- Tracking instability in our philosophical judgments: Is it intuitive?Jennifer Wright - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):485-501.details
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On intuitional stability: The clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic.Jennifer Cole Wright - 2010 - Cognition 115 (3):491-503.details
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Philosophical expertise and the burden of proof.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):215-229.details
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Are philosophers expert intuiters?Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.details
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Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.details
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Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.details
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
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How not to test for philosophical expertise.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):431-452.details
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Actions, intentions, and consequences: The doctrine of doing and allowing.Warren S. Quinn - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):287-312.details
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Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1026-1044.details
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Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):52-64.details
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Philosophical temperament.Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma, Adam Feltz, Richard Scheines & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):313-330.details
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Expertise and Intuitions about Reference.Edouard Machery - 2012 - Theoria 27 (1):37-54.details
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):128-159.details
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Putting the trolley in order: Experimental philosophy and the loop case.S. Matthew Liao, Alex Wiegmann, Joshua Alexander & Gerard Vong - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):661-671.details
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Some hope for intuitions: A reply to Weinberg.Thomas Grundmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):481-509.details
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Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making.Shane Frederick - 2005 - Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (4):25-42.details
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Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.details
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Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):378-410.details
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Doctrine of double effect.Alison McIntyre - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Cleanliness is Next to Morality, Even for Philosophers.Kevin Patrick Tobia, Gretchen B. Chapman & Stephen Stich - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20.details
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Moral Luck.Dana K. Nelkin - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser - 2006 - Psychological Science 17 (12):1082-1089.details
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Learning to think: The challenges of teaching thinking.Ron Ritchhart & David N. Perkins - 2005 - In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. pp. 775--802.details
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