This article presents an analysis of Gödel's dialectica interpretation via a refinement of intuitionistic logic known as linear logic. Linear logic comes naturally into the picture once one observes that the structural rule of contraction is the main cause of the lack of symmetry in Gödel's interpretation. We use the fact that the dialectica interpretation of intuitionistic logic can be viewed as a composition of Girard's embedding of intuitionistic logic into linear logic followed by de Paiva's dialectica interpretation of linear (...) logic. We then investigate the various properties of the dialectica interpretation, such as the characterisation theorem, and variants of Gödel's interpretation within the linear logic context. The role of contraction in extensions to classical logic, arithmetic and analysis is also discussed. (shrink)

Linear continuous logic is the fragment of continuous logic obtained by restricting connectives to addition and scalar multiplications. Most results in the full continuous logic have a counterpart in this fragment. In particular a linear form of the compactness theorem holds. We prove this variant and use it to deduce some basic preservation theorems.

La parution de la monographic de Sneed,The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics a suscité un renouveau d'intérêt en philosophie contemporaine des sciences. Cet ouvrage arrivait à un moment où l'épistémologie des sciences, telle que développée dans les milieux germaniques et anglo-saxons, accusait de graves insuffisances dans la reconstruction rationnelle du développement historique des théories physiques. Mis sur la défensive par les thèses et arguments historiques de Kuhn et de Feyerabend, ces milieux « orthodoxes » devaient reconnaitre l'état embryonnaire de ce (...) qui devait être uneépistémologie diachroniquedes sciences, une épistémologie du changement scientifique où les méthodes d'analyse formelle puissent être aussi mises á contribution. A cela s'ajoutait un certain malaise, une certaine stagnation de la problématique, plus synchronique, de l'approche traditionnelle issue du mouvement empiriste logique. Le probleme de la dichotomielangage théorique—langage observationnel, ainsi que son fidèle compagnon, le problème destermes théoriques, le statut épistémologique desrègies de correspondance, la dèfinition du concept d'analyticitéen science, autant de questions qui avaient été discutées et critiquées, à maintes reprises, pour aboutir à des résultats peu concluants aux yeux des philosophes, comme à ceux des physiciens préoccupés des fondements de leur discipline et à qui la teneur de cette discussion semblait souvent étrangère à la pratique scientifique. (shrink)

Pour le philosophe intéressé aux structures et aux fondements du savoir théorétique, à la constitution d'une « méta-théorétique «, θεωρíα., qui, mieux que les « Wissenschaftslehre » fichtéenne ou husserlienne et par-delà les débris de la métaphysique, veut dans une intention nouvelle faire la synthèse du « théorétique », la logique mathématique se révèle un objet privilégié.

§1. Iterated Gödelian extensions of theories. The idea of iterating ad infinitum the operation of extending a theory T by adding as a new axiom a Gödel sentence for T, or equivalently a formalization of “T is consistent”, thus obtaining an infinite sequence of theories, arose naturally when Godel's incompleteness theorem first appeared, and occurs today to many non-specialists when they ponder the theorem. In the logical literature this idea has been thoroughly explored through two main approaches. One is that (...) initiated by Turing in his “ordinal logics” and taken very much further in Feferman's work on transfinite progressions, which also introduced the more general study of extensions by reflection principles, of which consistency statements are a special case. This approach starts from an assignment of theories to ordinal notations, and extracts sequences of theories through a suitable choice of a path in the set of ordinal notations. The second approach, illustrated in particular by the work of Schmerl and Beklemishev, starts instead from a suitably well-behaved primitive recursive well-ordering, which is used to define a sequence of theories. This second approach has led to precise results about the relative proof-theoretical strength of sequences of theories obtained by iterating different reflection principles. The Turing-Feferman approach, on the other hand, lends itself well to an investigation in qualitative and philosophical terms of the relevance of such iterated reflection extensions to mathematical knowledge, in particular because of two developments associated with this approach. (shrink)

Kochen and Specker’s theorem can be seen as a consequence of Gleason’s theorem and logical compactness. Similar compactness arguments lead to stronger results about finite sets of rays in Hilbert space, which we also prove by a direct construction. Finally, we demonstrate that Gleason’s theorem itself has a constructive proof, based on a generic, finite, effectively generated set of rays, on which every quantum state can be approximated. r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

