En su libro Una ética sin fundamentos, Nicolás Zavadivker sostiene que la teoría ética y metaética de Mario Bunge pretende fundamentar las normas morales en premisas fácticas, sin hacer uso de valores. El presente trabajo discute esa tesis y sostiene que la teoría de Bunge busca construir y evaluar un sistema de valores y de normas, de forma rigurosa y sin arbitrariedad, a partir de conocimientos fácticos y valores de los evaluadores. Dado que la teoría de Bunge incluye valores entre (...) sus premisas argumentativas, es incorrecto categorizarla como una posición fundacionista que prescinde de valores. (shrink)

I present a condensed exposé of systemic materialism, a synthesis of materialism and systemism originally proposed by Mario Bunge. Matter is identified with mutability of propertied particulars, and a concrete or material system is defined as an object with composition, structure, mechanism, and environment. I review different aspects of this ontology, and discuss some of its implications for epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. I also try to identify some problems of this view and offer some ways to overcome the difficulties. I (...) conclude that systemic materialism is a promising philosophical project still in the making. (shrink)

The concept of ideology is central to the understanding of the many political, economic, social, and cultural processes that have occurred in the last two centuries. And yet, what is the nature of the different ideologies remains a vague, open, and much disputed question. Many political, sociological, and ideological studies have been devoted to ideology. Very little, on the other hand, has been done from the philosophical field. And this despite the fact that there are undoubtedly many philosophical questions related (...) to ideology and its role in modern industrialized societies. Just a few examples of ideology-related philosophical questions suffice to prove the point: What objects do ideologies deal with? Are the ideologies testable? Are there true ideologies? Do they evolve? How are ideologies related to societies? Is the existence of ideologies inevitable in modern societies? What is the relation of ideology to science? Is science just another kind of ideology? Are we, as human beings, innately predisposed to believe in ideologies? Or, instead, ideologies proliferate through indoctrination and propaganda? Are ideologies necessarily harmful?...and much more. In this article I try to answer some of these questions from a philosophical point of view, taking a materialist approach. I begin by characterizing ideology as a complex, multi-layered concept. Then, I briefly discuss the material systems on which ideological movements operate, that is, societies and concrete human groups. I identify at least 11 different elements that seem to be present in most ideologies, and I compare these characteristics with those of contemporary science and technology. Although some superficial similarities can be identified, there are deep differences that make ideology completely different from science. The similarities, however, are stronger with technology. Ideologies continually evolve with technological advances, social changes, and even with mere fashion. The current fragmentation of ideologies caused by the widespread use of new technologies and social networks has given rise to new phenomena of ideological propagation which, in my opinion, are very dangerous, particularly for open societies. I discuss these processes, within the context of the nature vs nurture debate, along with the question of whether we can get rid of ideologies. (shrink)

[[THIS IS THE COMPLETE SECOND ISSUE OF MΕTASCIENCE]] -/- This second issue of the journal Mεtascience continues the char acterization of this new branch of knowledge that is metasci ence. If it is new, it is not in a radical sense since Mario Bunge practiced it in an exemplary way, since logical positivists were accused of practicing only a mere metascience, since scientists have always practiced it implicitly, and since some philosophers no longer practice philosophy but rather metascience, but without (...) characterizing it or theorizing it, that is, without realizing that they have abandoned one general discourse for another. The novelty therefore lies in this aware ness that a general discourse without philosophy is possible: a scien tific general discourse. The twelve contributions gathered in this volume illustrate the metascientific approach to knowledge of the world as well as to knowledge of knowledge of the world, that is, science. And like Bunge’s project, they are neither part of the analytical movement nor the continental movement in philosophy. We will read here studies about the Bungean system, some applications of Bungean thought, some metascientific contributions, and some reflections around meta science. Among metascientific disciplines, ontology occupies a prominent place in this issue of Mεtascience. Metascience differs from philoso phy in its rejection of the fundamental philosophical distinction be tween appearance and reality. Metascientific ontology therefore does not postulate the existence of any metaphysical reality. But metasci entific ontology, no more than philosophical ontology, is a factual sci ence. The first, because it studies scientific constructs and not concrete objects, the second, because it is interested in transcendent or meta physical objects. (shrink)

After a review of previous uses of the term “pseudotechnology”, a definition is proposed: “A pseudotechnology is an alleged technology that is irreparably dysfunctional for its intended purpose since it is based on construction principles that cannot be made to work”. The relationship between pseudotechnology and pseudoscience is discussed, and so is the relationship between pseudotechnology and the much weaker concept of technological malfunction. An explanation is offered of why pseudotechnology is much more seldom referred to than pseudoscience: dysfunctional technology (...) usually reveals itself when put to use, whereas dysfunctional science tends to be more difficult to disclose. (shrink)

