per the standard reading of his view, Hart held that the legally valid norms of any legal system are those identified as such by the criteria of validity effectively accepted in common by the system's officials. Here, I focus on the presupposition underlying this Hartian account of legal facts – namely, that the officials of any legal system share a perspective that fixes the identity of their system's legally valid norms. Below, I hope to establish the appeal of this presupposition (...)
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  • Alf Ross on the Concept of a Legal Right.Torben Spaak - 2014 - Ratio Juris 27 (4):461-476.
    In this article, I discuss Alf Ross's claim that the concept of a legal right is best understood as a technical tool of presentation, which ties together a disjunction of operative facts and a conjunction of legal consequences, and that rights statements render the content of a number of legal norms in a convenient manner. I argue that while Ross's analysis is appealing, it is problematic in at least three respects. I also argue, however, that despite these difficulties Ross's analysis (...)
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  • What Conscience Can Do for Equity.Irit Samet - 2012 - Jurisprudence 3 (1):13-35.
    The paper argues that there are good reasons to frame the categories of equitable liability around the concept of conscience. A quick look at recent case law reveals an increasing use of conscience categories to discourage overly selfish behaviour among parties to commercial relationships. Critics discard 'conscionability' as an empty category of reference, or see it as a dangerously subjective point of reference. I want to show that the critics assume a very specific, and controversial, model of conscience in which (...)
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  • Raz’s appeal to law’s authority.Ben Martin - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):267-280.
    Joseph Raz’s _Argument from Authority_ is one of the most famous defences of exclusive positivism in jurisprudence, the position that the existence and content of the law in a society is a wholly social fact, which can be established without the need to engage in moral analysis. According to Raz’s argument, legal systems are _de facto_ practical authorities that, like all _de facto_ authorities, must claim _legitimate_ authority, which itself entails that they must be _capable_ of being an authority. Further, (...)
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  • What’s left of general jurisprudence? On law’s ontology and content.Andrei Marmor - 2018 - Jurisprudence 10 (2):151-170.
    ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to show that general jurisprudence is in no need of reinvention. The sentiment shared by many contemporary legal philosophers that theories about the nature of law...
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  • A Jurisprudential Controversy over Law's Shared Authority?Haris Psarras - 2017 - Jurisprudence 8 (3):631-640.
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  • Detachment and Deontic Language in Law.Robert Mullins - 2018 - Law and Philosophy 37 (4):351-384.
    Some legal philosophers regard the use of deontic language to describe the law as philosophically significant. Joseph Raz argues that it gives rise to ‘the problem of normativity of law’. He develops an account of what he calls ‘detached’ legal statements to resolve the problem. Unfortunately, Raz’s account is difficult to reconcile with the orthodox semantics of deontic language. The article offers a revised account of the distinction between committed and detached legal statements. It argues that deontic statements carry a (...)
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  • Joseph Raz’s Theory of Authority. [REVIEW]Kenneth Ehrenberg - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):884-894.
    Joseph Raz’s theory of authority has become influential among moral, political, and legal philosophers. This article will provide an overview and accessible explanation of the theory, guiding those coming to it for the first time as to its theoretical ambitions within the wider issues of authority, and through its intricacies. I first situate the theory among philosophical examinations of authority, and then explain the theory itself in detail.
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  • The Public Conscience of the Law.David Dyzenhaus PhD - 2014 - Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 43 (2):115-126.
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  • Voting in Bad Faith.Joanne C. Lau - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (3):281-294.
    What is wrong with participating in a democratic decision-making process, and then doing something other than the outcome of the decision? It is often thought that collective decision-making entails being prima facie bound to the outcome of that decision, although little analysis has been done on why that is the case. Conventional perspectives are inadequate to explain its wrongness. I offer a new and more robust analysis on the nature of voting: voting when you will accept the outcome only if (...)
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  • (1 other version)Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification.Torben Spaak - 2003 - Ratio Juris 16 (4):469-485.
    In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study (...)
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  • The regular practice of morality in law.Michael Giudice - 2008 - Ratio Juris 21 (1):94-106.
    This article examines the possibility of moral considerations and arguments serving as validity conditions of law in legal positivist theory. I argue that, despite recent attempts, this possibility has yet to be established. My argument turns on a defense of Joseph Raz's Sources Thesis, yet I do not adopt his famous “argument from authority.” Rather, I offer a renewed defense of the distinction between creation and application of law and argue that moral considerations and arguments, whether recognized in law or (...)
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  • Raz and the Rule of (Authoritative) Law.Hillary Nye* - 2022 - Ratio Juris 35 (3):258-272.
    Ratio Juris, Volume 35, Issue 3, Page 258-272, September 2022.
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