- A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy.Andrea Polonioli - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3841-3867.details
|
|
The Unreliable Intuitions Objection Against Reflective Equilibrium.Norbert Paulo - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (3):333-353.details
|
|
Arguments from Expert Opinion and Persistent Bias.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (2):175-195.details
|
|
Positive Psychology and Philosophy-as-Usual: An Unhappy Match?Josef Mattes - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (3):52.details
|
|
Cognitive Style and Frame Susceptibility in Decision-Making.David R. Mandel & Irina V. Kapler - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:375475.details
|
|
Response to Janet Levin and Michael Strevens.Edouard Machery - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):246-255.details
|
|
Response to Akagi, Hughes, and Springle. [REVIEW]Edouard Machery - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):608-623.details
|
|
The threat of the intuition-shaped hole.Ethan Landes - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):539-564.details
|
|
Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Stable Across both Demographic Groups and Situations.Joshua Knobe - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (2):11-76.details
|
|
Two types of debunking arguments.Peter Königs - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):383-402.details
|
|
Experimental ethics, intuitions, and morally irrelevant factors.Peter Königs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2605-2623.details
|
|
Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.details
|
|
Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde - 2017 - Cognition 169 (C):139-146.details
|
|
Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive Control.Michael Klenk & Hanno Sauer - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (7):938-961.details
|
|
"Ought Implies Can,” Framing Effects, and "Empirical Refutations".Alicia Kissinger-Knox, Patrick Aragon & Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):165-182.details
|
|
The brittleness of expertise and why it matters.Daniel Kilov - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3431-3455.details
|
|
Pundits and Possibilities: Philosophers Are Not Modal Experts.Daniel Kilov & Caroline Hendy - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):824-843.details
|
|
The genetic technologies questionnaire: lay judgments about genetic technologies align with ethical theory, are coherent, and predict behaviour.Svenja Küchenhoff, Johannes Doerflinger & Nora Heinzelmann - 2022 - BMC Medical Ethics 23 (54):1-14.details
|
|
Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.Jonathan D. Cohen Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144.details
|
|
The epistemology of thought experiments without exceptionalist ingredients.Paul O. Irikefe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-29.details
|
|
A fresh look at the expertise reply to the variation problem.Paul Oghenovo Irikefe - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):840-867.details
|
|
The moral behavior of ethics professors: A replication-extension in Chinese mainland.Tiantian Hou, Xiaojun Ding & Feng Yu - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
|
|
Ordering effects, updating effects, and the specter of global skepticism.Zachary Horne & Jonathan Livengood - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1189-1218.details
|
|
Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
|
|
Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):342-359.details
|
|
Rejecting Beliefs, or Rejecting Believers? On the Importance and Exclusion of Women in Philosophy.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (2):293-312.details
|
|
Fast, Cheap, and Unethical? The Interplay of Morality and Methodology in Crowdsourced Survey Research.Matthew C. Haug - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):363-379.details
|
|
Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement.Robert Gressis - forthcoming - Synthese 197:1-18.details
|
|
Expressive Responding, Experimental Philosophy, and Philosophical Expertise.Shane Nicholas Glackin - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.details
|
|
Philosophers' linguistic expertise: A psycholinguistic approach to the expertise objection against experimental philosophy.Eugen Fischer, Paul E. Engelhardt & Aurélie Herbelot - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-33.details
|
|
Philosophical expertise under the microscope.Miguel Egler & Lewis Dylan Ross - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1077-1098.details
|
|
Nonassertive Moral Abolitionism.Jason Dockstader - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (4):481-502.details
|
|
In Bello Proportionality: Philosophical Reflections on a Disturbing Empirical Study.Stephen de Wijze, Daniel Statman & Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan - 2022 - Journal of Military Ethics 21 (2):116-131.details
|
|
The ‘Arguments Instead of Intuitions’ Account of Thought Experiments.Friderik Klampfer - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):191-203.details
|
|
Culture and cognitive science.Jesse Prinz - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Moral psychology: Empirical approaches.John Doris & Stephen Stich - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Culture and Cognitive Science.Andreas De Block & Daniel Kelly - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Reflective equilibrium.Daniels Norman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Methodological Challenges for Empirical Approaches to Ethics.Christopher Shirreff - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontariodetails
|
|
Moral Realism and Expert Disagreement.Prabhpal Singh - 2020 - Trames: A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 24 (3):441-457.details
|
|
Moral nihilism and its implications.Marc Krellenstein - 2017 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 38 (1):75-90.details
|
|
A Plea for Minimally Biased Empirical Philosophy.Andrea Polonioli - unknowndetails
|
|