Après un examen des emplois antérieurs du terme « pseudotechnologie », une définition est proposée : « Une pseudotechnologie est une technologie présumée, irrémédiablement dysfonctionnelle pour l’usage auquel elle est destinée, puisqu’elle est basée sur des principes de construction qui ne peuvent pas être mis en œuvre ». La relation entre la pseudotechnologie et la pseudoscience est examinée, tout comme la relation entre la pseudotechnologie et le concept beaucoup plus faible de malfonction technologique. Une explication est proposée de la raison (...) pour laquelle la pseudotechnologie est beaucoup plus rarement mentionnée que la pseudoscience : le dysfonctionnement d’une technologie se manifeste généralement au moment de son utilisation, tandis que le dysfonctionnement d’une science est généralement plus difficile à établir. (shrink)

We will explain why the Treatise on Basic Philosophy is a metascientific work and not a philosophical one. We will then argue that this meta-science is part of a long process of naturalization of thought that begins at the end of the Middle Ages to give birth to the scientific thought of the study of the world. For Bunge, naturalization takes the form of the naturalization of the general thought which makes it possible to replace philosophical general discourse with scientific (...) gen-eral discourse. Finally, this naturalization of general discourse should not be con-fused with the projects of naturalization of philosophy, in particular one of many projects of scientific or naturalized metaphysics known as ontic structural real-ism. (shrink)

Nous expliquerons pourquoi le Treatise on Basic Philosophy est une œuvre mé-tascientifique et non pas philosophique. On soutiendra ensuite que cette métas-cience s’inscrit dans un long processus de naturalisation de la pensée qui débute à la fin du Moyen Âge pour donner naissance à la pensée scientifique de l’étude du monde. La naturalisation prend la forme chez Bunge d’une naturalisation de la pensée générale qui permet de remplacer le discours général philosophique par le discours général scientifique. Finalement, cette naturalisation du (...) discours général ne doit pas être confondue avec les projets de naturalisation de la philo-sophie, notamment un des projets de la métaphysique scientifique ou naturali-sée connu sous le nom de réalisme structurel ontique. (shrink)

⦿ In my dissertation I introduce, motivate and take the first steps in the implementation of, the project of naturalising modal metaphysics: the transformation of the field into a chapter of the philosophy of science rather than speculative, autonomous metaphysics. -/- ⦿ In the introduction, I explain the concept of naturalisation that I apply throughout the dissertation, which I argue to be an improvement on Ladyman and Ross' proposal for naturalised metaphysics. I also object to Williamson's proposal that modal metaphysics (...) --- or some view in the area --- is already a quasi-scientific discipline. -/- ⦿ Recently, some philosophers have argued that the notion of metaphysical modality is as ill defined as to be of little theoretical utility. In the second chapter I intend to contribute to such skepticism. First, I observe that each of the proposed marks of the concept, except for factivity, is highly controversial; thus, its logical structure is deeply obscure. With the failure of the "first principles" approach, I examine the paradigmatic intended applications of the concept, and argue that each makes it a device for a very specific and controversial project: a device, therefore, for which a naturalist will find no use for. I conclude that there is no well-defined or theoretically useful notion of objective necessity other than logical or physical necessity, and I suggest that naturalising modal metaphysics can provide more stable methodological foundations. -/- ⦿ In the third chapter I answer a possible objection against the in-principle viability of the project: that the concept of metaphysical modality cannot be understood through the philosophical analysis of any scientific theory, since metaphysical necessity "transcends'' natural necessity, and science only deals with the latter. I argue that the most important arguments for this transcendence thesis fail or face problems that, as of today, remain unsolved. -/- ⦿ Call the idea that science doesn't need modality, "demodalism''. Demodalism is a first step in a naturalistic argument for modal antirealism. In the fourth chapter I examine six versions of demodalism to explain why a family of formalisms, that I call "spaces of possibility'', are (i) used in a quasi-ubiquitous way in mathematised sciences (I provide examples from theoretical computer science to microeconomics), (ii) scientifically interpreted in modal terms, and (iii) used for at least six important tasks: (1) defining laws and theories; (2) defining important concepts from different sciences (I give several examples); (3) making essential classifications; (4) providing different types of explanations; (5) providing the connection between theory and statistics, and (6) understanding the transition between a theory and its successor (as is the case with quantisation). -/- ⦿ In fifth chapter I propose and defend a naturalised modal ontology. This is a realism about modal structure: my realism about constraints. The modal structure of a system are the relationships between its possible states and between its possible states and those of other systems. It is given by the plurality of restrictions to which said system is subject. A constraint is a factor that explains the impossibility of a class of states; I explain this concept further. First, I defend my point of view by rejecting some of its main rivals: constructive empiricism, Humean conventionalism, and wave function realism, as they fail to make sense of quantum chaos. This is because the field requires the notion of objective modal structure, and the mentioned views have trouble explaining the modal facts of quantum dynamics. Then, I argue that constraint realism supersedes these views in the context of Bohm's standard theory and mechanics, and underpins the study of quantum chaos. Finally, I consider and reject two possible problems for my point of view. -/- ⦿ A central concern of modal metaphysicians has been to understand the logical system that best characterises necessity. In the sixth chapter I intend to recover the logical project applied to my naturalistic modal metaphysics. Scientists and philosophers of science accept different degrees of physical necessity, ranging from purely mathematically necessary facts that restrict physical behaviour, to kinetic principles, to particular dynamical constraints. I argue that this motivates a multimodal approach to modal logic, and that the time dependence of dynamics motivates a logic of historical necessity. I propose multimodal propositional (classical) logics for Bohmian mechanics and the Everettian theory of many divergent worlds, and I close with a criticism of Williamson's approach to the logic of state spaces of dynamic systems. (shrink)