In this paper we prove a boundedness theorem in the theory ID1. This answers a question asked by Feferman, for example in [3]. The background is the following.Let A[X, x] be an X-positive formula arithmetic in X. The theory ID1 is an extension of Peano arithmetic PA by the following axioms:for arbitrary formulas F; PA is a constant for the least fixed point of A[X, x]. Set-theoretically, PA can be defined by recursion on the ordinals as follows:where is the first (...) nonrecursive ordinal.Now let a ≺ b be the arithmetic relation which expresses that the recursive tree coded by a is a proper subtree of the tree coded by b, and defineThe least fixed point of Tree[X, x] is the set PTree of all well-founded recursive trees. We write W or Wα for PTree or, respectively. Since W is complete we have for all α <. If we define for each element a ∈ W its inductive norm ∣a∣ by ∣a∣≔ min{ξ: a ∈ Wξ}, then we have = {∣a∣: a ∈ W} and the elements of W can be used as codes for the ordinals less than.Assume that B[X, x] is an X-positive formula arithmetic in X with the only free variables X and x, and assume that QB is a relation that satisfiesIf we definethen we obviously have PB = IB. (shrink)

Completeness and other forms of Zorn’s Lemma are sometimes invoked for semantic proofs of conservation in relatively elementary mathematical contexts in which the corresponding syntactical conservation would suffice. We now show how a fairly general syntactical conservation theorem that covers plenty of the semantic approaches follows from an utmost versatile criterion for conservation given by Scott in 1974.To this end we work with multi-conclusion entailment relations as extending single-conclusion entailment relations. In a nutshell, the additional axioms with disjunctions in positive (...) position can be eliminated by reducing them to the corresponding disjunction elimination rules, which in turn prove admissible in all known mathematical instances. In deduction terms this means to fold up branchings of proof trees by way of properties of the relevant mathematical structures.Applications include the syntactical counterparts of the theorems or lemmas known under the names of Artin–Schreier, Krull–Lindenbaum, and Szpilrajn. Related work has been done before on individual instances, e.g., in locale theory, dynamical algebra, formal topology and proof analysis. (shrink)

This paper is a summary of a lecture in which I presented some remarks on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and their meaning for the foundations of physics. The entire lecture will appear elsewhere.

The main result proved in the paper is that on every recursive structure the intrinsically hyperarithmetical sets coincide with the relatively intrinsically hyperarithmetical sets. As a side effect of the proof an effective version of the Kueker's theorem on definability by means of infinitary formulas is obtained.

Model theory is concerned mainly, although not exclusively, with infinite structures. In recent years, finite structures have risen to greater prominence, both within the context of mainstream model theory, e.g., in work of Lachlan, Cherlin, Hrushovski, and others, and with the advent of finite model theory, which incorporates elements of classical model theory, combinatorics, and complexity theory. The purpose of this survey is to provide an overview of what might be called the model theory of finite structures. Some topics in (...) finite model theory have strong connections to theoretical computer science, especially descriptive complexity theory. In fact, it has been suggested that finite model theory really is, or should be, logic for computer science. These connections with computer science will, however, not be treated here.It is well-known that many classical results of ‘infinite model theory’ fail over the class of finite structures, including the compactness and completeness theorems, as well as many preservation and interpolation theorems. The failure of compactness in the finite, in particular, means that the standard proofs of many theorems are no longer valid in this context. At present, there is no known example of a classical theorem that remains true over finite structures, yet must be proved by substantially different methods. It is generally concluded that first-order logic is ‘badly behaved’ over finite structures.From the perspective of expressive power, first-order logic also behaves badly: it is both too weak and too strong. Too weak because many natural properties, such as the size of a structure being even or a graph being connected, cannot be defined by a single sentence. Too strong, because every class of finite structures with a finite signature can be defined by an infinite set of sentences. Even worse, every finite structure is defined up to isomorphism by a single sentence. In fact, it is perhaps because of this last point more than anything else that model theorists have not been very interested in finite structures. Modern model theory is concerned largely with complete first-order theories, which are completely trivial here. (shrink)

We show how to interpret weak Kőnig's lemma in some recently defined theories of nonstandard arithmetic in all finite types. Two types of interpretations are described, with very different verifications. The celebrated conservation result of Friedman's about weak Kőnig's lemma can be proved using these interpretations. We also address some issues concerning the collecting of witnesses in herbrandized functional interpretations.

