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Overview of fundamental work in deontic logic. 

The program put forward in von Wright's last works defines deontic logic as ``a study of conditions which must be satisfied in rational normgiving activity'' and thus introduces the perspective of logical pragmatics. In this paper a formal explication for von Wright's program is proposed within the framework of settheoretic approach and extended to a twosets model which allows for the separate treatment of obligationnorms and permission norms. The three translation functions connecting the language of deontic logic with the language (...) 

It is well known that systems of action deontic logic emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law are subject to paradoxes. In general, paradoxes are acknowledged as such if we have intuitions telling us that things should be different. The aim of this paper is to introduce a paradoxfree deontic action system by (i) identifying the basic intuitions leading to the emergence of the paradoxes (...) 

The biennial DEON conferences are designed to promote interdisciplinary cooperation amongst scholars interested in linking the formallogical study of normative concepts and normative systems with computer science, artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy, organization theory and law. In addition to these general themes, DEON 2016 encouraged a special focus on the topic "Reasons, Argumentation and Justification.". 

In the paper we present a formal system motivated by a specific methodology of creating norms. According to the methodology, a normgiver before establishing a set of norms should create a picture of the agent by creating his repertoire of actions. Then, knowing what the agent can do in particular situations, the normgiver regulates these actions by assigning deontic qualifications to each of them. The set of norms created for each situation should respect (1) generally valid deontic principles being the (...) 

The aim of this paper is to introduce a system of dynamic deontic logic in which the main problems related to the de finition of deontic concepts, especially those emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law, are solved. The basic idea is to introduce two crucial distinctions allowing us to differentiate (i) what is ideal with respect to a given code, which fixes the types (...) 

Deontic logic is devoted to the study of logical properties of normative predicates such as permission, obligation and prohibition. Since it is usual to apply these predicates to actions, many deontic logicians have proposed formalisms where actions and action combinators are present. Some standard action combinators are action conjunction, choice between actions and not doing a given action. These combinators resemble boolean operators, and therefore the theory of boolean algebra offers a wellknown athematical framework to study the properties of the (...) 

Trivalence is quite natural for deontic action logic, where actions are treated as good, neutral or bad.We present the ideas of trivalent deontic logic after J. Kalinowski and its realisation in a 3valued logic of M. Fisher and two systems designed by the authors of the paper: a 4valued logic inspired by N. Belnap’s logic of truth and information and a 3valued logic based on nondeterministic matrices. Moreover, we combine Kalinowski’s idea of trivalence with deontic action logic based on boolean (...) 

In the paper we discuss different intuitions about the properties of obligatory actions in the framework of deontic action logic based on boolean algebra. Two notions of obligation are distinguished–abstract and processed obligation. We introduce them formally into the system of deontic logic of actions and investigate their properties and mutual relations. 

We introduce a family of tableau calculi for deontic action logics based on finite boolean algebras, these logics provide deontic operators which are applied to a finite number of actions ; furthermore, in these formalisms, actions can be combined by means of boolean operators, this provides an expressive algebra of actions. We define a tableau calculus for the basic logic and then we extend this calculus to cope with extant variations of this formalism; we prove the soundness and completeness of (...) 

Imperatives occur ubiquitously in natural languages. They produce forces which change the addressee’s cognitive state and regulate her actions accordingly. In real life we often receive conflicting orders, typically, issued by various authorities with different ranks. A new update semantics is proposed in this paper to formalize this idea. The general properties of this semantics, as well as its background ideas are discussed extensively. In addition, we compare our framework with other approaches of deontic logics in the context of normative (...) 

The paper offers a logical characterisation of multistep actions in the context of deontic notions of obligation, permission and prohibition. Deontic notions for sequentially composed actions are founded on deontic notions for onestep actions. The present work includes a formal study of situations where execution of a multistep action has been unsuccessful and provides normative analysis of such actions. 

The semantics for a deontic action logic based on Boolean algebra is extended with an interpretation of action expressions in terms of sets of alternative actions, intended as a way to model choice. This results in a nonclassical interpretation of action expressions, while sentences not in the scope of deontic operators are kept classical. A deontic structure based on Simons’ supercover semantics is used to interpret permission and obligation. It is argued that these constructions provide ways to handle various problems (...) 



We present a solution to the paradox of free choice permission by introducing strong and weak permission in a deontic logic of action. It is shown how counterintuitive consequences of strong permission can be avoided by limiting the contexts in which an action can be performed. This is done by introducing the only operator, which allows us to say that only is performed (and nothing else), and by introducing contextual interpretation of action terms. 

We describe a new way in which theories about the deontic status of actions can be represented in terms of the standard twosorted firstorder extensional predicate calculus. Some of the resulting formal theories are easy to implement in Prolog; one prototype implementation—R. M. Lee's deontic expert shell DX—is briefly described. 

The aim of the paper is to point out the modelling choices that lead to different systems of deontic action logic. A kind of a roadmap is presented. On the one hand it can help the reader to find the deontic logic appropriate for an intended application relying on the information considering the way in which a deontic logic represents actions and how it characterises deontic properties in relation to (the representation of) actions. On the other hand it is a (...) 

We describe a new way in which theories about the deontic status of actions can be represented in terms of the standard twosorted extensional predicate calculus. Some of the resulting formal theories are easy to implement in Prolog; one prototype implementationR. M. Lee's deontic expert shell DXis briefly described. 

This paper tackles the problem of inference in normative systems where norms concerning actions and states of affairs appear together. A deontic logic of actions and states is proposed as a solution. It is made up of two independent deontic logics, namely a deontic logic of action and a deontic logic of states, interlinked by bridging definitions. It is shown at a language and a model level how an agent should look for norms to follow in a concrete situation. It (...) 





The paper tackles two problems. The first one is to grasp the real meaning of Jerzy Kalinowski’s theory of normative sentences. His formal system K 1 is a simple logic formulated in a very limited language . While presenting it Kalinowski formulated a few interesting philosophical remarks on norms and actions. He did not, however, possess the tools to formalise them fully. We propose a formulation of Kalinowski’s ideas with the use of a settheoretical frame similar to the one presented (...) 