Metascientific ontology differs from philosophical ontologies in its objectives, objects and methods. By an examination of the ontological theories of Mario Bunge, we will show their main objective is a unified representation of the world as known through the sciences, that their objects of study are scientific concepts, and that their methods do not differ from those that one expects to find in any rational activity. Metascientific ontology is therefore not transcendent because it does not seek to represent non-concrete objects (...) alien to the world we inhabit and to the sciences that study it, and therefore does not need special faculties and methods to carry out its research. Metascientific ontology is a general scientific discourse on the world because it was designed by and for the sciences. (shrink)

La representación científica del mundo se construye sobre un tejido de teorías en las cuales hay enunciados generales que representan leyes naturales. Estas leyes son patrones de sucesos regulares. Un presupuesto básico de la ciencia es que todo acontecimiento es legal: ocurre regido por leyes que son fijas. ¿Es compatible esa legalidad con la libertad de elección que creemos tener? ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones para la libertad política que debemos esperar en una sociedad organizada y racional? ¿Cuál es el rol (...) de la ética en todo esto? Trataré de responder a estas preguntas aquí, defendiendo la concepción de una sociedad abierta, democrática y plural, que maximice la libertad de elección y acción de las personas que la forman. (shrink)

L’ontologie métascientifique se distingue des ontologies philosophiques par ses objectifs, ses objets et ses méthodes. Par un examen des théories ontologiques de Mario Bunge, nous montrerons que leur principal objectif est l’élaboration d’une représentation unifiée du monde tel que connu via les sciences, que leurs objets d’étude sont les concepts scientifiques, et que leurs méthodes ne diffèrent pas de celles qu’on s’attend à trouver dans toute activité rationnelle. L’ontologie métascientifique n’est donc pas transcendante parce qu’elle ne cherche pas à représenter (...) des objets étrangers au monde que nous habitons et aux sciences qui l’étudient, et par conséquent elle n’a pas besoin de facultés ni de méthodes spéciales pour mener à bien ses recherches. L’ontologie métascientifique est un discours général scientifique sur le monde parce que conçue par et pour les sciences. (shrink)

Le scientisme a plus de notoriété que l’histoire proprement dite, car il a été identifié avec le « positivisme », le « réductionnisme », le « matérialisme » ou le « marxisme », ou même tenu responsable de la domination de la science sur leur autres activités humaines. L’idée que la recherche scientifique produit les meilleures connaissances possible réside dans la définition même du « scientisme ». Cependant, alors même que la science peut se prévaloir d’un nombre considérable de succès (...) théoriques et pratiques, une confiance rationnelle envers elle comme moyen de résoudre tout problème factuel a été dénoncée comme illégitime, discutable ou dogmatique. Ainsi, après avoir passé en revue les diverses conceptions du scientisme, je défends une position raisonnable du scientisme contre certaines de ses critiques dominantes. Ainsi, on soutiendra que la science est l’approche la plus fiable pour acquérir des connaissances sans nuire à d’autres activités importantes dans la mesure où celles-ci ne traitent pas de questions factuelles ou cognitives ni ne sont en contradiction avec une vision du monde scientifique. (shrink)