In the course of ten short sections, we comment on Gödel's seminal dialectica paper of fifty years ago and its aftermath. We start by suggesting that Gödel's use of functionals of finite type is yet another instance of the realistic attitude of Gödel towards mathematics, in tune with his defense of the postulation of ever increasing higher types in foundational studies. We also make some observations concerning Gödel's recasting of intuitionistic arithmetic via the dialectica interpretation, discuss the extra principles that (...) the interpretation validates and comment on extensionality and higher order equality. The latter sections focus on the role of majorizability considerations within the dialectica and related interpretations for extracting computational information from ordinary proofs in mathematics. (shrink)

Resumo: No presente artigo, discutiremos os aspectos filosóficos de teorias de conjuntos paraconsistentes. A fim de ilustrar nossas considerações de modo mais concreto, abordaremos uma nova teoria de conjuntos baseada em um sistema bem conhecido de Quine e em um cálculo paraconsistente.Palavras-chave: existência, contradição, lógica e paraconsistência.: In the present paper we deal with the philosophical aspects of paraconsistent set theories. In order to illustrate our points more concretely, we will discuss new paraconsistent set theory based both on Quine's well-known (...) system and on a paraconsistent calculus.Keywords: existence, contradiction, logic and paraconsistency. (shrink)

In the present paper I wish to regard constructivelogic as a self-contained system for the treatment ofepistemological issues; the explanations of theconstructivist logical notions are cast in anepistemological mold already from the outset. Thediscussion offered here intends to make explicit thisimplicit epistemic character of constructivism.Particular attention will be given to the intendedinterpretation laid down by Heyting. This interpretation, especially as refined in the type-theoretical work of Per Martin-Löf, puts thesystem on par with the early efforts of Frege andWhitehead-Russell. This quite (...) recent work, however,has proved valuable not only in the philosophy andfoundations of mathematics, but has also foundpractical application in computer science, where thelanguage of constructivism serves as an implementableprogramming language, and within the philosophy oflanguage.\footnote{Nordstr\"{o}m et al. give an overview of the work in computerscience, whereas Ranta provides an impressiveconstructivist alternative to Montague Grammar usingthe richer type structure of Martin-L\"{o}f in placeof the simple classical type theory of Church.} Mypresentation will be carried out through a contrastwith standard metamathematical work.\footnote{Troelstra and van Dalen give an encyclopedictreatment of the metamathematics of constructivism.}In the course of the development I have occasion tooffer some novel considerations on thenature of proof and inference. (shrink)

This paper addresses John Burgess's answer to the ‘Benacerraf Problem’: How could we come justifiably to believe anything implying that there are numbers, given that it does not make sense to ascribe location or causal powers to numbers? Burgess responds that we should look at how mathematicians come to accept: There are prime numbers greater than 1010 That, according to Burgess, is how one can come justifiably to believe something implying that there are numbers. This paper investigates what lies behind (...) Burgess's answer and ends up as a rebuttal to Burgess's reasoning. (shrink)

Gödel's dialectica interpretation of Heyting arithmetic HA may be seen as expressing a lack of confidence in our understanding of unbounded quantification. Instead of formally proving an implication with an existential consequent or with a universal antecedent, the dialectica interpretation asks, under suitable conditions, for explicit ‘interpreting’ instances that make the implication valid. For proofs in constructive set theory CZF‐, it may not always be possible to find just one such instance, but it must suffice to explicitly name a set (...) consisting of such interpreting instances. The aim of eliminating unbounded quantification in favor of appropriate constructive functionals will still be obtained, as our ∧‐interpretation theorem for constructive set theory in all finite types CZFω‐ shows. By changing to a hybrid interpretation ∧q, we show closure of CZFω‐ under rules that – in stronger forms – have already been studied in the context of Heyting arithmetic. In a similar spirit, we briefly survey modified realizability of CZFω‐ and its hybrids. Central results of this paper have been proved by Burr 2000a and Schulte 2006, however, for different translations. We use a simplified interpretation that goes back to Diller and Nahm 1974. A novel element is a lemma on absorption of bounds which is essential for the smooth operation of our translation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to investigate continuity properties arising in elementary (i.e., first-order) logic in the hope of illuminating the special status of this logic. The continuity properties turn out to be closely related to conditions which characterize elementary logic uniquely, and lead to various further questions.

