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Is “Free Will” an Emergent Property of Immaterial Soul? A Critical Examination of Human Beings’ Decision-Making Process(es) Followed by Voluntary Actions and Their Moral Responsibility.Satya Sundar Sethy & M. Suresh - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (3):491-505.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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Metaphysical Foundations of Causation: Powers or Laws of Nature?Dmytro Sepetyi - 2021 - Metaphysica 22 (2):295-309.details
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Representation and desire: A philosophical error with consequences for theory-of-mind research.Eric Schwitzgebel - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):157-180.details
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Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in Intersubjectivity, Consciousness, and Language.Andrea Schiavio - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):735-739.details
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Experiencing organisms: from mineness to subject of experience.Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2447-2474.details
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Modeling intentional agency: a neo-Gricean framework.Matti Sarkia - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7003-7030.details
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Perlocuciones: ¿reconstrucción o eliminación?Antonio Blanco Salgueiro - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 39 (2):57-80.details
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Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children.James Russell - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.details
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Intentions and interactive transformations of decision problems.Olivier Roy - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):335 - 349.details
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How Social Institutions Can Imitate Nature.Corrado Roversi - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):327-338.details
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What kind of evaluative states are emotions? The attitudinal theory vs. the perceptual theory of emotions.Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):544-563.details
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The Genealogy of Content or the Future of an Illusion.Alex Rosenberg - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):537-547.details
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Moore’s Moral Facts and the Gap in the Retributive Theory.Brian Rosebury - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (3):361-376.details
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Hacia una visión biopragmática de la conciencia humana.Angélica María Rodríguez - 2017 - Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana 38 (116):237-258.details
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A reply to Cling’s “The epistemic regress problem”.William A. Roche - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):263-276.details
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What’s Really Going On in Searle’s “Chinese room‘.Georges Rey - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):169-85.details
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Perceptual Co-Reference.Michael Rescorla - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):569-589.details
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Bayesian Sensorimotor Psychology.Michael Rescorla - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):3-36.details
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The psychologist's fallacy as a persistent framework in William James's psychological theorizing.Edward Reed - 1995 - History of the Human Sciences 8 (1):61-72.details
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Does linguistic communication rest on inference?François Recanati - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (1-2):105–126.details
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A Kantian stance on the intentional stance.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.details
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Salvation and Speech Act. Reading Luther with the Aid of Searle’s Analysis of Declarations.Jacob R. Randolph - 2017 - Perichoresis 15 (1):101-116.details
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Metacognition and metarepresentation: Is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition? [REVIEW]Joëlle Proust - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):271 - 295.details
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A plea for mental acts.Joëlle Proust - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):105-128.details
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Selection Restrictions as Ultimate Presuppositions of Natural Ontology.Michele Prandi - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):73-81.details
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On the Moral Agency of Computers.Thomas M. Powers - 2013 - Topoi 32 (2):227-236.details
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On Scott-Phillips’ General Account of Communication.Ronald J. Planer - 2017 - Acta Biotheoretica 65 (4):253-270.details
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Emotional actions: A new approach.David Pineda - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):671-689.details
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The tuning-fork model of human social cognition: A critique☆.Pierre Jacob - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):229-243.details
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Cognitive self-management requires the phenomenal registration of intrinsic state properties.Frederic Peters - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1113-1135.details
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Bratman, Searle, and Simplicity : Comments on Bratman, Shared Agency, Planning Theory of Acting Together.Björn Petersson - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):27–37.details
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Introspection & Remembering.Josef Perner, Daniela Kloo & Elisabeth Stöttinger - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):253 - 270.details
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Do Computers "Have Syntax, But No Semantics"?Jaroslav Peregrin - 2021 - Minds and Machines 31 (2):305-321.details
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A new defense of trope content view of experience.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1757-1768.details
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Truth conditions of tensed sentence types.L. A. Paul - 1997 - Synthese 111 (1):53-72.details
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A thirder and an Everettian: A reply to Lewis's 'Quantum Sleeping Beauty'.David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):78-86.details
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The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.details
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The content of intentions.Elisabeth Patherie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432.details
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Self‐Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2010 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.details
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Seeing-as, seeing-o, and seeing-that.Søren Overgaard - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2973-2992.details
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Perceptual Error, Conjunctivism, and Husserl.Søren Overgaard - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (1):25-45.details
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Enactivism and the Perception of Others’ Emotions.Søren Overgaard - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):105-129.details
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Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesis.Søren Overgaard & Alessandro Salice - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1-25.details
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A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.details
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A puzzle about seeing for representationalism.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2625-2646.details
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Can groups have concepts? Semantics for collective intentions.Cathal O'Madagain - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):347-363.details
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Self-Ascription of Intention: Responsibility, Obligation and Self-Control.David R. Olson - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):297 - 314.details
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