Scientism has more notoriety than history proper for it has been identified with “positivism”, “reductionism”, “materialism” or “Marxism”, or even held responsible for the enforcement of science at the expense of other human affairs. The idea that scientific research yields the best possible knowledge lies at the very definition of “scientism”. However, even when science has shown a considerable amount of theoretical and practical successes, a rational confidence put on it as a mean for solving any factual problem has been (...) denounced as illegitimate, defective, or dogmatic. Thereby, after revisiting the varieties of the meaning of scientism, I argue for a reasonable defense of scientism against some of its prevailing criticisms. Hence, it will be sustained that science is the most reliable approach for attaining knowledge without detriment of other valuable human activities insofar these do not address factual or cognitive questions nor are at odds with a scientific worldview. (shrink)

La teoría de los valores, la axiología, a veces suele pasar muy inadvertida en los análisis que se hacen de la obra filosófica de Mario Bunge, o autores que siguen su línea de investigación como Gustavo Esteban Romero. En este artículo voy a repasar las principales concepciones básicas en teoría de valores de los dos filósofos citados (aunque se intentará no caer en un mero análisis escolástico), centrándome en las diferencias y coincidencias con tal de lograr luego una tentativa síntesis. (...) Se expone el proceder: primeramente se tratará de explicar cada sistema por separado, destacando todas sus similitudes e implicaciones, luego se contrastarán algunas diferencias, se discutirán estas y se tratará de conformar una teoría consistente que encare la axiología con todos los aportes hechos, como rama de la filosofía científica y general. (shrink)

Existen conceptos clave en las diversas ciencias (ya sean formales, naturales, biosociales o sociales) como “teoría” o “modelo” que están aún hoy sujetos a un amplio debate epistemológico, i.e. desde la teoría del conocimiento, y centrada en el estudio del conocimiento científico en particular. Los científicos, pues, construyen y utilizan diferentes nociones que cargan tras de sí realmente con un exhaustivo debate extracientífico sobre su naturaleza. En este trabajo se ofrecerán algunas aclaraciones y propuestas formales de definición sobre tales nociones (...) desde la filosofía de la ciencia del astrofísico y filosofo Gustavo Esteban Romero (G. E. Romero). En concreto se ensayaran unas definiciones formales de “teoría” y “modelo”, para las ciencias actuales (y otras disciplinas pasibles de su aplicación), y se contextualizarán estas ideas en el debate sobre la estructura y organización de los saberes científicos. (shrink)

Las teorías que usamos para representar el mundo pueden ser extremadamente complejas. Abordan temas tales como electrones, campos cuánticos, estrellas de neutrones, materia oscura, redes neuronales, mercados económicos, la atmósfera y muchas otras entidades que suponemos existen en el universo. Al formular nuestras teorías, recurrimos a lenguajes exactos que nos permiten minimizar la vaguedad y expresarnos lo más precisa y cuantitativamente posible. Recurrimos a la matemática. Cuando formulamos nuestras teorías fácticas en lenguaje matemático, estas se refieren no solamente a objetos (...) que nosotros interpretamos como materiales, tales como partículas o personas, sino también a entidades más raras de un mundo abstracto: conjuntos, números, funciones, espacios algebraicos, variedades, topologías, y otras entidades similares. Estos objetos no son materiales en el sentido en que nosotros decimos que una manzana es material. Ellos no existen en el espacio-tiempo, no interactúan, no cambian o evolucionan. Sin embargo, allí están, profundamente arraigados en nuestras teorías más apreciadas acerca del mundo. (shrink)

Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that (...) often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it. (shrink)

In this text we try to summarize the axiological and ethical theories, as well as its relation with human rights -HR- that is developed from scientific philosophy: a philosophy that seeks to construct general conceptual systems that are clear and exact, and tries to adjust itself to the sciences of its time, to feed back with them. In this way, it is investigated in the practical philosophy faced with the maximum possible rigor and focused on achieving certain objectivity; a technical (...) philosophy. All along this work we develop the central concepts, hypothesis and prescriptions of the practical philosophy on the scientific substrate available. It also proposes some ideas critical of ‘human rights’ that may be of interest to jurists and legal theorists. The final objective of these critics it is not the refutation or suppression of HR, but just the opposed: their strength reaffirmation with the improvements and readjustments required. (shrink)

After a review of previous uses of the term “pseudotechnology”, a definition is proposed: “A pseudotechnology is an alleged technology that is irreparably dysfunctional for its intended purpose since it is based on construction principles that cannot be made to work”. The relationship between pseudotechnology and pseudoscience is discussed, and so is the relationship between pseudotechnology and the much weaker concept of technological malfunction. An explanation is offered of why pseudotechnology is much more seldom referred to than pseudoscience: dysfunctional technology (...) usually reveals itself when put to use, whereas dysfunctional science tends to be more difficult to disclose. (shrink)