We prove that the minimal Logic of Formal Inconsistency $\mathsf{QmbC}$ validates a weaker version of Fraïssé’s theorem. LFIs are paraconsistent logics that relativize the Principle of Explosion only to consistent formulas. Now, despite the recent interest in LFIs, their model-theoretic properties are still not fully understood. Our aim in this paper is to investigate the situation. Our interest in FT has to do with its fruitfulness; the preservation of FT indicates that a number of other classical semantic properties can be (...) also salvaged in LFIs. Further, given that FT depends on truth-functionality, whether full FT holds for $\mathsf{QmbC}$ becomes a challenging question. (shrink)

We propose a criterion to regard a property of a theory (in first or second order logic) as virtuous: the property must have significant mathematical consequences for the theory (or its models). We then rehearse results of Ajtai, Marek, Magidor, H. Friedman and Solovay to argue that for second order logic, ‘categoricity’ has little virtue. For first order logic, categoricity is trivial; but ‘categoricity in power’ has enormous structural consequences for any of the theories satisfying it. The stability hierarchy extends (...) this virtue to other complete theories. The interaction of model theory and traditional mathematics is examined by considering the views of such as Bourbaki, Hrushovski, Kazhdan, and Shelah to flesh out the argument that the main impact of formal methods on mathematics is using formal definability to obtain results in ‘mainstream’ mathematics. Moreover, these methods (e.g., the stability hierarchy) provide an organization for much mathematics which gives specific content to dreams of Bourbaki about the architecture of mathematics. (shrink)

An external characterization of the inductive sets on countable abstract structures is presented. The main result is an abstract version of the classical Suslin-Kleene characterization of the hyperarithmetical sets.

We characterize the bimodal provability logics for certain natural (classes of) pairs of recursively enumerable theories, mostly related to fragments of arithmetic. For example, we shall give axiomatizations, decision procedures, and introduce natural Kripke semantics for the provability logics of (IΔ 0 + EXP, PRA); (PRA, IΣ 1 ); (IΣ m , IΣ n ) for $1 \leq m etc. For the case of finitely axiomatized extensions of theories these results are extended to modal logics with propositional constants.

This paper is a continuation of [27], where we provide the background and the basic tools for studying the structural properties of classes of models over languages without equality. In the context of such languages, it is natural to make distinction between two kinds of classes, the so-called abstract classes, which correspond to those closed under isomorphic copies in the presence of equality, and the reduced classes, i.e., those obtained by factoring structures by their largest congruences. The generic problem described (...) in [27] is to investigate under what conditions this reduction process does not alter the metatheory of a class. Here we focus our attention on a concrete aspect of this generic problem that we import from universal algebra, namely the existence and description of free models. As in [27], we can find here again the basic notion of protoalgebraicity, which was originally introduced in [7] as the weakest condition to guarantee that the reduction process behaves reasonably well from an algebraic point of view. Our concern, however, takes us to handle a further notion, that of semialgebraicity, which corresponds to the notion of equivalential logic of [18]; semialgebraicity turns out to be the property which ensures that freeness is fully preserved by the reduction process. (shrink)

We present a framework that provides a logic for science by generalizing the notion of logical (Tarskian) consequence. This framework will introduce hierarchies of logical consequences, the first level of each of which is identified with deduction. We argue for identification of the second level of the hierarchies with inductive inference. The notion of induction presented here has some resonance with Popper's notion of scientific discovery by refutation. Our framework rests on the assumption of a restricted class of structures in (...) contrast to the permissibility of classical first-order logic. We make a distinction between deductive and inductive inference via the notions of compactness and weak compactness. Connections with the arithmetical hierarchy and formal learning theory are explored. For the latter, we argue against the identification of inductive inference with the notion of learnable in the limit. Several results highlighting desirable properties of these hierarchies of generalized logical consequence are also presented. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we present a generalisation of proof simulation procedures for Frege systems by Bonet and Buss to some logics for which the deduction theorem does not hold. In particular, we study the case of finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics. To this end, we provide proof systems and which augment Avron's Frege system HŁuk with nested and general versions of the disjunction elimination rule, respectively. For these systems, we provide upper bounds on speed-ups w.r.t. both the number of steps in proofs (...) and the length of proofs. We also consider Tamminga's natural deduction and Avron's hypersequent calculus GŁuk for 3-valued Łukasiewicz logic and generalise our results considering the disjunction elimination rule to all finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics. (shrink)

In this study, we prove the completeness and cut-elimination theorems for a first-order extension F4CC of Arieli, Avron, and Zamansky’s ideal paraconsistent four-valued logic known as 4CC. These theorems are proved using Schütte’s method, which can simultaneously prove completeness and cut-elimination.