- (1 other version)The rules and aims of inquiry.Javier González de Prado - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Responding to Second-Order Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism.Mark Boespflug & Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Resolving to Believe: Kierkegaard’s Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Experiment-Driven Rationalism.Daniele Bruno Garancini - 2024 - Synthese 203 (109):1-27.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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Defending a Realist Stance.Christopher Pincock - 2024 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 37 (1):1-15.details
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A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Can we combine practical and epistemic reason?Darren Bradley - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (1):53-69.details
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Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.details
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How Reasons Guide Us (in Reasoning and Rationalisation).Franziska Poprawe - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (4):544-569.details
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Epistemic Partialism.Cathy Mason - 2023 - Philosophy Compass (2):e12896.details
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How Does Trust Relate to Faith?Daniel J. McKaughan & Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):411-427.details
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There are no epistemic norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-24.details
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The Epistemic vs. the Practical.Antti Kauppinen - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 18:137-162.details
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Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):136-157.details
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Controlling our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Noûs 57 (4):832-849.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2023 - In Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Ought to believe, simpliciter.Anthony Robert Booth - forthcoming - Episteme:1-13.details
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Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails
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Was William James an Evidentialist?Henry Jackman - 2022 - Southwest Philosophy Review 38 (1):81-90.details
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Accuracy, probabilism, and the insufficiency of the alethic.Corey Dethier - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2285-2301.details
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A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2315-2340.details
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On the Epistemic Costs of Friendship: Against the Encroachment View.Catherine Rioux - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):247-264.details
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An Inductive Risk Account of the Ethics of Belief.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Philosophy. The Journal of the Higher School of Economic 3 (3):146-171.details
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How to Argue with a Pragmatist.Artūrs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The epistemic demands of friendship: friendship as inherently knowledge-involving.Cathy Mason - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2439-2455.details
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Authoritative Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502.details
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Faith, Hope, and Justification.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 201–216.details
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Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 6: The Pattern Stops Here?Guy Axtell - 2018 - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement. Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
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The value of truth and the normativity of evidence.Tommaso Piazza - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5067-5088.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.details
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(2 other versions)Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2018 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Unifying Group Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:517-544.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.details
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Engaging with “Fringe” Beliefs: Why, When, and How.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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No practical reasons for belief: the epistemic significance of practical considerations.Hamid Vahid - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-18.details
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Evidentialists’ Internalist Argument for Pragmatism.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (4):427-436.details
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Coherence as Competence.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):353-376.details
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There Are No Irrational Emotions.Steven Gubka - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):293-317.details
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Can Beliefs Be Based on Practical Reasons?Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2019 - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York: Routledge. pp. 215-234.details
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Radical Pragmatism in the Ethics of Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):403-419.details
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The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition.Zoe Jenkin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):251-298.details
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Discussion Note: Selim Berker’s Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Adam Shmidt - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):763-776.details
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How Privacy Rights Engender Direct Doxastic Duties.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (4):547-562.details
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